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Abstract 
For almost three decades, Somalia has defied definition and expectation precisely because the 
country has lacked an effective, centralized state apparatus. As a result, the term ‘failed state’ is 
often applied to Somalia in popular discourse and by scholars. For a state to formally function as 
such, a few conditions must be met including the state’s ability to unquestionably legitimatize its 
authority over its territory, its residents pledging allegiance to that state, and explicit recognition 
by other states. Despite the perceived chaos and violence associated with the country, there is 
evidence of structures that allow for markets to function and social services to be delivered. The 
Somali diaspora is one factor in supporting Somalia’s economic and social system, as remittances 
pay for children’s education, social services and provide investment funds for businesses. 
Moreover, Somalia has been able to foster a vibrant Information Communications Technologies 
(ICTs) sector, comparable to that of its more stable and wealthier East African neighbours. 
Therefore, the objective of this Information Systems thesis is to examine how Information 
Communication Technologies are utilized within communities that are considered failed (or 
failing) and lack defined, and legitimate state apparatus. The guiding research question for this 
thesis is: What role does Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and the diaspora 
play in the creation of a `stable` Somalia? 
 To address the research question, in addition to providing Somalia’s historical context, 
three interrelated empirical studies were designed. The first study utilizes both qualitative and 
quantitative content analysis approaches to extend our understanding of how Somalia is defined in 
Western media. This included determining when the failed state term became synonymous with 
Somalia. The study, additionally, applies the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis to explore 
how Somalia and Somalis are perceived and portrayed in Western news sources. The study 
confirmed that Western media narratives about the country are negative in tone, violent in the 
description and have reinforced negative stereotypes regarding Somalia and its people. 
The second study explores the existing social structures in Somalia, utilizing Anthony 
Giddens’s Structuration Theory. More specifically, the study examines the banking and credit 
system used by Somalis, how the education and justice systems are delivered along with other 
necessary social services accessed by residents within the country. Through in-country key 
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informant interviews from various sectors and industries, the study aimed to discover how visible 
and invisible institutions that are central to the delivery of social and economic services in Somalia 
are mediated by ICTs. This study found evidence of functioning social structures, despite the failed 
state label applied to Somalia.  
The third study aimed, through surveys and key informant interviews, to better understand 
the role played by the diaspora in Somalia’s economic and social system. This study explores the 
institution behind the Hawala system and how it is enabled by technology. By examining how the 
remittance system works and the methods Somalis employ including recent innovations such as 
mobile banking, this study also establishes the role of Information Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) in the Somali money transfer sector. 
In the concluding chapter, the contributions to both the Information Systems field and our 
collective understanding of Somalia are discussed. Drawing on the evidence from the three studies, 
this chapter makes four main claims. The first claim of this study is that ICTs act as a binding 
agent of social structures within Somalia as defined by a social theory framework. I am thus 
demonstrating why Somali social institutions function in the absence of a robust administrative 
state. The second claim argues that the diaspora are essential agents in stabilizing Somali social 
and economic institutions by offering financial aid, investments and knowledge transfer. The third 
claim suggests that the perceptions of Somalia and its people have been negatively influenced by 
Western news media. Finally, I argue that definitions of a failed state are narrow, Western-centric 
and do not necessarily apply to Somalia. 
 
 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis v 
Publications 
Part of the research has been published, and comments from the academic community shaped some 
of the ideas in the thesis. The list of published articles and conference presentations is as follows: 
 
Elmi, M., Ngwenyama. O., “What role does technology mobile money and the diaspora play in 
the Somali remittance system?” Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing 
Countries, Special Issue Title: Digital development for a progressive networked-society” (Revise 
& Resubmit) 
 
Elmi, M., Ngwenyama. O., (2019) “The Role of Mobile Money in Somalia’s Remittance 
System” In International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction (pp. 119-136).. 
Elmi, M., (2017). “Big Leap: Mobile Banking and Remittances in Somalia’s Development,” The 
Canadian Association for the Study of International Development Annual Conference, Toronto, 
ON, May 31-June. 
 
Elmi, M., (2017), “Characteristics and Definitions of Somalia as a Failed State: A Critical 
Discourse Analysis of Western Media.” Canadian Communication Association Conference, 
Calgary, Canada. May 31-June 2. 
 
Cukier, W., Gagnon, S., Roach, E., Elmi, M., Yap, M, & Rodrigues, S., (2017) "Trade-offs and 
disappearing acts: Shifting societal discourses of diversity in Canada over three decades," 
International Journal of Human Resource Management¸28 (7), 1031-1064. 
 
Cukier, W., Jackson, S., Elmi, M., & Roach, E., (2016). “The Representation of Women in 
Senior Leadership Positions and the Media: A Multi-disciplinary Approach,” Gender in 
Management: An International Journal, 31(5/6). 
 
Elmi, M., (2016), “The Development implications of Technology in Somalia,” The Canadian 
Association for the Study of International Development Annual Conference, Calgary, Canada, 
June 1-3. 
 
Elmi, M., (2016), “A Path to Development? The Information and Communication Technologies 
sector in Somalia.” Canadian Communication Association Conference, Calgary, Canada. May 
28-31. 
 
Elmi, M., (2015), “Information and Communication Technologies and the Stabilization of a 
Failed State: the case of Somalia,” 2015 Geopolitical Economy Research Group Inaugural 
Conference, Winnipeg, Canada, September 25-27. 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis vi 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii 
Publications ..................................................................................................................................... v 
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... vi 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. xi 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... xii 
List of Appendices ....................................................................................................................... xiii 
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ xv 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Statement .......................................................................... 1 
1.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Context and rationale ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.3. Research Question ............................................................................................................... 6 
1.4. Research Problem and Objectives ....................................................................................... 7 
1.5. Nomological Net ................................................................................................................ 14 
1.6. Structure of the thesis......................................................................................................... 17 
Chapter 2: The Historical Context .............................................................................................. 20 
2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 20 
2.2. The Somali – a nation of clans? ......................................................................................... 21 
2.3. The colonial era.................................................................................................................. 25 
2.4. The quest for an independent Somali state ........................................................................ 28 
2.5. The first decade of independence ...................................................................................... 31 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis vii 
2.6. The rise of a dictatorship.................................................................................................... 35 
Chapter 3: Characteristics and Definitions of Somalia as a Failed State: A Critical Discourse 
Analysis of Western Media ........................................................................................................... 41 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 41 
3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 41 
3.2. Background and Context.................................................................................................... 43 
3.3. Literature review ................................................................................................................ 44 
3.4. Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 49 
3.4.1 Data Collection ............................................................................................................ 49 
3.4.2 The Data ....................................................................................................................... 51 
3.5. Empirical Results ............................................................................................................... 53 
3.5.1 Overview of Trends ..................................................................................................... 53 
3.5.2 Sentiment Analysis ...................................................................................................... 54 
3.5.3 Leximancer Content Analysis ...................................................................................... 59 
3.5.4 Atlas/Ti Coding and Analysis ...................................................................................... 62 
3.6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 74 
3.6.1 Limitations and contributions ...................................................................................... 77 
Chapter 4: Study 2: Institutional and organizational structures within Somalia that support 
economic and social activity: Evidence from Somaliland ............................................................ 78 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 78 
4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 78 
4.2. Background and Context.................................................................................................... 82 
4.3. Literature Review............................................................................................................... 84 
4.3.1 Agency ......................................................................................................................... 84 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis viii 
4.3.2 Structure ....................................................................................................................... 85 
4.3.3 State and Society .......................................................................................................... 86 
4.3.4 Modernity ..................................................................................................................... 89 
4.4. Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 90 
4.4.1 Research Approach ...................................................................................................... 90 
4.4.2 Researcher’s Background and Assumptions ................................................................ 92 
4.4.3 Site Selection ............................................................................................................... 92 
4.4.4 Participant Selection .................................................................................................... 93 
4.4.5 Recruitment Procedure................................................................................................. 93 
4.4.6 Interview Settings ........................................................................................................ 94 
4.4.7 Semi-Structured Interviews ......................................................................................... 94 
4.4.8 Note-taking Experience ............................................................................................... 95 
4.4.9 The Data ....................................................................................................................... 95 
4.4.10 Coding Procedure....................................................................................................... 97 
4.5. Empirical Results ............................................................................................................... 98 
4.5.1 Economy ...................................................................................................................... 98 
4.5.2 Financial Sector ......................................................................................................... 102 
4.5.3 Education and Justice Systems .................................................................................. 108 
4.5.4 Delivery of social Services ........................................................................................ 114 
4.6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 116 
4.6.1 Summary of the Findings ........................................................................................... 116 
4.6.2 Research Contribution ............................................................................................... 119 
4.6.3 Limitations and Challenges........................................................................................ 119 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis ix 
Chapter 5: Study 3: The roles of technology in economic and social systems of Somalia: A case 
of remittance by Somalis in the Diaspora. .................................................................................. 120 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................... 120 
5.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 120 
5.2. Context ............................................................................................................................. 122 
5.2.1 Hawala ....................................................................................................................... 122 
5.2.2 Somali population in Canada ..................................................................................... 128 
5.2.3 Somali population in the GTA ................................................................................... 131 
5.2.4 Hawala in the GTA .................................................................................................... 132 
5.3. Methodology .................................................................................................................... 133 
5.3.1 Research Approach .................................................................................................... 134 
5.3.2 Survey Design ............................................................................................................ 136 
5.3.3 Participant Selection .................................................................................................. 137 
5.3.4 The Data ..................................................................................................................... 137 
5.4. Findings............................................................................................................................ 138 
5.4.1 Participant demographics ........................................................................................... 138 
5.4.2 Reasons for sending ................................................................................................... 142 
5.4.3 Online/Mobile MTOs................................................................................................. 143 
5.4.4 Communication .......................................................................................................... 143 
5.5. Theoretical elaboration .................................................................................................... 144 
5.5.1 Social Ties .................................................................................................................. 145 
5.5.2 Altruism theory .......................................................................................................... 147 
5.5.3 Mobile Money ............................................................................................................ 150 
5.5.4 Security ...................................................................................................................... 153 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis x 
5.6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 157 
5.6.1 Limitations and contributions .................................................................................... 160 
Chapter 6: Conclusion: Theoretical elaboration, theoretical contribution, study limitations and 
areas for future research .............................................................................................................. 161 
6.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 161 
6.2. Theoretical elaboration .................................................................................................... 163 
6.3. Claim 1: Evidence of social systems and how ICTs stabilize institutions within Somalia
................................................................................................................................................. 166 
6.3.1 Economy .................................................................................................................... 166 
6.3.2 Governance ................................................................................................................ 169 
6.3.3 Dispute resolution ...................................................................................................... 172 
6.3.4 Social conditioning .................................................................................................... 174 
6.4. Claim 2: The diaspora as stabilizing actors ..................................................................... 176 
6.5. Claim 3: The news media frames Somalia negatively ..................................................... 180 
6.6. Claim 4: The Somali state is a recent phenomena and Western invention ...................... 182 
6.7. Theoretical contribution ................................................................................................... 186 
6.8. Limitations of this research .............................................................................................. 188 
6.9. Areas of future research ................................................................................................... 189 
Appendices .................................................................................................................................. 192 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 233 
 
 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis xi 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1: Select human development indicators ........................................................................... 4 
Table 1.2: ICT Penetration in Somalia ......................................................................................... 12 
Table 1.3: Summary of thesis structure ........................................................................................ 17 
Table 3.1: Validity Claims and Speech Dimension (adapted from Cukier et al., 2003 and Cukier et 
al., 2009). ................................................................................................................... 49 
Table 3.2: The news sources, number of articles, average word count and first date and last date 
for each source ........................................................................................................... 52 
Table 3.3: Sentiment analysis of taxonomy of all news headlines ............................................... 57 
Table 3.4: Sentiment analysis of concepts in all news headlines ................................................. 58 
Table 3.5: Sentiment analysis score of all news headlines ........................................................... 58 
Table 3.6: Sentiment analysis targeted keywords in all news headlines ...................................... 59 
Table 3.7: Five major themes and five concepts references across all news sources ................... 61 
Table 3.8: Atlas/Ti concepts in four code families ....................................................................... 64 
Table 5.1: The number of firms, fees and foreign exchange margin and the total cost to remit to 
Somalia..................................................................................................................... 127 
Table 5.2: Name of Somali MTO, number of locations, headquarters  and estimated amounted 
remitted .................................................................................................................... 133 
Table 5.3: Survey participants gender, age, income, and employment status (frequency and 
percent)..................................................................................................................... 138 
Table 5.4: Average mounts remitted in 2017.............................................................................. 139 
Table 5.5: Somali MTOs most frequently used to send money .................................................. 140 
Table 5.6: Confirmation methods of funds received .................................................................. 142 
Table 5.7: Main reason for sending money ................................................................................ 142 
Table 5.8: Mobile money services utilized by Somali Remitters ............................................... 143 
Table 5.9: Communication technologies used by GTA Somalis to communicate with people in 
Somalia..................................................................................................................... 144 
Table 5.10: Information required and provided by Somali MTO to send money. ..................... 156 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis xii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Comparison of life expectancy with Somalia's neighbours (1980 - 2016) .................. 3 
Figure 1.2: Nomological Net of the study .................................................................................... 16 
Figure 3.1: Methodological approach for Study 1 ........................................................................ 51 
Figure 3.2: News sources by number of articles over time........................................................... 54 
Figure 3.3: Sentiment analysis entities tree-map of all headlines ................................................. 56 
Figure 3.4: Sentiment analysis keywords tree-map of all headlines ............................................. 57 
Figure 3.5: Leximancer concept map of all news sources ............................................................ 62 
Figure 3.6: The link network map of causes and components of a failed state ............................ 65 
Figure 3.7: Atlas/Ti concepts tree-map in four code families across all news sources ................ 66 
Figure 4.1: Giddens' Duality of Structure (1986) ......................................................................... 86 
Figure 4.2: Giddens' Types of Society (1981) and Craib (2011) .................................................. 88 
Figure 4.3: Atlas/Ti economy code and related codes ................................................................ 102 
Figure 4.4: Atlas/Ti financial sector code and related codes ...................................................... 108 
Figure 4.5: 2014 UNFP Population Estimation Survey: Population by age group .................... 109 
Figure 4.6: Atlas/Ti education, Justice and Social service sectors code and related codes ........ 113 
Figure 5.1: The Hawala model.................................................................................................... 125 
Figure 5.2: Average cost to send money to Somalia by quarter and year (2011 – 2018) ........... 128 
Figure 5.3: Number of Somali refugees (1974 - 2016) ............................................................... 129 
Figure 5.4: Somali refugees in Canada by year and total numbers of arrival ............................. 130 
Figure 5.5: Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................ 145 
Figure 5.6: Classification Tree of Amount sent and Communication frequency ....................... 147 
Figure 5.7: Classification Tree of Amount sent and Communication frequency ....................... 157 
Figure 6.1: Overview of research results .................................................................................... 163 
Figure 6.2: Influence of ICTs in Somalia’s social systems ........................................................ 166 
Figure 6.3: Explanatory model ................................................................................................... 180 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis xiii 
List of Appendices 
Appendix 1: Map of Somalia, Sections, States and Population .................................................. 192 
Appendix 2: Somali clans and major sub-clans .......................................................................... 193 
Appendix 3: Sentiment entities analysis - type, relevance, sentiment score and count in news 
headlines................................................................................................................... 194 
Appendix 4: Sentiment keyword analysis - relevance, sentiment type, and score in news headlines
 .................................................................................................................................. 195 
Appendix 5: Targeted keyword analysis – Type, relevance, sentiment type, and score in news 
headlines................................................................................................................... 196 
Appendix 6: Top five Leximancer themes and their connectivity in percentage across 14 news 
sources ...................................................................................................................... 198 
Appendix 7: All Leximancer themes and their connectivity in percentage as well all concepts and 
number of hits across 14 news sources .................................................................... 199 
Appendix 8: Leximancer name-like concepts, count and their relevancy across all news sources
 .................................................................................................................................. 200 
Appendix 9: Leximancer word-like concepts, count, and relevance across all news sources .... 201 
Appendix 10: Atlas/Ti codes grouped by four news code families ............................................ 202 
Appendix 11: Atlas/Ti coding matrix code co-occurrence and ratio from all news sources ...... 204 
Appendix 12: Major regions, populations and GDP within Somalia ......................................... 205 
Appendix 13: Questionnaire and Narrative Report .................................................................... 205 
Appendix 14: Interview participant demographics ..................................................................... 208 
Appendix 15: Atlas/Ti codes grouped by nine code families ..................................................... 209 
Appendix 16: Total Somali refugees around the world since 1987 ............................................ 210 
Appendix 17: Number of Somali migrants by category and applicant type (1980 – 2016) ....... 211 
Appendix 18: Survey and Questionnaire .................................................................................... 212 
Appendix 19: Length of time sending money............................................................................. 220 
Appendix 20: Length of time sending money by age range ....................................................... 220 
Appendix 21: Reasons for sending money (select all that apply) ............................................... 220 
Appendix 22: Somali MTOs used by remitters .......................................................................... 221 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis xiv 
Appendix 23: Chi-Square tests for amounts sent and income levels (2X2 Tables) .................... 221 
Appendix 24: Communication frequency and amounts sent ...................................................... 224 
Appendix 25: Chi-Square tests for amounts sent and age ranges, gender, and employment status
 .................................................................................................................................. 225 
Appendix 26: Chi-Square tests for communication frequency, length and amounts sent .......... 227 
Appendix 27: Zaad Mobile Money Registration form ............................................................... 229 
Appendix 28: Chi-Square tests for online/mobile money, amounts sent and length of sending 
money ....................................................................................................................... 230 
 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis xv 
Abbreviations 
CDA  Critical Discourse Analysis 
DOI  Diffusion of Innovation Theory 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FG   Federal Government 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
ICT   Information Communication Technologies 
ICT4D  Information Communication Technologies for Development 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IS  Information Systems 
IT  Information Technology 
MTO   Money Transfer Organizations 
SNM   Somali National Movement 
SSRP   Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party 
SYL   Somali Youth League 
SAPs   Structural Adjustment Programs 
SRC   Supreme Revolutionary Council 
TCA  Theory of Communicative Action 
UAE   United Arab Emirates 
UN   United Nations 
USD  United States Dollar 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 1:  1 
Chapter 1:  Introduction and Research Statement 
1.1. Introduction 
Somalia is an enigma in the international state system. From the outside, we often hear that the 
country has been embroiled in a civil war with no effective, functional state apparatus for almost 
thirty years. We read that Somalia is currently divided between differing traditional factions, an 
internationally backed Federal Government (FG), militants inspired by trans-national ideology, 
and secessionist regions of Puntland and Somaliland. The FG, which is considered weak and 
ineffectual, controls only a fraction of the entire country (Hesse, 2010). As a result, the term ‘failed 
state’ is often applied to Somalia (Cliffe, 1999; Haldén, 2008; Hills, 2014; International Crisis 
Group, 2002, 2008; The Fund for Peace, 2014). For a state to formally function, the ability to 
legitimatize its authority over a territory should be unquestioned, with its citizens pledging 
allegiance to that state, and explicit recognition by other states (Hall & Ikenberry, 1989; Held, 
1989; Melossi, 1990; Oppenheimer, 2007).  However, these explanations of Somalia often lack in-
depth analysis of social systems apparent within the country. Moreover, the enabling role of 
Information Communication Technologies in Somali society rarely link them to the same social 
systems.  
1.2. Context and rationale 
The popular perception that Somalia is failed is linked to 1991 when President Siad Barre was 
ousted from office amid a civil war and since Somalia has been without a functioning state 
apparatus (Menkhaus, 2011). Ever since, the country has been mired in economic and social 
stagnation, in part due to the lack of a centralized government with control over the recognized 
territory of the country (Byrne, 2013). After the collapse of the state, several individuals, 
organizations and international actors have attempted to assert their control with little success 
(United States Government Accountability Office, 2008). In the immediate aftermath of the 
Barre’s exile, Ali Mahdi Mohamed declared himself president; however, A.M. Mohamed was not 
recognized by the different fighting factions (Clark, 1992). At the same time, several clans in 
northern Somalia declared independence from Somalia and created a new state called Somaliland 
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based on the former British colonial boundary (Bradbury, 2008). After initially attempting to 
broker a peace deal between A.M. Mohamed and General Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aidid, leader 
of the largest rebel group - United Somali Congress, international actors through the United 
Nations inserted themselves in the conflict. In 1992, after a negotiated settlement failed, the UN 
decided to send a peace keeping mission to Somalia due to a deteriorating humanitarian conditions 
in which an estimated 350,000 Somalis lost their lives (Clark, 1992). After one year, the UN 
peacekeeping mission in the country ended. Consequently, the UN and much of the international 
community reduced their active participation in the country. Nevertheless the UN Secretary 
General took an indirect role as mediator between contesting local power groups by setting up the 
United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) in 1995 (United Nations, 1995). 
Over this period, Somalia’s social development indicators became some of the lowest in 
the world, attributed to the fact that parts of the country were still experiencing civil war conditions 
along with an insurgency inspired by transnational ideology – Islamism of Al Qaida and the 
Islamic State (Lindley, 2010b; Lindley & Haslie, 2011; Shay, 2017). The armed conflict that began 
in the 1980s and continues to this day in some parts of the country has resulted in a large 
displacement of people. Between 2006 and 2012, the displacement of people was exacerbated by 
increased conflict as different factions re-ignited their fight for territorial control, leading to a 
widespread famine in 2011 (C. Robinson, Zimmerman, & Checchi, 2014). Consequently, in 2017 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that the country had 2.6 
million Internally Displaced Persons1 (IDP) and another 821,169 refugees2 outside the country of 
out an estimated total population of 14 million (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
2017). 
Furthermore, human development indicators show that poverty afflicts the country , with 
61% percent of the urban population poor, and 80% of the rural population living under poverty, 
                                                 
1 According to UNHCR (2017): “Persons who are displaced within their country and to whom UNHCR extends 
protection and assistance. It also includes people in IDP-like situations. This category is descriptive in nature and 
includes groups of persons who are inside their country of nationality or habitual residence and who face protection 
risks similar to those of IDPs but who, for practical or other reasons, could not be reported as such.”(United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017) 
2 According to UNHCR (2017): “Persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol, the 
1969 OAU Convention, in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, persons granted a complementary form of protection 
and those granted temporary protection. It also includes persons in a refugee-like situation for whom refugee status 
has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.” 
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for an overall poverty rate of 80% (UNDP, 2010, 2012, 2015). In the last UNDP/World Bank 
Socio-economic survey conducted in the country, people living under extreme poverty, (living 
with less than a dollar a day) are estimated to be 43.2% of the population (UNDP & World Bank, 
2003). Accordingly, the UNDP estimates that half the population is in urgent need of aid and 
require some form of international assistance (OCHA, 2012). The country’s per capita Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) is one of the lowest in the world at $128 US dollars, having dropped 
significantly from a high of $284 in 2008 (United Nations, 2017). A variety of factors contributed 
to this  drop, including a famine in 2011 and a spike in the civil conflict (UNDP, 2012). As a result,  
Somalia’s life expectancy in 2016 was 56.29 (United Nations, 2015) much lower than its African 
neighbours (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1: Comparison of life expectancy with Somalia's neighbours (1980 - 2016) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
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One of the factors hampering Somalia’s development has been the low levels of education and 
illiteracy affecting young people. Instability in the county has contributed to adult literacy rates 
estimated at 35.5% (UNDP, 2012). In 2012, 73% of Somalis were under the age of 30, according 
to a UNDP study and 42%, were between the ages of 14 and 29. Moreover, the education rates of 
these youth were abysmal. for example, only 42% of students attended primary education, and of 
those, only 36% were girls. Moreover, UNICEF estimated that only 38% of students that started 
grade 1 were still enrolled in grade 5 (UNICEF, 2013, 2016). While 0.5% of students made it to 
the tertiary education level, some 51,471 students across the 44 higher education institutions based 
throughout the country (The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2013). As a result, 21% of youth 
are neither enrolled in school or are unemployed. See Table 1.1 for a list of selected human 
development indicators. 
 
Table 1.1: Select human development indicators 
Indicators  Year Data 
Demographics Total Population (millions) 2017 14.7 
Urban share of the population (percentage of total) 2017 44.4 
Total fertility rate (births per woman) 2013 6.6 
Economic 
status 
Population living below $1.00 a day (%) 2002 43.2 
Population living below $2.00 a day (%) 2002 73.4 
Gross Domestic Product (PPP, US$) 2012 128.1 
Per Capita GNI (US$) 2012 122.9 
Employed (% of 15-64 Years) 2012 45.7 
Health Life expectancy at birth (years) 2012 54.7 
Under-five mortality rate 2012 147/1,000 
Population with sustainable access to an improved 
drinking water source (%) 
2011 29.5 
Maternal mortality ratio 2010 1,000/10,000 
Infant mortality rate 2012 91/1,000 
Education Literacy rates (% of 6 years and above) 2012 35.5 
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Expected Years of Schooling (years) 2010 1.8 
Mean Years of Schooling (years) 2010 4.8 
Other indices Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) 2014 1,133,000 
Refugees 2014 1,080,788 
Data source: (UNDP, 2014; WHO, 2015; World Bank, 2015; UN Data, 2015) 
Due Somalia’s economic and social stagnation, the country is very dependent on remittances from 
abroad to supplement any income they generated domestically. Remittance services play an 
essential role throughout the global economy. The World Bank estimates that over $325 billion is 
transferred worldwide every year, with $40 billion remitted from developed countries to Africa 
(Mohapatra & Ratha, 2011). Consequently, international agencies such as the United Nations, the 
African Development Bank and other international NGOs have postulated that the billions from 
remittances can be harnessed to help developing countries such as Somalia economically and 
socially progress.  
The large Somali diaspora community (conservatively estimated at 1 million) contributes 
more than $1.3 billion in remittances into the country every year (Hassan & Chalmers, 2008; IMF, 
2013). Somalis living in the United States alone remit around $215 million annually (Orozco & 
Yansura, 2013). It has been estimated that, on average, residents in Somalia receive $3,000 per 
year (Orozco & Yansura, 2013, p. 10), which is a significant amount compared to the country’s 
per capita GDP of $499 (United Nations, 2017). Furthermore, in 2012 remittances directed towards 
the country outstrip Official Development Assistance ($101 million), Foreign Direct Investments 
($775.2 million) and exports ($515.8 million)(CIA, 2015; FSNAU, 2013). In Somalia, remittances 
play an outsize role in the economy, with the UNDP concluding: “Without this external support 
network, the economy would have imploded long ago”(UNDP, 2012, p. 25). This figure results in 
some households receiving up to 40% of their incomes from the funds transferred from abroad 
(AfDB, 2013). 
Somalia receives one of the largest transfers of remittances on a per capita basis in the 
world (UNDP, 2012). Slightly more women receive remittances than men do. Interestingly, Somali 
remittances are 100% sent through other services than the large multinational money transfer 
agencies such as Money Gram or Western Union. Moreover, these money transfer agencies tend 
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to be self-owned retail operations. The unique system that developed by Somalis to send and 
receive money has been the result of a lack of standardized financial institutions linked to the 
international financial system. More specifically, a system built on trust has developed to become 
one of the most efficient systems to transfer money. Although Dahabshiil, one of the largest Money 
Transfer Operator (MTOs) is family-owned, most MTOs are independently owned by a group of 
shareholders (Orozco & Yansura, 2013). This system is based on an intricate communication 
method beginning with a physical-delivery method that emerged even before the period in which 
the country was at war. It evolved as Somali community spread globally and built social networks 
across international boundaries. The money transfer system also embraced technology, particularly 
telephone communications, to deliver the remittances. Since its relatively recent implementation, 
mobile banking has allowed for an almost instant delivery of transfer monies to the recipient 
around the country. 
However, the data and the information presented about Somalia appears to lack historical 
context and the current reality within the country. Most of the prescriptions for what ails the 
country is to create conditions that foster, a state-centric approach similar to Western countries. 
Consequently, what the Somali people are witnessing presently is often not connected to what 
happened in Somalia prior to 1991. Somalia's history and its people complex. One thing that is 
common throughout Somalia's history is that it has had no singular government in control of all its 
people and territory. What we know now about Somalia is linked to relatively new, Western-
defined view of what a state, should look like and the type of relationship people should have with 
the state. Utilizing an inductive approach, this thesis wants to go beyond these widely shared 
explanations of Somalia and offer insight into Somalia and its people. Moreover, this study wants 
to offer an analysis that can help explain this disconnect. Moreover, I want to bring out the role 
that ICTs play in fostering a different kind of relationship between what we view as state.  
1.3. Research Question 
Over the last three decades, the Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) sector has 
become a potent force in how the global community functions (Gurstein, 1999; Heeks, 2010; 
Webster, 2014). Over this same period, advancements within the ICTs sector have transformed 
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how people communicate (Leu, Kinzer, Coiro, & Cammack, 2004; Schreyer, 2000), how the world 
conducts commerce (Chareonwongsak, 2002; Wigand, 1997) and how people are educated  (R. E. 
Anderson, 2003) to name  a few examples. Accordingly, ICTs are fully embedded in the economic 
and social structures of every corner of the world. Within developmental states, particularly in 
Africa, investment in the ICTs sector has been encouraged as a way to improve their economic 
and social standing (Unwin, 2009). ICT for development (ICT4D), for example, is offered as a 
guiding policy that could be implemented in a way to address economic stagnation and social ills 
in countries termed ‘developing’, ‘Third World’ and ‘least developed’, of which some are further 
labelled ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ (Doong & Ho, 2012; Sein & Harindranath, 2004; Thompson, 2004). 
However, within the Information Systems (IS) field and beyond, little attention has been paid to 
how ICTs function in spaces that lack a unified state structure that acts as intermediaries between 
and among various private entities including, for example, assisting in gain access to standardized 
technology. Consequently, the objective of this study is to examine how information and 
Communication Technologies are utilized within communities that lack defined, legitimate, failed 
(or failing) state apparatus. More specifically, this thesis examines the case of Somalia, a state 
fragmented politically and yet fosters a vibrant ICT sector that is comparable to its East African 
neighbours. The research question that will guide my study is: What role does Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) play towards stabilizing Somalia? 
i. How has Western, English-Speaking, mass media affected how Somalia is defined, 
perceived and discussed in the West and globally thereafter. 
ii. What institutional and organizational structures have allowed economic and social activity 
in Somalia under failed state conditions? 
iii. What role does information communications technology and the diaspora, through the 
remittance system, play in the economic and social ecosystem of Somalia? 
1.4. Research Problem and Objectives 
The landscape of literature surrounding Somalia requires further exploration. The first aspect of 
this Information Systems dissertation will be a closely examination of various perceptions about 
the country with Western media. This thesis will employ both qualitative and quantitative 
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methodological approaches to ascertain the role that ICTs play within the context of Somalia. 
Within the international relations subfield, concerns regarding the security and-terrorism nexus are 
often central to the discourse on Somalia. The country’s positioning in the international system 
has led to confusion and needs to be better defined. This thesis is heavily influenced by my personal 
history and background. As a person of Somali descent, I was often curious was as to why a 
particular narrative about Somalia is so pervasive. What I know of Somalia and the Somali people 
are often at odds with what the news says about the country and its people. I also grew up and 
received my education in the West, and I have been exposed to the stories about Somalia from 
afar. This contradiction has a fed curiosity to offer a better explanation of the country and its 
people.   
Thus, the first study of this dissertation examines how Somalia is portrayed, discussed, and 
examples of its perceived failings. More specifically, this dissertation will examine Western 
English-speaking news media. Additionally, this study will explore the available data, including 
that of the United Nations and its member agencies, to determine the economic and social context 
of this “failed” state. More specifically, this study will examine the day to day economic activities 
of the country’s 14 million people. Moreover, a careful examination of the data dealing with 
Information and Communication Technologies will be undertaken. This data analysis will  help 
identify how the country’s institutions function. Once that is accomplished, this study will then 
explore the issue of the diaspora and their connection to the country.   
Somalia is often described as a failed state in popular discourse, particularly in Western 
mass media (Haldén, 2008; B. G. Jones, 2008; Menkhaus, 2014). The country is often presented 
as the definition of state failure as Byrne (2013) observes: “when thinking of states that have 
‘failed’, it is most likely that Somalia will be first to spring into the mind” (p. 111). Furthermore, 
this discourse has resulted in the perception of Somalia being portrayed as a haven for pirates, 
which fosters terrorists and is generally ungovernable (International Crisis Group, 2002; Marchal, 
2007). Consequently, the first study of this thesis conducts a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
of how Western, English-Speaking, mass media has affected how Somalia is defined, perceived 
and discussed in the West and globally thereafter. The media play a vital role in defining and 
shaping reality in society (Adoni & Mane, 1984; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992). 
More specifically, mass media exerts its influence and power through the reproduction of 
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knowledge systems and assists in the exertion of influence in social relations and practices 
(Habermas, 2006). By understanding the discourse surrounding Somalia, this study aims to fulfil 
a gap in the research of how the media ideologically constructs perceptions of the country and its 
people. 
 Consequently, this study explores the discourse of how media organizations based in 
England, Canada and the United Kingdom discussed Somalia through Habermas’ concept of 
universal pragmatics, which creates a framework that showcases a ‘communicative action’ 
(Dahlberg, 2004; Habermas, 2002).  
Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action defines four main types of behaviour and 
social action that agents and actors utilize: instrumental, communicative, strategic and discursive 
(Kemmis & McTaggart, 2008; Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 1988; Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997). 
Communication acts, particularly those found within text or speech, underlie a set of claims mainly 
truth, sincerity, legitimacy and comprehensibility communication. This study aims to test the 
claims made in the media reports about Somalia. The purpose of the CDA analysis of the validity 
claims is to test for perceptions of Somalia, along with creating a revised definition of a failed 
state.  
The second study of this thesis explores evidence of institutions and societal structures in 
Somalia. Although the country is perceived as having few institutional structures, there is evidence 
of structures that allow markets to function and to deliver social services. This study will scan for 
evidence across sectors to explore evidence of these existing institutions. Institutions as a concept 
can be distilled as the rules of the game (Ostrom, 2007). More specifically, the rules of the game 
can be formal in the sense of the regulatory bodies, organizations and agencies or they can be 
informal rules based on norms and customs of a particular society, referenced in Habermasean 
terms as lifeworld (Campbell, 1998; Habermas, 1991). By examining evidence of how institutions 
such as the monetary system, social services systems, education system and justice system are 
delivered, this study will delve past superficial media perspectives of Somalia. Moreover, how the 
ICT sector enables these institutions and structures sector to deliver goods and services to Somalis 
will be explored. Notably, empirical evidence of this study will critically examine the role of ICT 
in all the areas of the economy. 
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The third and final study of this thesis scrutinizes the role of technology in economic and 
social systems of Somalia through an extensive analysis of the remittances sent by Somalis in the 
diaspora. More specifically, this study focuses on the communication and social networks utilized 
by Somalis currently living abroad in order to facilitate money transfers and foster social 
relationships through a unique system called Hawala. Somalia relies heavily on remittances to pay 
for children’s education, social services, and provides investment funds for small businesses. More 
specifically, it has been estimated that close to 40% of families in the country rely on the $1.3 
billion remittances per year (Gutale, 2015). Moreover, remittance, serve between 25% to 40% of 
the national economy in addition to serving as a financial cushion during humanitarian 
emergencies (Hassan & Chalmers, 2008). Accordingly, remittance companies account for a large 
segment of the financial sector in Somalia. Yet, the remittance system functions in spite of the lack 
of a financial system. How the Hawala system functions along with its role as the economic 
backbone of the country is little understood. Thus, the aim of the third empirical study is to better 
demonstrate the role played by the diaspora in Somalia’s economic and social systems through the 
use of Hawala. I do so by examining how the remittance system works. I also study the role of 
ICTs with a focus on how recent innovations such as mobile banking are employed in the Somali 
money transfer sector. 
An exploration of how the remittance system utilizes ICTs within Somalia is part of this 
final study. The ICT sector is one of the most productive sectors of the Somali economy, and it is 
also one of the largest segments of the county’s GDP per year (UNDP, 2012). Furthermore, the 
ICT sector has developed locally over the years serviced by local companies (Hesse, 2010). This 
growth can be witnessed in part due to the proliferation number of companies in the ICT sector as 
well as the relatively low cost associated with access to ICT services (Unwin, 2009). Thus, like 
much of the world, Somalis now have access to news, communication, services and more at the 
touch of a button. This leads to another question of this study: What role, if any, has the diaspora 
played in the advancement of the ICT sector in Somalia? 
In the past, communication networks required expensive land and undersea cable lines in 
addition to a vast network of physical infrastructure, which meant ICT was unaffordable for 
developing countries because of the high costs associated with implementing and sustaining such 
networks over large, rugged terrain. This lack of ICT infrastructure coupled with other issues such 
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as lack of paved roads, access to a stable supply of electricity or a highly educated and skilled 
workforce resulted in developing countries lagging technologically compared to developed 
countries (Aker & Mbiti, 2010). Accordingly, many developing countries, including those  in 
conflict and primarily African countries struggled to benefit from the economic and social benefits 
of ICT.  
However, over the last three decades, the move to wireless, mobile technology has enabled 
countries that lacked the expensive physical infrastructure to join in the ICT revolution (Etzo & 
Collender, 2010). The emergence of mobile technologies over these years has increased the 
number of low-cost technology resulting in a variety of ICT companies. Thus, more people in 
developing countries gained access to these technologies, particularly cellphones, increasing the 
possibilities to easily communicate and conduct commerce. The ICT revolution also brought with 
it innovations that were developed locally. The most cited example of this is M-Pesa in Kenya. M-
Pesa brought with it the ability to easily send and receive money through text messages and acquire 
physical cash from ubiquitous money agents throughout the country (Mbiti & Weil, 2011). 
In the case of Somalia, since the year 2000, the number of people with mobile phones has 
risen from 1% to roughly half of the population (46.7%) in 2017 (United Nations, 2017). More 
specifically, the number of people with cellphones was 648,200, but by 2013, that number had 
reached 6,653,040 million subscribers (World Bank, 2015b). In comparison, the number of 
telephones plateaued in 2004 at 1.2% (100,000) of the population having access to a landline 
telephone and has been steadily declining to 0.6% in 2013 (64,000). One of the factors increasing 
the populations connectivity has been the move towards mobile phones, particularly internet-
enabled smartphones. Another factor has been to the increased accessibility of mobile technologies 
is the reduction in cost of the physical handsets.  
The five largest companies that currently operate in the country are Telesom, Somtel, 
Hormuud Telecom, Golis and NationLink. Interestingly, Dahabshil, the largest money transfer 
organization in the country, was taken over the largest cellphone operators in Northern Somalia, 
Somtel Network. This was in part to manage the mobile money platform developed by Somtel 
though a variety of smaller operators are in operation. In June 2014, the Somali Ministry of Posts 
and Telecommunications blocked some carriers that did not have licenses (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2014). The World Bank has instituted a review of the 
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telecommunications sector to assist  the Somali federal government with better regulatations 
(World Bank, 2015). The review ensured that the three large telecom companies started paying the 
federal government 400,000 dollars per month instead of licensing fees. This means that the 
government will be earning $12 million in 2015 for the three companies.  
Somalia has witnessed a rise in internet users in part due to the increased number of 
internet-connected devices and the ubiquity of smartphones, which have integrated many functions 
into handheld devices. Internet users stand at 163,185 or 1.5% (0.6% are broadband users) of the 
population in 2014 (see Table 1.2). However, these figures only relate to users who have access to 
the internet through a connection at home, not taking into account mobile users (Hare, 2007). Even 
with landline connected internet users, the number grew by 12% in one year (United Nations, 
2017).  
Table 1.2: ICT Penetration in Somalia 
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers (2013)` 60,000 
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 people) (2016) 0.34 
Internet users (per 100 people) (2016) 1.88 
Mobile cellular subscriptions (2017) 6,653,040 
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) (2017) 46.7 
Secure Internet servers (2017) 378 
Secure Internet servers (per 1 million people) (2017) 25.64 
Telephone lines (2013) 64,000 
Telephone lines (per 100 people) (2013) 0.6 
Data source: (UN Data, 2017; ITU, 2018) 
Another example of the Somalis embrace of ICT has been the proliferation of websites that are 
about Somalia and originate from within the country (Abdisalam M Issa-Salwe, 2006). The 
number of Somali related websites have seen a marked increase over the last decade, matching the 
proliferation of mobile technologies. Moreover, the internet has become an important source of 
news and information for people living in the diaspora (Menkhaus, 2013). Abdisalam M. Issa-
Salwe and Olden (2008) have argued that the social nature of ICTs are conducive to Somalia 
because of the high importance placed on oral traditions. The internet has served to create and 
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facilitate a sense of identity online to a population that is spread around the globe. For example, 
the number of Somali youth who are members of social media site Facebook has increased steadily 
over the last few years. Specifically, Dhaha and Igale (2013) estimate that 51% of youth with 
access to smart phones are members of the social media website. 
The lack of regulation is cited as one of the main reasons why the country’s 
telecommunication industry has proliferated. One industry held up as an example of having 
blossomed without a regulatory framework under the state is the ICT sector, and some researchers 
point to this industry as having helped Somalia stabilize (Stremlau, 2012). The industry has utilized 
customary law of Xeer as well as religious law of sharia in place of a system implemented through 
government (Center for Global Communication Studies, 2014). The growth of the sector has been 
facilitated by the advancement of technology that can be easily set up and installed without the 
need for substantial investment infrastructure (Hesse, 2010). The ICT sector is also aided by the 
fact that the “tax” charged to them by the various factions has been relatively low compared to 
other parts of the economy because it is deemed a vital service (Hesse, 2010). However, the ICT 
sector faces with problems precisely because of the lack of centralized oversight. Examples include 
(1) the nonexistence of clear structure for assigning numbers, (2) some calls cannot connect with 
rival phone systems, and (3) service in rural areas is often spotty due to the companies 
concentrating within populated centres. However, the ICT sector is credited with providing the 
cheapest long distance calling rates in all of Africa. The sector provides a mechanism for the other 
parts of the economy to function. For example, the large Somali diaspora can easily and relatively 
quickly send money to family members still in Somalia (Yusuf, 2015).  
Somalia has created a vibrant telecommunication sector that has connected a large segment 
of the population. Through the three studies, the resulting thesis contributes to the Information 
Systems field by expanding knowledge of the intersection between society and technology. In the 
case of Somalia, state failure is divided into issues of either ‘political’ or ‘social’ disorder (Haldén, 
2008). Although the country has no centralized state structure, private entities and communities 
have created and fostered new ICT companies. The companies have invested a significantly 
smaller amount compared to the neighbouring countries to set-up their companies, and yet they 
are thriving. The advancement of cheaper technology that is easier to deploy has facilitated the 
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growth of the sector. For example, ‘cell-phone companies in a suitcase’ can be easily created to 
fill a need within a remote community.  
Regulation and red-tape have hampered the adoption of new technology in some of 
Somalia’s neighbouring countries. In Somalia, however, the lack of a state has been associated 
with reduced operating costs because ICT companies do not have to pay excessive taxes and fees. 
Considered a vital service, the ICT sector has benefitted from a relatively lower taxation rate 
compared to other parts of the economy. ICT could serve as a method to encourage peace in the 
fragile capital, it could assist serve a cost-effective way to educate youth, and it could boost an 
economy that does not absorb a large unemployed population. Understanding the contribution of 
ICTs through these three studies may serve as a powerful tool in understanding Somalia.   
Accordingly, this study explores the role of ICTs and the diaspora in the creation of a 
`stable` Somalia, employing a multi-method approach to ascertain the impact that the diaspora has 
on the ICT sector. This study started by collecting baseline data about the Somali population in 
Canada and the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Then, I created an inventory of the Hawala business 
gathered from secondary sources and online business listings along with the Somali remittance 
sector worldwide. Next, a survey was conducted of 143 Somalis who have remitted internationally 
in 2017. The survey was divided into four sections: inclusion criteria, reasons for remittances, the 
technology used and demographics. The survey technique is best suited when seeking out a larger 
number of participants in order to better explain the phenomena at hand (Fowler Jr, 2013). Finally, 
small–sample interviews were conducted with members of Somali Money Transfer Organizations 
(MTOs) in the GTA to understand the business climate. The aim of the interviews was to get 
specific inputs from people with direct knowledge about the remittance system more generally and 
technology utilized. 
1.5. Nomological Net 
The structure of this thesis is illustrated by the nomological net, which is designed to capture the 
main concepts and themes explored in this thesis (see Figure 1.2). The nomological net is defined 
as “the predicted pattern of relationships that would permit naming a construct” (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979, p. 70).  The nomological net is helpful in clarifying how different studies are 
connected, particularly in a thesis such as this where multiple studies and approaches are utilized. 
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The net is categorized into three sections to mirror the three major research areas explored in this 
thesis. The first study explores the definition of Somalia as a failed state through a Critical 
Discourse Analysis of perceptions of the country. In order to accomplish this, definitions of a failed 
state, and resulting international implications, are examined in Western news media discourse. The 
second study then examines the role of institutions in the country and explores evidence of internal 
social structures that allow for the delivery of economic and social services to the Somali public. 
More specifically, the banking and credit system of the country, the education and justice systems 
along with the provisions of social services that are available to residents within the country are 
studied. The third study explores the role of the diaspora in the remittance system, also called 
Hawala. Moreover, this study explores the institution behind the Hawala system and how it is 
enabled by technology. By examining how the remittance system works and the methods Somalis 
employ including recent innovations such as mobile banking, this study establishes the role of 
Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the Somali money transfer sector. Thus, 
drawing on the evidence from the three studies, the concluding chapter makes four main claims 
that contribute to our collective understanding of Somalia.   
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Figure 1.2: Nomological Net of the study 
 
 
Table 1.3 provides a summary of the research questions for each study, the title, the research 
approach utilized for study and finally, the research strategy applied for each study. 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 1:  17 
Table 1.3: Summary of thesis structure 
Study Research Questions Study title Research Method 
Research 
Strategy 
Study 1 1. How has Western, English-
Speaking, mass media affected 
how Somalia is defined, 
perceived and discussed in the 
West and globally thereafter? 
a. What are the characteristics 
of a failed state? 
b. What are the main causes of 
a failed state? 
Characteristics and 
Definitions of 
Somalia as a Failed 
State: A Critical 
Discourse Analysis 
of Western Media 
Critical 
Discourse 
Analysis 
Deductive 
Study 2 1. What institutional and 
organizational structures have 
allowed economic and social 
activity possible in Somalia 
under conditions of failure? 
a. How does the economy work 
in Somalia? 
b. How is education delivered, 
and how are individuals 
certified? 
c. What approach do these 
dispute resolution 
mechanisms gain and 
maintain their legitimacy? 
Institutional and 
organizational 
structures within 
Somalia that support 
economic and social 
activity: Evidence 
from Somaliland 
Interviews – 
Thematic 
Content 
Analysis 
Deductive 
 
Study 3 1. What role does information 
communication technology 
and the diaspora, through the 
remittance system, play in the 
economic and social 
ecosystem of Somalia? 
a. How does the remittance 
system work in Canada? 
b. What role, if any, has the 
diaspora played in the 
advancement of the ICT 
sector in Somalia? 
The roles of 
technology in 
economic and social 
systems of Somalia: 
A case of remittance 
by Somalis in the 
Diaspora. 
Survey, 
Small-sample 
Interviews 
Retroductive 
 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as indicated in the following section. 
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Chapter 2: The Historical Context - provides a historical overview of Somalia, including the 
social and familial linkages of the country. This chapter also provides a brief outline of the Somali 
people and debates about the Somali identity. Next, this chapter discusses the colonial era its 
impact on the country and its influence on the language about the Somali people. Finally, this 
chapter concludes by looking at what happened to the country since independence until the 
collapsed of the government in 1990. 
 
Chapter 3:  Study 1 - the first empirical study of this thesis examines the discourse surrounding 
Somalia. The data utilized for this chapter is 14 English speaking news sources based in the United 
States, Great Britain and Canada. Thus, the main research question that guides this study is: How 
has Western, English-Speaking, mass media affected how Somalia is defined, perceived and 
discussed in the West and globally thereafter. The chapter begins, with sentiment analysis of news 
article headlines to explore the type of language utilized in reference to Somalia. Then, , a content 
analysis of the corpus of the data using Leximancer, a Computer-Aided Content Analysis, to 
uncover the themes and concepts found within these stories. Finally, a mixed-method approach is 
utilized using the Atlas/Ti of coding a priori codes as well through new codes that emerged from 
a close reading of the news sources. This study employed Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of 
Communicative Action and utilized Critical Discourse Analysis to understand the characteristics 
of a failed state. 
 
Chapter 4: Study 2 - This second study reviews the existing social structures within Somalia, 
using Somaliland as a case study. This section explores how the Somali economy functions and 
how social services are delivered. This study is guided by the question, what institutional and 
organizational structures have allowed economic and social activity possible in Somalia under conditions 
of failure? Through in-country informant interviews from various sectors and industries, the visible 
and invisible institutions central to delivering social and economic services in Somalia is 
examined. This study explores how the Somali economy functions and how social services are 
delivered in the country. This study employs Anthony Giddens’ Structuration Theory as most 
appropriate to explain the situation in Somalia. The concepts that form and underlie the theory 
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such as power, agency and structure are important in understanding the institutions that bind the 
social practices within Somalia. 
 
Chapter 5: Study 3 - The final study of this thesis aims to better understand Somalia’s economic 
and social system through in-country interviews and surveys. The study tested three theories, 
Social Ties, Altruism, and Diffusion of Innovation to ascertain the role of the diaspora and ICTs 
in supporting people in Somalia through remittances. By examining how the remittance system 
works and by studying what methods Somalis employ including recent innovations such as mobile 
banking, the role of ICTs in the Somali money transfer sector is established. This study explores 
the institution behind the Hawala system and how it is enabled by technology. The main question 
guiding this study is  What role does technology and the diaspora, through the remittance system, 
play in this economic and social system of Somalia? 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion - This chapter summarises the empirical evidence of the thesis. Moreover, 
this chapter offers contributions to both the IS field and argues for new understanding of Somalia. 
Consequently, a theoretical elaboration employing social theory is utilized based on the previous 
three studies’ empirical evidence. It offers insights into the limitations of the thesis and offers some 
areas for future research. 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 2:  20 
Chapter 2:  The Historical Context 
2.1. Introduction 
In order to understand what Somalia is and who the Somali people are we have to understand their 
history. Moreover, we need to understand what social structures and the types of government that 
have existed before and after colonization. One aim of this thesis was to understand what explains 
modern day Somalia and Somali people, without this fundamental understanding some of the 
theories about how Somalia is a “failed” state is lacking. In light of this understanding, this second 
chapter aims to detail how Somalis utilize a dual mechanism to govern interpersonal relationships 
along with the inter-clan relationships. Moreover, I touch aim to upon some of the critiques that 
have emerged from our current understanding of the Somali people and the country they come to 
inhabit. What the clan structure is, and how it is intertwined with political system of the Somali 
people. I also examine other explanation about Somalia such as class, economic and even gender 
structures as better interpreters, rather than clans, of Somali society. The chapters discuss how the 
various European colonial systems affected the people in the Horn of Africa region. The British 
and the Italians laid claims to different parts of the region and over the decades they went about 
changing how resources and power were distributed. Finally, this chapter illustrates the response 
to colonialism and the Somali people’s fight for independence. This included the drive to unite the 
Somali regions that were separated by colonialism. 
Somalia is located on the eastern coast of Africa surrounded by the Red Sea, the Gulf of 
Aden and the Indian Ocean to its north and east and it is land-bordered by Djibouti, Ethiopia and 
Kenya (See Appendix 1). Like much of Africa, this modern boundary was shaped during the 
colonization period by European powers in the late nineteenth century (M. Harper, 2012; Prunier, 
2010). Prior to European colonization, the land was defined by an ever-changing, permeable 
territory with a variety of peoples and characteristics (H. S. Lewis, 1966). The origins of the Somali 
people cannot be directly linked to a singular movement or time period. The interactions of the 
Persian-Arabic contact with the Bantu people within the Somali peninsula is widely accepted as 
the origin of the Somali people (Kassim, 2006). Accordingly, the region was not a single, unified 
or cohesive grouping led by one or a few acknowledged leaders, but a rather inhomogeneous 
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grouping of people who occupied a mostly arid land (H. S. Lewis, 1966; Pankhurst & Cassanelli, 
1989). The country witnessed several forms of identities as well as norms of governance. Early 
records indicate cities and coastal regions came under the rule of distant sovereigns in far-off 
places like Egypt, Oman, and Zanzibar often with little direct rule (Djama, 2010).  
Over time, a more cohesive ethnic grouping of people, the Samaal and Saab, began to 
emerge with a significant population that shared a similar language (Somali), religion (Islam), and 
cultural system (Xeer) (Bradbury, 2008; Laitin, 1976). Due to their nomadic lifestyle, the Somali 
people spread out throughout the Horn region in search of grazing land and water for their animals 
(Laitin, 1976; I. M. Lewis, 1999). By the two largest rivers, a group of sedentary agriculturalists 
dominated in the southern part of the country. Its location on the coast and its proximity to the 
Arabian Peninsula greatly influenced its culture, while contact with inland peoples came to define 
a strong sense of identity (Pankhurst & Cassanelli, 1989). The Somali people then could be 
described as being a ‘nation’ with the necessary political and social constructs that entails being 
labelled as such (Abdi, 1998). Notably, during this early period, Somalis did not have a clearly 
defined ‘state’ in the European ‘Westphalia’ model3. This has led some scholars to label, Somalia 
as “a nation in search of a state” (Laitin & Samatar, 1987; Little, 2003; Makinda, 1991, p. 112). 
2.2. The Somali – a nation of clans? 
The positioning of Somalia linked it to the wider world, through trade with Arabs, Persians and 
later Europeans – particularly the Portuguese (Adam, 2010). Precisely due to this contact, the 
Somali culture, language and governance has evolved as it has come into contact with these 
different peoples and it spread from the coastal regions deeper into the interior of the African 
continent (M. Harper, 2012; Ahmed I. Samatar, 1988). The various cultures that met on the Horn 
of Africa contributed to the national myth of the uniqueness of Somali culture (Bradbury, 2008). 
None the less, Somalis strongly single out their attachment to Arabic and Islamic culture more 
strongly than others (I. M. Lewis, 1962). Somalis claim to be different from other Sub-Saharan 
cultures, as M. Harper (2012) noted: “the perception of a deep connection with the Arab world 
                                                 
3 Although this model has been criticized as largely ‘fiction’  (Eva, 1998, p. 33; Krasner, 2001); for the purposes of 
this paper, the Westphalia State Model refers to “a state-centric, sovereignty-oriented, territorially bounded global 
order” (Falk, 2002, p. 147) 
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explains why many Somalis see themselves as ‘other’ than sub-Saharan Africans”(45-46). Another 
factor employed to distinguish themselves from their neighbours is the religion of Islam (Laitin & 
Samatar, 1987). Thus, Somalis often trace their direct lineage to specific Muslim Sheikhs that 
came to settle within the territory (Laitin & Samatar, 1987; Ahmed I. Samatar, 1988). 
A unifying factor about Somalis is the common language shared almost unanimously by 
the population (A. A. Warsame, 2001). The Somali language can be traced to the ancient Egyptian 
era and is related to the Afro-Asiatic group of languages (Mukhtar, 2010; A. A. Warsame, 2001). 
Although the language has various dialects that are unique to particular parts of the region, it has 
been estimated that there are some 20 identifiable dialects (Mukhtar, 2010). The exact origins of 
the language is unknown; however, it can be linked to the trade route that the country occupies. 
For example,  some point to the Arabic terms that dominate business terms of Somali (Mukhtar, 
2010). Additionally, historical documents are dominated by the use of the Arabic language. This 
evidenced by the fact that most antiquities found or preserved within Somalia are written in Arabic 
script. However, the Somali language developed out of a mixture of the various languages that 
surround the Arabian Gulf and the Bantu languages of the African interior. As permanent seaports 
and larger settlements were established, the language became more entrenched. Over time, the 
Somali language became a point of pride within Somali culture as poets, poetry and the spoken 
word were celebrated (Laitin, 1976).  
Correspondingly, the claim for being different from other sub-African inhabitants has 
influenced how Somalis perceive each other as well. As cultures and people intermingled, a system 
of patrilineal kinship became entrenched. This developed into a multitude of clans and sub-clans, 
gradually becoming the primary system of governance (I. M. Lewis, 1962). The clan system is the 
main structure of the social organization, which defines the relationship between individuals, class 
and territories (Menkhaus, 2000). Furthermore, the system is a dominant and enduring form of 
identity and identification. For example, it is often noted that when Somalis meet each other for 
the first time, they introduce their family lineage as a point of reference (I. M. Lewis, 1999). The 
clan labels defined the relationship between Somalis either to unite or to divide, politically (Mah, 
1999). For instance, these divisions have led some to observe Somalis “a people divided by their 
sameness” (Washington, 2003, p. 9). The robust clan system has come to define the Somali people 
for good or bad.  
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The clan system is dominated by six major clans that are situated within two major 
ethnicities in the territory; the Somaale and Saab ethnic groups. More specifically, the four, mostly 
pastoral northern clans are Darood, Dir, Hawiye, and Isaq. The two main sedentary clans are the 
Digil and Rhanweyn located in the areas surrounding the two rivers in the south (M. Harper, 2012; 
Laitin & Samatar, 1987; I. M. Lewis, 1962). The clans have common historical linkages that have 
obvious connections with constantly changing territories and alliances that are often fluid (Ssereo, 
2003). These six major groupings contain within them numerous sub-clans and sub-sub clans 
(Cassanelli, 2010; I. M. Lewis, 1957). The basic unit contains between 500 - 1000 members that 
then trace their lineage to the larger grouping (Bruton, 2012). Although the exact numbers of clans 
are still unknown, the number has been estimated to be five hundred by one author (M. Harper, 
2012). For a list of clans and sub-clans, see Appendix 2. 
During pre-colonial times, the clan helped establish the rules and norms of people living in 
the Horn region (D. M. Anderson, 2012). The clan structure was, to a great degree, intertwined 
with the political system of Somalis (Ssereo, 2003). Furthermore, a framework under the clan 
system outlined societal roles, including dispute mechanisms and land management. More 
specifically, a dual mechanism outlined the roles of people, and the rer system managed intra-clan 
relationships while the Xeer governed the inter-clan negotiations (Doornbos & Markakis, 1994). 
Typically, the clan was governed by a council of elders that established negotiated alliances with 
lineage-affiliated clans, defined territories of claim. They could also define the terms of war and 
peace. Within the clan, a Sultan is often at the head of the leadership structure yet the “positions 
are tenuous and carry little defined authority beyond such personal influence as a particular 
incumbent is able to exercise” (I. M. Lewis, 1962). However, the decentralized manner of 
governance with all clan members of the participating in the political process led I. M. Lewis 
(1999) to label the Somali governance system as a “Pastoral Democracy.” Additionally, the leaders 
did not have defined constitutional laws or the courts that enforced them (I. M. Lewis, 1962). 
Alternatively, the political structure necessitated the rules be created in an ad-hoc manner and that 
all concerned community members can participate in the proceedings. In modern times, Somalia 
and Somalis have come to be defined anthropologically by the clan-lineage system.  
However, a vigorous debate surrounding the true role of clans has arisen, even the method 
by which to define a clan in the Somali context has itself come into question (Djama, 2010; Luling, 
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2006). Some have pointed to class, economic and even gender structures as better interpreters, 
rather than clans, of Somali society (Ahmed I. Samatar, 1988). The use of clans as the central 
paradigm to examine Somali society is viewed as too weak and too simplistic (Besteman, 1996). 
For example, although the clan theory has its merits, it “suggests to many people something 
irrational and mindless, generating motiveless hostilities” (Luling, 2006, p. 474). A determining 
factor, some critics note, is the quest for economic and political power is at the heart of 
manipulation of a clan system (Luling, 2006; Ssereo, 2003). As Abdi I. Samatar (1992) contends 
the appeal to clanism today was partly supported by the competition for state resources, which was 
directly perpetuated by various elite actors (Abdi I. Samatar, 1992). As Abdi Ismail Samatar (1992) 
argued, was due to “the leadership in the old tradition had no public resources that they could 
compete for and loot, and as such, the nature of the allocations made under that regime was 
qualitatively at variance with the current order. The moral force of the Xeer and the materially 
constraining conditions of the household economy were not operative” (Abdi I. Samatar, 1992, p. 
634). Simply put, the clan label does not apply in today’s global economic and state system. 
Furthermore, cultural hegemony was also employed, mainly, through the dominant 
influence perpetuated by the British anthropologist I.M. Lewis about Somalia. Critics point to 
Lewis’s conclusions that clan (and Kinship lineage) was often the overriding factor of how people 
interacted with each other both in pre-colonial and modern times (Djama, 2010; Abdi I. Samatar, 
1992). Lewis’s influential writings on the Somali has embedded terms into our understanding of 
the people, including terms such as ‘Pastoral Democracy,’ which have lasted the test of time 
(Besteman, 1996). Lewis’s writings have created a virtuous circle, Kapteijns (2004), posits 
“Lewisian paradigm with its overemphasis on clanship not only has a history of which it is unaware 
but, because of that history, has also contributed to the clan discourse that continues to dominate 
thinking about Somalia today”(p. 3). The methods utilized by Lewis have led to some of his 
conclusions about Somalia and the Somali people being questioned (Besteman, 1996, 1998; 
Kapteijns, 2004). For example, critics contend his myopic view of power structures observed by 
Lewis led him to conclude that Somalis excised participatory form of governance, with everyone 
having an equal voice (Kapteijns, 2004). Some point to historical examples of a monarchical style 
of government throughout parts of Somalia (Punkhurst & Cassanelli, 1989). Some have argued 
that clans in Somalia are more similar to tribes elsewhere (Djama, 2010). This is due to the same 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 2:  25 
characteristics that even though Somalis share a similar language culture and religion, the way the 
clan is constituted is more closely associated with tribes (Besteman, 1998). Tribes are often defined 
by a political structure. Yet another line of critique was articulated by Abdi I. Samatar (1992) is 
that colonialism is one factor often disregarded in the role it played in fostering clanism (or 
tribalism) in Somalia. 
2.3. The colonial era 
Somalia’s governance shifted between Italian and British colonial administrations requiring 
changes that created hierarchies and contributed to the divisions (Besteman, 1996; Kapteijns, 
1995). The region’s positioning on the Red Sea attracted the British to lay claim to the region, in 
order to protect a vital trading route to the British Colony of India. Importantly, it was designed to 
defend the more critical British naval station of Aden across the Gulf the Aden (Prunier, 2010). 
The area claimed by the British was marked by a harsh environment and did not offer a settler-
colonial setting like the other British possession of Kenya. Somalia’s geography is marked by, in 
the north, a dry climate that often goes through long dry spells has led to a situation in which 
nomadic a lifestyle is the norm. The search for water and pasture for the animals has defined 
Somali people in the north (M. Harper, 2012). In pre-colonial times, the social and economic 
structures had come to rely largely on the nomadic care of animals. Even in the South’s more 
arable region, especially in the region between the rivers in the south Somalis placed a higher 
emphasis on the nomadic way of living (I M. Lewis, 1955; Abdi I. Samatar, 1989).  
Early in their colonization, the British took a hands-off approach governing Somalia; 
nonetheless, they chose “clan” leaders that they assigned a governance role (Laitin & Samatar, 
1987). This necessitated the British and Italians to “stud[y] genealogical trees and classified clans 
in order to further their ‘divide and rule’ policies” (Luling, 2006, p. 482)4. The British instituted 
policies which classified members of clans to be Aryan while labelled others as African. 
Additionally, the colonial system created an institutionalized structure that paid leaders of clans, 
granted them political and judicial powers and the colonizers utilized collective punishment 
(Kapteijns, 2008).  
                                                 
4 This quote is translated from Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (1993), “Une nouvelle methode d’utilisation des arbres 
genealogiques, anthropologie somalienne”, Centre de Recherches de l’Histoire Ancienne, Universite´ de Besancon 
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Under those circumstances, in 1899, a twenty-year armed resistance called the Dervish 
resistance started in response to the European and Ethiopian troops division of Somali territory led 
by the charismatic Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan (Jardine, 1923; Laitin & Samatar, 1987). 
Hassan began a religiously inspired insurgency that was in response to the threat posed by the new 
economic and social structure instituted by the British and supported by other Christian states, 
particularly Ethiopia (Ibrahim & Ali, 1989). Thus, when the system created by the British faced a 
credible challenge, they reacted with overwhelming force in order to quell the resistance (Laitin & 
Samatar, 1987). The British ruthlessly attempted to put down the resistance, even destroying entire 
villages associated with Hassan (Jardine, 1923). Fearing the success of the resistance, the alliance 
between Great Britain, Italy and Ethiopia hastily negotiated the territorial boundaries of Somalia, 
with land concessions being signed over to the Ethiopians (Barnes, 2007). Another tactic employed 
by the British, in 1910, was to provide arms to ‘friendly’ clans to fight the Dervish, resulting in 
score-settling between clans which then contributed to a famine leading to the population of British 
Somaliland being reduced by one-third (Abdi I. Samatar, 1989, p. 39). By 1920, utilizing a 
relatively new invention of aerial bombardments, the British won the battle against the Dervish 
resistance. Notably, this marked the period when British colonial rule in Somalia began to coalesce 
around a more direct form of colonialism, in contrast, to what Prunier (2010) referred to as the 
previous British policy of ‘benign neglect’(Laitin & Samatar, 1987). 
Meanwhile, in the south, the Italians desired to turn their east African possession into a 
settler colony (Prunier, 2010; Reyner, 1960). The Italian colonization of Southern Somalia was 
part of their rush to join other European nations in laying claim to parts of Africa (Kassim, 2006; 
Uzoigwe, 1985). Compared to other European countries, the Italians arrived later to the scramble 
for Africa for a variety of reasons chief among them being it was still a relatively new state (Novati, 
1994; Srivastava, 2006). The Italians established a colony on the African continent fifteen years 
after the formal unification of the Italian state (Punkhurst & Cassanelli, 1989). This quest for 
territory was driven by factors that included political and economic.  
The political strategy was part of a nation-building approach harkening back to the Roman 
Empire. More precisely, the conquest of new lands could help with the creation of a sense of a 
shared identity (Novati, 1994). Nonetheless, like other European countries that went into African 
before them, the Italians claimed that their annexation of the coastal territories was part of scientific 
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exploration, the protection of sea routes and the introduction ‘modern,’ Western methods of 
education (Punkhurst & Cassanelli, 1989). Along with the southern Somalia base, the Italians 
ambitious plans to gain territory in Africa led it to acquire Eritrea with the ultimate goal to take 
over Abyssinia - present-day Ethiopia (Punkhurst & Cassanelli, 1989). In the mid-1890s, the 
Italians invaded Ethiopia intending to control all of the Horn region of Africa. However, the Italian 
quest for Ethiopia ended in a humiliating military defeat at the hands of the Ethiopian emperor 
Menelik in 1896 (Novati, 1994). 
 Economically, the new Italian state was poor compared to the other European countries 
(A. Samatar & Samatar, 1987; Srivastava, 2006). In fact, the Italians promoted the new colonial 
lands as destinations to employ a population in need of work (Srivastava, 2006). These new 
territories could provide a potential economic boost to its economy. The country established a 
trading company, Filonardi Company, which was given all vestiges of state authority, similar to 
the British and Dutch firms in other parts of the world (Kassim, 2006). Then, they negotiated with 
the British to let them take over the Benadir coast surrounding Mogadishu, which was under the 
direct control from the Sultan of Zanzibar (Aidid, 2011; Garibo-Peyró, 2012). Additionally, the 
Italians initiated protection treaties with the various leaders, guaranteeing their claim over coastal 
Somalia as they moved inland towards Ethiopian lands. However, the Filonardi Company was 
revealed to be actively involved in the banned slave trade along with knowingly using slave labour 
in the company’s plantations. These scandals resulted in the Italian government withdrawing its 
concession and giving it to another trading company, the Benadir Company (Eno, 2004; A. 
Samatar & Samatar, 1987). Throughout this period, several rebellions arose to fight against the 
Italian presence in Somalia, and some were led by escaped slaves (Eno, 2004).  
Accordingly, these controversies led the Italian government to start investigating the 
Benadir Company, which was also struggling financially due to mismanagement (Mukhtar, 1996). 
A commissioned Italian parliamentary committee concluded that the company should lose its 
authority over the territory, and the Italian government become more directly involved in the 
governance of Somalia (Aidid, 2011). Thus, in 1904, the Italian government assumed a direct role 
in administering its Somali colony. This led them to create a bureaucracy to support their colony 
along with economic and social structure needed to support it. To gain revenue to support the 
administrative structures, the government began instituting policies such as a hut tax and sold land 
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concessions to foreign companies (Aidid, 2011). In addition, the Italians expanded the plantation 
economy by changing the land tenure structure around the river valleys (Laitin & Samatar, 1987).  
Paradoxically, the new administration turned to forced labour in the hopes of expanding 
the plantation economy. The colonial administration resorted to forms of indentured labour in 
response to pressures to increase production from the fascist regime that came to power in Italy 
(Cassanelli, 1988). In the event the private plantation companies could not meet their staffing 
needs, the Italian colonial administration intervened in the interest of the “public service” and 
forced nearby villages to supply able people to toil on the plantations (Cassanelli, 1988, p. 327). 
At the same time, the Italians commenced an enforced a system of class that placed a high emphasis 
on the Italians at the top of the hierarchy, the nomadic Somali in the middle and they placed the 
sedentary agriculturalist, often Bantu peoples, at the bottom. The government went even further 
and passed apartheid laws meant to separate the classes from each other. The government banned 
schooling for African students past grade one (Ponzanesi, 2000). Due to this, the Italian 
government gained a reputation as one of the most ruthless colonizers throughout Africa. 
Undoubtedly, policies such as these had a devastating effect on the societal structures of the 
Somali.  
2.4. The quest for an independent Somali state  
The Second World War proved a pivotal moment for the end of European colonialism around the 
world, and this was particularly the case for the Italian colonial possession of Somalia. The Italians 
were on the losing side of the Second World War. They had allied themselves with the Germans 
(Jaenen, 1957). With the Italians possession back up for grabs, competing interests came to the 
fore with regards to who would control Somalia (Longrigg, 1945; Stafford, 1949). On the one 
hand, the British harboured ideas for a Greater Somalia meant to incorporate all the Somalia 
regions into one centrally administered colony controlled by Great Britain (Bradbury, 2008; M. 
Harper, 2012). The British favoured this approach because it would gain expanded territory and 
secure a large swath of East Africa. One the other hand, Italy was desperate to keep its colonial 
possession for a variety of reasons that included economic and political (Longrigg, 1945). Yet 
another claim over Somalia’s governance was pursued by the Ethiopian government, which also 
demanded the return of Eritrea from the Italians (Braine, 1958). The Ethiopians pursued an African 
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Nationalist stance, proposing that Somali territories be united with Ethiopia, or in the least 
territories that were annexed by Italy returned to it (Stafford, 1949). At the same time, a resilient 
independence movement strongly advocated for the creation of a unified Somali state. The most 
organized was the Pan-Somali organization the Somali Youth League (SYL) which had the 
broadest reach in the region (Abdi I. Samatar & Samatar, 2002). At the same time, the British 
supported and encouraged the nationalist SYL’s drive for unification because it strengthened their 
own claim of uniting all Somali lands under their rule (Longrigg, 1945; Abdi I. Samatar & Samatar, 
2002). The reason for this was given by Longrigg (1945) as:  
Somalia is a country of dull harbourless coastline, vast undulating sandy and 
thorn-grown wastes, and two narrow strips of alluvial fertility along its two rivers. 
Somalia has no minerals, almost no corn-crops. European settlement cannot be 
considered, except to the extent of a few hundred families at most along the lower 
Juba and Webbi Shibeli. A more economically unenviable country could hardly 
be imagined. Its scanty and scattered population, all Somali, is wholly disunited 
by variety of dialect, tribe and tradition. Of possible ruling class or family there is 
no trace; even the village or small-region potentates, whom the Italians removed, 
could scarcely stand now if replaced. Somalia must be governed by an outside 
authority, or revert to an anarchy doubtless fatal to security and to all hope of 
progress. To abandon it to such is, indeed, one possible solution for its future, and 
the Trucial Coast on the Persian Gulf is quoted as a precedent. But this is a counsel 
of despair, and he must have a hard heart who accepts it, even though a Somali 
"self-determination" might choose it (p. 366). 
 
With various European, Ethiopian and nationalistic interests at play over the future of the Somali 
territories, the United Nations formed the Four Powers Commission of Investigation to settle 
control of Somalia (Longrigg, 1945; Abdi I. Samatar & Samatar, 2002). This UN-mandated 
process created a competition for the future of Somalia that at times, led to violent clashes between 
the various groups and their supporters (Aidid, 2011). The commission travelled throughout 
Somalia seeking input from Somalis about their preferred choice with the ultimate goal being 
independence (Longrigg, 1945). The British, through the SYL, argued their method of governance 
was better for Somalia. However, the Italians aggressively pursued to retain their former colony. 
They spent a considerable amount to woo the general Somali population onto their side in order to 
keep the status quo. For example, the Italian administration that was still recovering from the 
Second World War, spent money to rehire previously let go Somali administration staff (Abdi I. 
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Samatar & Samatar, 2002). In the end, the UN commission failed to come up with a viable 
recommendation due to the competing member interests from the Soviet Union to the French, each 
with their own interest that they were pursuing (Stafford, 1949). The vote on the future Italian 
colonies went to the general assembly made up of 53 countries. At the last minute, the British 
dropped their bid of a unified Somalia in favour of the Italian plan, the vote handed the Italians 
trusteeship over its former southern colony for a ten-year period with a yearly review (Abdi I. 
Samatar & Samatar, 2002). On March 1, 1950, the Italians began their trusteeship and 
subsequently governed southern Somalia for the next decade. Within Somalia, this decade was 
viewed as a preparatory period for their independence. Organizations such as SYL and Greater 
Somali created and expanded political apparatuses to better position themselves after 
independence was secured (Abdi I. Samatar & Samatar, 2002). 
As the trusteeship decade was coming to an end in southern Somalia, the British initiated 
preparations for their rule in northern Somalia to come to an end as well (Braine, 1958). Even 
though the Italians desired to extend the trusteeship for another decade, the local Somali population 
was adamantly against it and approached the UN not to renew it (Abdi I. Samatar & Samatar, 
2002). In 1959, after Italy recognized the UN would not renew its trusteeship, it rushed Somalia’s 
independence by six months, even though the UN asked for that time to prepare the country for its 
new sovereignty (Reyner, 1960). Meanwhile, the British also began their plans to transfer 
sovereignty to the locals. Inevitably, unification negotiations were launched in order to bring all 
Somalis into one country. On June 26, 1960, British Somaliland gained its independence, and five 
days later, it was joined by Italian Somaliland (Abdi I. Samatar & Samatar, 2002). Shortly after, 
the two former colonies came together as one country, with the system in which power was divided 
between a prime minister in parliament and a president. Moreover, they agreed to operate under a 
transitional constitution until a permanent one could be voted on through a national referendum 
(Abdi I. Samatar & Samatar, 2002). In the new parliament, British Somaliland was represented by 
the Somali National League and United Somali Party while the Greater Somali League dominated 
in the south (Bradbury, 2008). Importantly, as the country unified, the political makeup of the 
country was based on ideological divisions rather kin-based. In the end, the union of Somalia was 
relatively quick, and it did not seem to appear to be hindered by the colonial administrations. 
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Reflecting at the almost one hundred years of colonization of Somalia had an undeniable 
impact on the Somali people. One can witness some of this impact by merely examining the 
manner the British, and the Italian governed their two parts of the country. The problems that are 
faced by the Somali state can be traced back to this mismanagement of the territory by both the 
British and Italians. For example, the British forced a system of enclosures of animals in order to 
track and control Somali movements or the Italian confiscation of prime agricultural lands 
resulting in the displacement of many inhabitants from their main source of livelihoods. 
Additionally, structural changes during the colonial era had the effect of magnifying the role of 
political ‘leaders’ either through official policy in the case of the British or the Italian system that 
created economic structures to reward certain clans (Hesse, 2010). The colonial administrations of 
both the Italian and British system reinforced the clan system by integrating it in the formal 
colonial administration (Novati, 1994). Indeed, the argument often presented to explain the Somali 
context begins with the country being “unable to get rid of its ancient rivalries” (Besteman, 1996, 
p. 121). For instance, Besteman (1996) analyzed and revealed how the media explains the Somali 
conflagration by employing clanism as the main explanatory factor. And yet, the role of slavery, 
colonialism and global nature of the Somali situation is not incorporated into this very simplistic 
analysis. 
2.5. The first decade of independence 
Post-independence Somalia saw a period of relative calm, with a stable parliamentary democracy 
as the basis of governance in the country (Ahmed I. Samatar, 1988). In 1961, one year after formal 
independence, the public ratified a constitution through a referendum formally merging together 
the differing political, judicial and economic systems of the north and south into one state. 
Optimism was abounding about the new state, the first president, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar, 
was viewed as a credible leader and politicians were instilled a sense of national pride (Abdi I. 
Samatar & Samatar, 2002). Once the economic activity of the country was back in Somali hands, 
the argument presented was that the economy would start to grow without the constraints of the 
colonial production limits (Castagno, 1960). This was particularly true for the agricultural sector 
in the south, which the Italians controlled tightly (I. M. Lewis, 1960).  More importantly, Somalis 
were elated to have ended colonial domination in the country and were eager to govern themselves. 
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However, it should be noted, as the country celebrated its new self-government, doubts 
about its ability to survive economically and politically were ever presented using ‘development’ 
discourse. One study concluded, “Independent Somalia presents a distressing picture. Its economic 
and commercial potential is bound to remain low because none of the known resources can be 
developed quickly and easily” (Reyner, 1960, p. 255). One example was the country’s low levels 
of education, prior to independence, the Italians provided mass education with low standards while 
the British offered education only to a fraction of Somalis (Hesse, 2010). Due to the staggeringly 
high illiteracy rate, problems manifested themselves in the new country and immensely affected 
how professionals could be recruited into the civil service (Laitin, 1976). Besides, the merger of 
the two territories presented their own challenges traced back to how each was governed by the 
British and Italians. Employing the assumption that the unique British and Italian governance 
structures had to be retained for the future country to be successful,  it meant that the two systems 
had to be integrated into the new nation (Garibo-Peyró, 2012). Tensions persisted in the post-
independence period because of the dual system that was attempting to merge laws, customs and 
even language (I. M. Lewis, 1960; Ahmed I. Samatar, 1988). Even the Somali constitution caused 
British Somalia to feel excluded because of its similarity to the Italian constitution, created after 
the Second World War (I. M. Lewis, 1963b). 
These north-south strains persisted throughout the first decade of independence, further 
instilling disunity in the country (Bradbury, 2008; M. Harper, 2012). A contention from the 
northern Somalilanders was the perception too much power was controlled by the south, and too 
much of the economic benefits were flowing southward after independence (Ahmed I. Samatar, 
1988). The civil service was presented as the most striking example of this split, a dividing line 
that became apparent was corruption (Ssereo, 2003). This fed into the idea that certain members 
of the national government were enriching their families and themselves at the expense of national 
unity. Abdi I. Samatar and Samatar (2002) described, through in-depth interviews with political 
leaders from Somalia’s first government, how the public purse was utilized to enrich members of 
the government and their kin. In their retelling, to some members of the government, the national 
treasure was plundered for the purposes of self-enrichment. This included Ministers stalking the 
prime minister’s or president’s office in order to gain more favourable postings for themselves or 
in search for postings for their family members. Ministers jealously guarded their holds on 
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departments stifling the establishment of a professional civil service (Abdi I. Samatar & Samatar, 
2002). 
Yet another complication faced by the new state was the geopolitical forces at play during 
the 1960s. In the International context, Somalia, like many sub-Saharan states, gained 
independence as the Cold War became more pronounced significantly affecting both domestic and 
foreign policy (Jackson, 2007). Illustratively, the country relied heavily on Italy and Great Britain 
alone to support up to half of its budget. Another large segment of its budget was supplemented 
through loans and international assistance from multilateral agencies (Silberman, 1959). 
Moreover, the United States provided $60 million in economic aid while the Soviet Union 
contributed to the construction of the infrastructure of the country by assisting in building a new 
seaport in Barbera (Laitin, 1976). In fact, an analysis of Somalia's budget during its first nine years 
of independence revealed it was receiving the highest foreign aid on a per capita basis than any 
other African country (Laitin, 1976, p. 472). 
Initially, the Somali government was aligned with Western countries, yet it maintained a 
cordial relationship with both sides of the Cold War divide and as a result gained significant aid 
from the two (Mehmet, 1971). Yet, undoubtedly, competing forces and interests were at play in 
the country. For example, the Soviet Union and the United States utilized military and economic 
aid to try to persuade the country to their side (Jackson, 2007). Ideologically, the Somali 
government committed itself to the Non-Aligned Movement5  as part of its effort to stay neutral 
in the cold war.  
And yet even with all the problems mentioned, the country seemed to be on a trajectory of 
economic and political development (I. M. Lewis, 1963b). Some of the things that worked in its 
favour as opposed to other newly independent countries in African were the fact that it had a 
common language, customs and religion. These factors contributed to a sense of a national purpose 
leading to a nationalistic wave to bring together other Somali dominated territories of their 
neighbours into the new Somalia: The Kenyan Somali, the Ethiopian Somali and French 
Somaliland into one great Grand Somalia (I. M. Lewis, 1963a). Unquestionably, the expansionist 
                                                 
5 Developing countries, in order to affirm their independence from the hegemony of a bi-polar world, created Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1955. The world was dividing itself into a communist world led by the Soviet Union 
and the capitalist world led by the United States. 
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nature of the Somali government did not sit well with its neighbours leading to several border 
skirmishes. 
From the time Somalia gained independence, it harboured designs to assimilate all territory 
inhabited by Somalis. This is best illustrated in article one of the constitution, which states, “the 
Somali people is one and indivisible” (Somalia, 1963). Moreover, the Somali flag, with its five-
sided star in the middle, was designed to incorporate all the five territories of the Somali nation 
(Garibo-Peyró, 2012). As a start, the new country negotiated with Britain about amalgamating 
Kenya’s Northern Frontier District which had overwhelmingly voted to join Somalia (I. M. Lewis, 
1963a). Instead, the British chose to keep the territory under Kenyan control, which had lobbied 
very hard to keep the territory (I. M. Lewis, 1963b). Somalia also had a desire to reclaim Ethiopia’s 
Ogaden region, which was formally conceded in the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty. This region, 
amounting to a third of Somali territory, was signed over to Ethiopia by the British (Mohamed, 
2002). This treaty was disputed by Somalia because it had no input from Somalis and established 
an arbitrary boundary that did not include traditional grazing lands, planting the seeds of discontent 
that has lasted (Laitin, 1976). Finally, French Somaliland was asked to join the new Greater 
Somalia and in 1958, which was on its way to independence in 1960. However, independence was 
unsuccessful mainly in part because France was unwilling to grant it, and the vote to unite with 
Somalia failed due factors including minorities voting against it and what many attribute to 
substantial French interference (Castagno, 1960). 
 The preoccupation with Greater Somalia led to friction with its neighbours that eventually 
led to a border war with Ethiopia in 1964 during a national election in Somalia (Abdi I. Samatar 
& Samatar, 2002). The pursuit to unify Somali people was also opposed by other African countries 
because it would be viewed as a precedent in many of their own countries (I. M. Lewis, 1963a). 
Most African states and their boundaries were created arbitrarily set by remote colonial 
administration with little regard to inhabitants of these new entities (Garibo-Peyró, 2012). Indeed, 
African states signed and agreed in a charter that they would respect borders that were in place 
from the colonial administrations. This could be used as a template for minorities in one country 
to agitate their separation from that state to join an established state or even a form new state. The 
irredentist dream of Greater Somalia seemed to be dying with each passing day, while at the same 
time increasing nationalistic fervour.  
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2.6. The rise of a dictatorship  
Within the country, Somalia appeared to be on the right track politically; elections came and went 
peacefully without much incident (Laitin, 1976). However, that all came to a crashing halt in 1969 
when then President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, elected in 1967 less than two years into his six-
year mandate, was assassinated by a bodyguard (Morris, 1975). It was widely acknowledged that 
the assassination was personal vendetta rather than a coordinated conspiracy (Bradbury, 2008). As 
a new president was being selected, the military, along with the support of the police, led a coup 
d’état a week after the president was killed (A. Samatar & Samatar, 1987). First, the military placed 
all the cabinet ministers under arrest and then it established a Supreme Revolutionary Council 
(SRC) under the leadership of army commander Major General Mahammad Siad Barre (Morris, 
1975). Ostensibly, the reason provided for the military takeover was to “abolish bribery, nepotism 
and tribalism” (Barre, 1969, p. online).  
At the start, the Siad Barre takeover was credited with improving the credibility of the 
government (Laitin, 1976). The democratic government was perceived to be very corrupt, and only 
select members benefited from the scarce resources of the country and immediately after the coup 
most of the population approved (Haakonsen, 1981; Laitin, 1976). Undoubtedly, there were 
grumblings from the people who directly benefited or were employed as a result of corruption. 
The military government appeared to have scaled back overt corruption and brought more 
accountability to the bureaucracy (Washington, 2003). For example, unlike other military-led 
coups at the time in Africa which resulted in significant budgetary increases for the military and 
police, the Somali military did not witness noticeable financial transfers to itself as a result of the 
coup, one study examining government spending showed (Laitin, 1976). In other words, the 
increases in funds to the military were almost insignificant. The reasoning postulated was that the 
Somali military was more professionally trained and adhered to their roles due to the external 
threat posed by Ethiopia (Laitin, 1976). 
Additionally, the new regime sought to enfranchise a large majority of people often 
excluded from economic participation through the use of cooperatives and the nationalization of 
industries (Leonard & Ramsay, 2013). As a result, the government’s expansion into the private 
sector led to a substantial increase in the number of people being employed directly by the 
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government. Another sector the government placed a focus was on agriculture, during the first half 
of the 1970s, in the hopes of: first to increase food self-sufficiency; second to gain foreign 
exchange from the exports and; third to increase employment in which a majority of the population 
relied upon for income (Haakonsen, 1981). Subsequently, the agricultural sector increased 
significantly, almost doubling in the span of five years (Haakonsen, 1981).  
Another policy Siad Barre was intent on relegating was the role of clans and family lineage 
in official governance (Laitin & Samatar, 1987; I. M. Lewis, 2004; Ssereo, 2003). It should be 
noted that previous elected governments also passed laws in order to reduce clan affiliations and 
even banned political party names based on clan names (Abdullahi, 1993). Nonetheless, the Siad 
Barre government placed a strong focus on eliminating the clan and kinship association. Siad Barre 
posited that corruption in the public service was primarily due clans supported by the clan- 
affiliated political parties that were intent on looting the public purse (Abdullahi, 1993). 
Furthermore, he noted that clans were a source of conflict between Somalis over scarce resources, 
a theory initially advanced by I.M Lewis (Elmi & Barise, 2006; Mah, 1999). Siad Barre explained 
the “incompatibility of nationhood and tribal allegiance makes a marked contrast, and the vivid 
manifestation of the incompatibility was very easily seen in our situation before the Revolution” 
(Barre, 1969, p. online). Therefore, the government banned the use of clan titles in the public 
sphere even went as far as replacing it with Somali word for clan (‘Ex’) with comrade (I. M. Lewis, 
2004, p. 501).  
The most successful and widely supported initiatives promoted by the military dictatorship 
was the development of a standard writing system to go along with the Somali language (A. A. 
Warsame, 2001). Prior to the introduction of the standardized system, the country had several 
official languages such as Italian, English and Arabic utilized in various official capacities. Somali 
people were very fond of their language and treasured their oral history (I. M. Lewis, 1999). For 
example, some historians have noted that within communal settings, those who are great with 
public speaking often were the default leaders. More specifically, those who presented the best 
argument were often rewarded with high regard (I. M. Lewis, 1999). Pre-military rule, debates 
raged as to what form would be used as the basis of the writing. Some preferred Arabic, others the 
Latin script, yet others presented a local script called Osmanya (Laitin, 1977). Each of the scripts 
had their positive and negative associated with them, and as such, the elected rulers could not come 
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to an agreement. Nonetheless, the new military rulers had ‘Scientific-Socialism’ as a tenet in their 
platform, quickly chose Latin script as the basis of the writing system (Mukhtar, 2010). They set 
an ambitious goal of two years to have the Somali-language writing system implemented and 
improve on the country’s five percent literacy rate (A. A. Warsame, 2001). The creation of a 
written Somali language was part of the government’s nationalistic plans. The regime had success 
in this endeavour and markedly improved literacy in the country (Mukhtar, 2010).  
Importantly, on the first anniversary of the ‘revolution,’ the new military junta created a 
governance structure that it labelled ‘Scientific Socialism,’ heavily influenced by Soviet-style 
communism (Laitin, 1976). Siad Barre hurriedly established the Somali Socialist Revolutionary 
Party (SSRP) to ensure that military-political nexus became entrenched in the country (Schraeder, 
2006). Although, outwardly, the SSRP was created with the intention to transition the country from 
direct military rule and gradually transfer power to the one-party rule through the SSRP. Indeed, 
the SSRP governance structure was modelled after Eastern European structures with most powers 
vested in the politburo controlled by the military and police (Sheik-Abdi, 1981). Prior to the shift 
towards the Soviet Union, the democratic government had received aid from communist countries 
and even had some members of the armed forces trained in the Soviet Union. Along with emulating 
the governance systems of the communist countries, Siad Barre shifted the country’s foreign policy 
stance from a neutral, albeit with Western leanings, towards the Soviet bloc (Laitin & Samatar, 
1987).  
However, Siad Barre commitment to socialism was tenuous and often misguided according 
to both his critics and supporters. First, in order to gain support from the almost exclusively Islamic 
population, Siad Barre argued that he created a form of socialism that was compatible with their 
faith (Schraeder, 2006). Nevertheless, the regime passed laws that were contradictory to Islamic 
laws, and when religious scholars protested, some were executed (Schraeder, 2006). Second, many 
pointed out that wealth and state resources were not transferred to the poor instead they remained 
in the hands of a few individuals, even though the government devolved economic planning 
powers to locals through the cooperatives (Ajani, 1982). For instance, privately held banana 
plantations and large agricultural companies were not nationalized like the service industry (Laitin, 
1976). Third, the government pledged economic self-reliance would result from its shift to 
socialism, and Somalia’s dependence on foreign aid would decline as a direct result (Adam, 1992). 
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Again the opposite occurred, and the government became a Soviet Union client state requiring 
considerable development assistance of up to 85 percent to meet its budgetary obligations 
(Mehmet, 1971; Schraeder, 2006). 
The geographic location of the country made it important to both the Soviet Union and the 
United States. Because the United States cancelled most of the aid, it provided the Siad Barre 
government, and the Somali government started receiving aid from communist bloc countries such 
as North Korea and China (Ahmed I. Samatar, 1988). In the meantime, the United States, through 
its allies, began enticing the Somali government away from Soviet influence by promising large 
amounts of loans, development aid and military arms (Jackson, 2007). US-allied governments of 
Iran and Saudi Arabia and Egypt were part of the countries that were trying to persuade the Somali 
government. Between 1974 and 1977, Ethiopia was going through a revolution that resulted in the 
emperor being deposed and was replaced by a Marxist regime (Jackson, 2007; Schraeder, 2006). 
The Siad Barre government began to soften its alliance with the Soviet Union because the Soviets 
were now also aligned with their enemy, Ethiopia. Siad Barre regarded this as a prime opportunity 
to launch a military attack to reclaim Somali lands reverting to the expansionist and Pan-Somali 
policies. 
In 1977, another territorial war broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia. This was a 
seminal moment during the Cold War, with both superpowers hedging against both sides (Jackson, 
2007). The Ethiopians were aided in their quest by the Communist aligned countries, and in fact, 
Cuba sent soldiers and weapons to aid the Ethiopian side (Saideman, 1998). One immediate 
consequence of the fallout was that the Somali government renounced a friendship treat and 
requested that the Soviet Union withdrawal all their staff and military personnel from the country 
(Schraeder, 2006). The Somali government falsely assumed that one of the superpowers would 
support their side, so it then requested assistance from the United States (Saideman, 1998). 
However, the United States remained neutral before the war and remained so during the fighting. 
The National Security Council Director, Zbigniew Brzezinski, advised the US president James 
Carter “we cannot really gain by getting involved in this problem” (Jackson, 2007, p. 62). As a 
result, Somalia was soundly defeated in the war and was left isolated globally.  
The military defeat, coupled with severe drought during the war precipitated in Siad 
Barre’s decade-long decline in power (M. Harper, 2012). A large number of Ogaden Somalis 
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displaced by the war were resettled inside Somalia, particularly in Northern Somalia. The UNHCR 
estimated that 1.5 million refugees or about 40 percent of the country’s total population resettled 
into Somalia (Bradbury, 2008, p. 38). The northern Somalis began resenting what they perceived 
to be the preferential treatment being given to the new arrivals by the government (Bradbury, 
2008). Siad Barre’s mother was an Ogadeen Somali, and northern Somalis perceived this as one 
more example of his government’s clan favouritism (Elmi & Barise, 2006). This created a hostile 
environment, and northern Somalis viewed the new residents as intruders, and this led to the 
creation of a separatist movement (M. Harper, 2012). Ironically, the clan system that Siad Barre 
had decried and attempted to root out of the country was a factor in his demise. As he grew weaker, 
Siad Barre became reliant on his clan, Mareehan, and other allied clans of Ogadeeni (his mother’s) 
and Dulbahante (his wife’s) to help govern the country (Schraeder, 2006). 
Furthermore, economic mismanagement which placed a large part of the economy into the 
hands of the central government and created a command economy was failing. The government 
also instituted policies that were designed to get a hold of the nomadic herders into the enclosure 
system to better control a large income generator of the country. In order to access foreign aid 
from the developed governments and international agencies, the government agreed to institute 
harsh economic measures called the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). The SAPs were 
introduced in the 1980s, making assistance conditional on implementing neoliberal policies such 
as deregulation, liberalization, privatization and reducing government spending (Abdi I. Samatar, 
1993). Another devastating economic blow came when livestock exports, the largest source of 
income and a significant source of employment in northern Somalia, were banned by Saudi Arabia 
due to rinderpest (Bradbury, 2008).  
The grumblings grew increasingly louder; the more prolonged the military dictatorship 
stayed in place. Consequently, the rebellion against the dictatorship grew more active, starting with 
an assassination attempt on Barre. Additionally, several groups formed an armed rebellion against 
the government, one being the northern-based Somali National Movement (Bradbury, 2008).  
Throughout the 1980s, various groups took up arms against the Siad Barre regime. The 
government renounced Scientific Socialism as the guiding force for the government. What 
replaced it was a one-man dictatorship that became ruthless in protecting its power (Elmi & Barise, 
2006). Siad Barre increasingly became bloodier in his quest to retain power, in response to the 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 2:  40 
secessionist movement in the north; he destroyed the capital of northern Somalia, Hargeisa (Elmi 
& Barise, 2006). This resulted in many northerners dying. 
Similarly, in the south, other armed groups took over large swaths of the country (see Appendix 
3). By the end of the 1980s, his government only controlled a few areas of the country; he was 
famously labelled a “mayor of Mogadishu” because that was the only area he effectively controlled 
(M. Harper, 2012). On January 27, 1991, Siad Barre fled the country, plunging the country into 
chaos (Hooglund, 1992). Somalia’s history prior to 1991 is complex with a variety of governance 
structures across the entire region. What this chapter illustrates is that the perception of Somalia 
focuses on a rather short time span, 100 years of colonization and an even shorter time after 
independence. The Somali people existed prior to European colonization and they choose system 
of governance that was different from that of the Europeans. Moreover, as we have seen the term 
‘state’ is only applied to Somalia relatively recently. For example, it was only after colonialization 
that Somalia saw its borders defined and a form of governance, whether British or Italian, imposed. 
These forms of governance each offered themselves as better than what the Somalis had prior to 
the European arrival. The British, Italians and French divided up the region and went about 
systematically erasing any link to previous social structures. As we have seen the clan structure 
which was the basis for social structure within Somali society was then utilized against the Somali 
people in order to perpetuate colonization. For example, the colonizers used the clan structure to 
divide Somali society and to reward those they saw as willing to support the colonial system. As 
we saw in this chapter, the period of instability after independence can be directly linked to 
colonization. The next chapter will further explore how and why Somalia is viewed as a failed 
state. The third chapter aims to then show how Somali social structures have re-emerged to 
resemble what has always existed. The fourth chapter will then show the role played by the 
diaspora, employing ICTs, in stabilizing Somalia. Finally, the concluding chapter will illustrate a 
better explanation for Somalia. 
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Chapter 3:  Study 1: Characteristics and Definitions of Somalia as a 
Failed State: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Western Media 
 
 
Abstract 
For almost a quarter-century, Somalia has been embroiled in a civil war and has had no effective, centralized 
state apparatus, and yet the country has defied definition and expectation. In this study, a critical 
examination is conducted of Western, English-speaking news media discourse about Somalia by analyzing 
14 English news sources based in the United States, Great Britain and Canada from December 28, 1992 to 
October 3, 2015. The study utilizes multi-method approach of qualitative and quantitative content analysis 
approaches to understand the portrayal of Somalia in Western news sources. First, sentiment analysis of 
headlines assists in exploring the type of language applied about Somalia. Second, a content analysis of the 
corpus of the data using Leximancer, a Computer-Aided Content Analysis software is undertaken. Finally, 
a mixed-method approach using the Atlas/Ti of coding a priori codes, as well new codes discovered from 
close reading of the news sources is conducted. Thus, this compressive approach aims to identify the role 
of media in shaping and entrenching the perceptions of Somalia. Furthermore, this deductive research 
identifies the main characteristics of the term ‘failed state’ in order to localize the term to Somalia. Utilizing 
Critical Discourse Analysis, the study confirms that dominant media narratives about the country are 
negative in tone, violent in description and reinforce negative stereotypes vis-à-vis Somalia and its people. 
Additionally, within these news sources, an identification of the leading causes and characteristics of a 
failed state (a term often used in association with Somalia) are determined.  
 
3.1. Introduction 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, Somalia has had a long and varied history. However, for 
close to three decades, Somalia has been viewed as a prime example of state failure, especially 
within international media discourse. Since the country plunged into Civil War at the end of the 
1980s, the country is perceived to be hotbed for violence (Bakonyi, 2015; De Waal, 2015), 
controlled by tribal warlords (Marchal, 2007), a haven for terrorists and pirates (Gilmer, 2016; 
International Crisis Group, 2002), and generally an international basket case that requires a 
concerted international response. Some researchers have argued that these characteristics do not 
conform to what a modern state should be and encompass the concept of a failed state (Byrne, 
2013; Menkhaus, 2014; Walls & Kibble, 2013). Accordingly, the discourse about the country can 
be distilled to: a complete societal collapse (Leeson, 2007a). As part of the early international 
response, the United Nations sent a peacekeeping force to the country to stave off a humanitarian 
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crisis and to restore a semblance of government. However, the UN peacekeepers withdrew after 
several violent skirmishes led to the deaths of UN peacekeepers (Bentley & Oakley, 1995). In 
addition to the humanitarian concerns, a recent argument advanced was that the lack of social 
cohesion represented by state institutions in Somalia was a threat to the international order and a 
direct threat to individuals worldwide. Over the next three decades, the country witnessed several 
events that have brought the country’s situation into the headlines of the world. For example, the 
country has been in the news in reference to issues of terrorism, piracy or famine. These stories 
have added to and perpetuated a particularly negative view of the country. 
 The role of media in framing, shaping and influencing the public sphere has been studied 
extensively within the field of Information Systems (Cukier, Ngwenyama, Bauer, & Middleton, 
2009; Thompson, 2003; Zappavigna, 2012). As carriers and reproducers of information, the news 
media is a powerful communicative instrument (Slater, 2007). The media shapes the public’s 
perception of distant cultures, people and countries. The media, therefore, assists in swaying public 
opinions and pushing for specific public actions. For example, the media has pushed Western 
countries to act in situations of famine and civil war. The media has played an important role in 
how the outside world views Somalia. For example, popular media in the form of movies such as 
‘Black Hawk Down,’ or ‘Captain Phillips’ have left an indelible mark about the country on people 
around the world. Perceptions of Somalia being violent and ungovernable in the news media have 
pointed to issues of social and economic stagnation through the lens of terrorism and piracy. 
However, how Western media defines Somalia needs to be analyzed empirically in order to 
critically understand what characterizes a failed state. Therefore, this study employs critical 
discourse analysis to understand the question: How has Western, English-Speaking, mass media 
affected the definition, perception and discussion of Somalia in the West and globally thereafter? 
Corollary to the central question, other questions include: What are the characteristics of a 
failed state? What are the leading causes of a failed state? The study utilizes a multi-method 
approach of qualitative and quantitative content analysis approaches to understand the portrayal of 
Somalia in Western news sources. First, sentiment analysis of headlines assists in exploring the 
type of language utilized about Somalia. Using AlchemyAPI tool, the aim of the sentiment analysis 
is to understand the tone and keywords designed to attract the reader’s attention. Second, a content 
analysis using Leximancer, a Computer-Aided Content Analysis, helps uncover emergent themes 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 3:  43 
and concepts from the corpus of news article data. Finally, a mixed-method approach was 
employed using the Atlas/Ti of coding a priori codes, which arose out of the first two approaches, 
as well though new codes discovered from close reading of the news sources. Thus, this 
compressive approach aims to identify the role of the media in shaping and entrenching 
perceptions of Somalia. Furthermore, this deductive research identifies the main characteristics of 
the term ‘failed state’ in order to localize the term to Somalia. 
3.2. Background and Context 
Somalia has been without a functioning state apparatus since 1991 when President Siad Barre was 
ousted from office amid a civil war (Menkhaus, 2011). Ever since, the country has been mired in 
economic and social stagnation, in part due to the lack of a centralized government that has control 
over the recognized territory of the country (Byrne, 2013). After the collapse of the state, several 
individuals, organizations and international actors have attempted to assert their control with little 
success (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008). In the immediate aftermath of 
Barre’s exile, Ali Mahdi Mohamed declared himself president; however, Mohamed was not 
recognized by the different fighting factions (Clark, 1992). While at the same time, several clans 
in northern Somalia declared independence from Somalia and created a new state called 
Somaliland based on the former British colonial boundary (Bradbury, 2008). After initially 
attempting to broker a peace deal between Mohamed and the General Mohamed Farrah Hassan 
Aidid, leader of largest rebel group, international actors through the United Nations also inserted 
themselves in the conflict. In 1992, after a negotiated settlement failed, the UN decided to send a 
peacekeeping mission to Somalia due to a deteriorating humanitarian conditions in which an 
estimated 350,000 Somalis lost their lives (Clark, 1992). One year later, the UN mission in the 
country ended. Consequently, the UN and much of the international community reduced their 
active participation in the country, nevertheless in the UN Secretary General took an indirect role 
as mediator by setting up the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) in 1995 
(United Nations, 1995). 
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3.3. Literature Review 
Somalia is often discussed as a failed state in popular discourse, particularly in Western mass 
media (Haldén, 2008; Menkhaus, 2014). Byrne (2013) observes, “when thinking of states that have 
‘failed’, it is most likely that Somalia will be first to spring into the mind” (p. 111). Furthermore, 
this discourse has resulted in the perception of Somalia as a haven for pirates, fostering terrorists, 
and generally as ungovernable (International Crisis Group, 2008; Marchal, 2007). The media play 
a vital role in defining and shaping reality in society (Adoni & Mane, 1984; Gamson et al., 1992). 
More specifically, the media exerts its influence and power through the reproduction of knowledge 
systems and assists in the exertion of influence in social relations and practice (Habermas, 2006). 
Thus the central question answered in the first study is: How has mass media, particularly Western 
English Media, affected the discourse about Somalia? By understanding the discourse surrounding 
Somalia, this study aims to fulfil a gap in the research of how the media ideologically constructs 
perceptions of the country. 
 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) aims to “uncover how language works to construct 
meanings that signify people, objects and events in the world in specific ways” (Brookes, 1995, p. 
462). Additionally, CDA can be employed to analyze the relationship between language, both 
written and spoken, and power resulting in radical and emancipatory change (Hammersley, 1997). 
Discourse can be reproduced by elites, institutions and groups in order to dominate along with the 
basis of class, political, ethnic and gender lines (van Dijk, 1993, p. 260). This study will utilize 
Critical Discourse Analysis based on Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (TCA). 
Through the Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, from which social life derives its 
opinions(Habermas, 1974). Accordingly, Habermas’ concept of the public sphere encompasses 
areas such the political institutions, mass media, lobbyists, among others (Cukier et al., 2009). The 
public sphere is where power is contested, and a vibrant public sphere is crucial to a healthy, free, 
democratic society (Calhoun, 1992; Habermas, 1991). 
Within this public arena, the news media plays a vital role in shaping society and how 
society views itself (Gamson et al., 1992). Moreover, some Critical Social Theorists have argued 
that media, utilizing language, can have an outsized effect on social norms. Specifically, the rise 
of the news media can be traced to the rise of global capitalism as Habermas noted, “The traffic in 
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news that developed alongside the traffic in commodities showed a similar pattern. With the 
expansion of trade, merchants’ market-oriented calculations required more frequent and more 
exact information about distant events” (Habermas, 1991, p. 16). Thus, these institutions of 
dissemination including mail and stock markets regularized and became part of a network of power 
structures of and for the elite. In another work by Habermas, he noted that as the political elites 
began to supplant the public discourse and the capitalism became the dominant economic system 
in western European countries, information became just as valuable as commodities. Habermas 
traced the development of newspapers, and the role of they played in shaping the public sphere 
while upholding links to the elite. For example, early newspapers were employed to disseminate 
new laws and ordinances. Embedded in the lifeworld structures articulated, these forms of 
communication became part of the social norms and experiences that are inherent in all public 
discourse. Currently, the mass media has come to shape public opinion and the perception of 
certain areas of the world. 
A central concept of this study is the contested and contentious overarching term ‘state’ 
(Mann, 1984; Mitchell, 1991). On the one hand, the state can be defined simply as a set of 
institutions, or it can be defined more broadly through the functions it conducts (Mann, 1984). But 
as an entry point in this research program, we explore the historical trajectory of the modern state, 
including theorizing that the state came into existence due in part to the need to protect from 
bandits and robbers (Oppenheimer, 2007, p. 1) while others see its creation as a necessity for a 
social contract (Melossi, 1990). Nonetheless, Francis Fukuyama best illustrates the existence and 
need for a state, manifested in institutions and social contracts. In the forward to Samuel 
Huntington’s, Political Order in Changing Societies, he discusses, “the total absence of social 
conflict, political institutions are unnecessary; in the total absence of social harmony, they are 
impossible” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 9). What does it mean to be a state? How does one come into 
existence? What are its defining features?  How do they develop? These questions have led many 
theorists to posit a plethora of definitions and concepts in order to explain the concept.  
As a starting point, many theorists acknowledge and observe some core elements central 
to all definitions of states, including one, a set of institutions; two, a defined territory; and three, 
an authority with rulemaking powers (Hall & Ikenberry, 1989, p. 1; Mann, 1984). These three 
linked features have been associated with community formation leading to a modern state. 
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Friedrich Engels (1884) noted some common features that led to the formation of modern states 
by pointing to almost linear trajectory linked to human development that was divided into three 
major periods. Engel has linked human development to state formation, expanding upon works of 
Lewis Morgan. Morgan posited that human development is essentially a trajectory from the first 
period, Savagery, when humans were tree dwellers, to the second period, Barbarism, when they 
become more sedentary leading to the development of new agricultural technologies and innovated 
the use of iron ore and finally in the third period, Civilization, when the division of labour becomes 
more pronounced. 
Engels views on the core assumptions behind state formation are themselves contested 
(Hall & Ikenberry, 1989; Mann, 1984; Oppenheimer, 2007). Indeed, the argument underlying 
Engels’ view on why states exist diverges depending on which paradigm it is situated. The three 
major paradigms, Liberal, Critical and Realist (Statist), differ on how to define the main features 
of the state (Mitchell, 1991). For example, the Liberal perspective is predicated on the central idea 
that people come together out of self-interest to form communities (Mann, 1984). While the 
Critical perspective views the state as part of the apparatus that arose in order for the few to exploit 
the surplus-labour of the many in society (Oppenheimer, 2007). The Realists view the state as an 
extension of the competitive nature of the community to hoard and seek more power versus the 
other (Hall & Ikenberry, 1989, p. 10). This thesis will employ the critical perspective of the state. 
In addition, this study aims to employ the Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) 
framework to analyze the discourse surrounding Somalia, along with an examination of the 
narrative of failed state, tribalism, terrorism, piracy and other dominant views of the country in  
Western mass media. Although it is interesting to note that there seems to be no outwardly clear 
indication as to why Western media would distort stories about Somalia, some have argued, this 
is part of the larger trend of stereotyping, dehumanizing and ‘othering’ of Africans more generally. 
The argument is predicated on presenting Africans as less than humans and incapable of creating 
a functioning state (Ogundimu, 1994; Ogundimu & Fair, 1997). This is argument can be traced to 
how Africa was generally perceived before and after colonization helped to usher in an era of 
social, economic and political domination (Mudimbe, 1988). 
Moreover, a type of language has developed that helps foster hegemonic discourse, which 
labels an entire landmass with the tag ‘Dark’ continent, with the implication of backwardness, 
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violence and barbarism (Jarosz, 1992; Nabudere, 2007). In practical terms, this language became 
part of the international agenda through the UN, with concepts of development that were 
predicated on Modernization Theory (Jiafeng, 2009). Although primarily concerned with 
economic development, modernization theorists relied heavily on the discourse of social 
backwardness of African nations such as primitive, underdeveloped, and Global South, among 
others (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012). For example, Modernization theorists emphasized 
developing nations to emulate the West, with the West serving as the peak of a linear trajectory to 
modernism (Martinussen, 1997). Somalia is no different in this regard. 
In Western media, the dominant narrative is that Somalia is an ungovernable part of the 
world with marauding warlords and murderous population (Besteman, 1996). Notably, as the Civil 
War raged in the early 1990s, there were calls for the UN and various countries to intervene in the 
conflict and the resulting famine in Somalia (Mermin, 1997). The images of Somalia reinforced 
some of the negative stereotypes of Somalia. For example, the idea that without assistance, the 
tribal Somalis would decimate each other (Kareithi & Kariithi, 2008). Previous studies (see 
Besteman (1996); Kareithi and Kariithi (2008); P. Robinson (2005)) have explored how Somalia 
is portrayed in the American media in the context of the American intervention in the 1990 civil 
war. As the Civil War broke out and famine overtook the country, the American media galvanized 
the American government into action to support the UN mission. Some theorized this to be the 
‘CNN effect,’ one reason that American government got involved in the UN mission and was 
pressured by the media images to act (Livingston & Eachus, 1995; P. Robinson, 2005). The CNN 
effect is defined as “the result of a clash of two distinct institutional imperatives: On one hand is 
the perceived need of various foreign policy actors to manage policy in an atmosphere of relative 
isolation, sheltered from the vicissitudes of public pressure. On the other hand, are various news 
media creating those very pressures” (Livingston & Eachus, 1995, p. 414). It was argued that 
Western, CNN and other media, were primarily the drivers of why the US government sent 
peacekeeping soldiers to Somalia (Besteman, 1996; Kareithi & Kariithi, 2008; P. Robinson, 2005).  
Conversely, some argue that the media serves as an entry point for the American 
government to further its own goals. More specifically, it was speculated that the images coming 
out of Somalia were the result of an effort by the US government to muster support for an 
intervention. The analysis by Livingston and Eachus (1995) showed that American politicians 
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were instrumental allies in the media’s coverage of Somalia. Additional analysis comparing prior 
media coverage before the intervention showed that media coverage was insignificant; however 
after the American government decided to get involved, reports increased in number immediately 
before the American intervention (Mermin, 1997). Furthermore, Kareithi and Kariithi (2008) 
argued that the American media played along unquestioningly in the American government's 
outward image of the saviour, a force for good in the world. Thus, this led Mermin (1997) to 
conclude that the American media’s role was, in fact, part of a support system for Washington’s 
foreign policy objectives. Specifically, the US needed to consolidate its supremacy as a world 
leader, especially as the global order was being redefined with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
After the US and the UN withdrew from the country, another pivotal moment was the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, with media coverage of Somalia focused on the stateless 
vacuum that could allow terrorists to operate freely (Gartenstein-Ross, 2009).  More recently, the 
media showcased stories about Somali pirates and piracy of the Somali coast has resulted in 
increased media awareness and coverage (M. Harper, 2012). Accordingly, this has resulted in a 
Somalia being associated with lawlessness and a lack of government that could extend its influence 
over its territory. In 2011, the country saw its coverage increase due to the famine (Cooley & Jones, 
2013). Ultimately, all these pointed to Somalia’s lack of centralized governance structures as the 
root cause of problems that afflicted its people. 
Given the way the country is discussed and portrayed, I employ the Critical Discourse 
Analysis as the most appropriate approach to uncover the underlying arguments about Somalia. 
Thus, this study explores the discourse through the Habermas’ concept of universal pragmatics, 
which creates a framework that showcases a ‘communicative action’ (Dahlberg, 2004; Habermas, 
2002). Habermas' TCA defines four main types of behaviour and social action that agents and 
actors utilize: instrumental, communicative, strategic and discursive (Kemmis & McTaggart, 
2008; Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 1988; Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997). Thus, this study will test the 
claims made in the media reports employing the communication found with the language of the 
text or the speech. These communications are underlined by a set of claims mainly truth, sincerity, 
legitimacy and comprehensibility. The purpose of the CDA using the validity claims is to test for 
perceptions of Somalia along with the definition of a failed state. Table 3.1 summarizes the validity 
tests that will be employed in the CDA. 
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Table 3.1: Validity Claims and Speech Dimension (adapted from Cukier et al., 2003 and Cukier et al., 
2009). 
Validity Claim Result Distortion Validity Test Speech 
Dimensions 
The propositional 
content is true. 
Truth Misrepresentation Is the evidence and 
reasoning provided 
sufficient? 
Argumentation and 
evidence 
The speaker is honest 
(or sincere) in what 
she says. 
Sincerity False Assurance Is what is said 
consistent with how 
it is said 
Metaphors and 
connotative words 
What is said is 
linguistically 
intelligible and 
comprehensible. 
Clarity Confusion Is the 
communication 
sufficiently 
intelligible?   
What is said is 
linguistically 
intelligible and 
comprehensible. 
What the speaker 
says (and hence does) 
is right or appropriate 
in the light of 
existing norms or 
values. 
Legitimacy Illegitimacy Are competing 
‘logics’ (e.g. 
Stakeholders) 
equally 
represented? 
Use of experts 
 
3.4. Methodology 
3.4.1 Data Collection 
This study, as illustrated in the nomological net (Figure 1.2), examines the perceptions of Somalia 
and the characteristics of a failed state. In order to trace how the term ‘failed state’ came to be 
associated with the discourse of Somalia, the first study of this thesis collected data by searching 
a variety of newspaper articles from different sources. The first news source searched was the New 
York Times; the articles were located on the LexisNexis database. The Boolean search terms used 
included “Somalia” AND “Failed State*” which retrieved 94 articles in total. The articles were 
downloaded in one large portable file format (pdf) which were then separated and labelled 
sequentially starting with NYT1 for the first article. Of those 94 articles, two were duplicates, and 
thus excluded from the final analysis. The New York Times was selected first because it is 
considered a paper of record in the United States, and often sets trends for other major dailies 
around the world. 
Additionally, it was selected because after the literature review, it was found that the New 
York Times was the source of the first mention of the term ‘failed state’ while referring to the 
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situation in Somalia. The term was first employed concerning Somalia by the New York Times 
editorial board on December 28, 1992. This was followed by Madeline Albright, at the time United 
States Secretary of State, in an opinion column for the same paper on October 8, 1993.  
Using the New York Times as a baseline, I then searched for a comparable Canadian news 
source, which found 42 articles in the Globe and Mail from the same LexisNexis database. The 
Globe and Mail was selected because it is the only Canadian, nation-wide paper in print since 
Somalia became independent. One drawback, however, is the paper carried many wire service 
articles in addition to a relatively low number of stories about Somalia written by its own staff 
writers. 
Finally, I sought to find more news articles from a variety of different perspectives, regions 
and services. I navigated to the Factiva database, one of the most comprehensive databases of news 
articles and transcripts. The same search term “Somalia” AND “Failed State*” from January 1, 
1960, to October 3, 2015 was queried. This resulted in a retrieval of 6,363 articles across all 101 
news sources. These 6,363 articles did not include similar or duplicate articles. I then downloaded 
the first sources with 100 articles or more. Additionally, I included Canadian Press, a news wire 
based in Canada. Figure 3.1 below summarises the approach for this study, including the type of 
analysis utilized for each data source. 
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Figure 3.1: Methodological approach for Study 1 
 
3.4.2 The Data 
In addition to the Globe and Mail and New York Times, four English language wire services were 
part of the data; these include Agence France Press, the Associated Press, Canadian Press and 
Reuters. The corpus of data included radio transcripts from National Public Radio (US). I included 
news sources from two primarily financial newspapers, the Financial Times based in the United 
Kingdom and the Wall Street Journal based in the United States. Three of the newspapers were 
British-based, the Guardian, the Telegraph and the Times of London (along with its sister 
publication the Sunday Times). The British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) articles did not return 
articles or transcripts from articles written by BBC writers or reporters; instead, it returned articles 
from its monitoring service, which scanned other news sources from Africa and the Middle East, 
as well as its research service. Notably, the BBC articles included news articles translated from 
other languages such as Somali, Arabic, German and Spanish, providing the data with a 
perspective that would not have otherwise been included. 
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After reviewing the sources, CNN news transcripts were omitted because its records only 
went back as far as 1999 with previous year’s transcripts unavailable. Moreover, CNN was 
excluded from the analysis because Somalia was mentioned in a few sentences amongst entire 
show transcripts. The other source removed was The Independent (UK) newspapers because it no 
longer publishes a print publication but has become an online service. Once all the articles were 
separated and labelled into individual articles, all duplicates not removed automatically in the 
Factiva search results were also excluded from the final analysis. Please refer to Table 3.2, which 
lists the sources, number of articles, the average word count, the date first noted in the source and 
the last date an article was retrieved.  
 
Table 3.2: The news sources, number of articles, average word count and first date and last date for each 
source 
Source Code Number of 
Articles 
Average 
Word Count 
First date 
(M/D/YYYY) 
Last Date 
(M/D/YYYY) 
Agence France Press AFP 155 462 7/7/2004 5/11/2015 
Associated Press AP 147 812 1/17/2003 7/23/2010 
British Broadcasting 
Corporation 
BBC 246 963 10/6/1993 5/12/2015 
Canadian Press CP 20 356 6/18/2007 1/15/2013 
Financial Times FT 108 1585 11/19/2001 6/26/2015 
Global and Mail, The GM 42 1233 4/16/1994 9/5/2015 
Guardian, The (UK)  GUA 103 1754 11/17/2001 9/21/2015 
National Public Radio NPR 78 3476 11/29/1995 3/27/2015 
New York Times NYT 92 1754 12/28/1992 5/19/2015 
Reuters REU 176 2493 7/15/1993 6/12/2015 
Telegraph, The (UK) TEL 74 1640 12/11/2001 3/10/2015 
Times of London, The TIM 101 1481 12/12/2001 8/23/2015 
Washington Post WPO 89 613 8/13/1993 5/1/2015 
Wall Street Journal WSJ 40 855 1/19/2000 12/19/2013 
Overall OVL 1471 1397 1/1/1960 10/03/2015 
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3.5. Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Overview of Trends 
Once all of the newspaper articles were cleaned, separated and labelled, the first step of the analysis 
began with a general trend analysis of the data. There were 1,471 articles in the corpus. The first 
article collected, appearing in the New York Times, was from December 12, 1992. The last articles 
collected were from September 21, 2015, which appeared in the Guardian. 
The BBC had the most articles at 246; however, with the exception of one article in 1993, 
most of the articles began to appear after the year 2001. The source with the least articles was the 
Canadian Press, a wire service. Many Canadian Press articles were excluded from the analysis 
because they were duplicates of Associated Press and Reuters articles.  
The third overview of the data extracted from all articles was the average word count per 
article. The purpose of obtaining the word count information was to ascertain differences over time 
about the amount of space dedicated to Somalia generally along with the country’s association 
with the concept ‘failed state’. NPR was the source with the most words per article/transcript, and 
this was due to each source being an entire show’s transcript not just specifically about the one 
story regarding Somalia. The source with the least average word count is the Canadian Press, and 
the wire service was most likely to feature snippets about stories rather than in-depth coverage. 
Two newspaper sources, the Guardian and the New York Times, both had the highest average 
word count per article at 1,754 each. Figure 3.2 is a visual illustration of all the data by year and 
source included in the final analysis. 
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Figure 3.2: News sources by number of articles over time 
 
 
3.5.2 Sentiment Analysis 
The second step of analyzing the data at a high level was through a sentiment analysis approach 
using AlchemyAPI tool. The purpose of the sentiment analysis is to obtain a high-level analysis 
of the discourse around the headlines in these sources. Sentiment analysis is defined as the 
“attitude, opinion or feeling toward something, such as a person, organization, product or location” 
(AlchemyAPI, 2015). Sentiment analysis has been a popular approach to understand large data 
sets found on social media. Previous studies have examined twitter hashtags (Das, Acharjya, & 
Patra, 2014), security (Simon, Goldberg, Aharonson-Daniel, Leykin, & Adini, 2014), public movie 
reviews (Singh, Piryani, Uddin, & Waila, 2013) as well as E-learning students’ feedback (Roberts, 
Campbell, & Vijayasarathy, 2016). Headlines, much like social media, serve as quick summaries 
of the story and are designed to gain readers' attention and play an important role as a 
communicative device in defining the subject in the mind of readers (Dor, 2003). Thus, a sentiment 
analysis of the headlines then would serve to explain the general perceptions of Somalia.  
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In order to analyze the headlines from across the 14 data sources, I employed a cloud-based 
sentiment analysis program that utilizes a variety of language databases. AlchemyAPI is a text 
analysis software and sentiment analysis tool that is part of IBM Watson’s machine learning 
algorithm (Turian, 2013a). AlchemyAPI was selected in part because it analyzes unstructured text. 
Moreover, the program is linked to a variety of different knowledge databases such as DBpedia, 
YAGO and Freebase (now Wikidata) which extract entities and content, to be semantically 
queried. Additionally, the program tags entities, concepts and keywords with a relevancy score 
that is based on their importance within the corpus of the documents (Turian, 2013a, 2013b). 
The AlchemyAPI program automatically processes several types of text analysis. This 
study selected the six most relevant types of analysis: (i) Entity Extraction, (ii) Keyword 
Extraction, (iii) Taxonomy Classification, (iv) Concept Tagging, (v) Document Analysis and (vi) 
Targeted Sentiment. The proceeding sections show the findings from these analyses. 
Findings 1: Entity extraction 
The entity extraction analyzes the complete document and identifies people, companies, and 
organizations. The findings are then assigned a relevance score. The relevance score is the 
“significance of each unique term …[t]he higher the relevance score, the more important that term 
to the central meaning of the document” (D. Harper, 2014, p. online). In the 1,471 headlines, 50 
entities were found; the most common was “Somalia,” it also had the highest relevancy score of 
89.3%, which had a word count of 227. “Somali government” with a count of 44.5% and a word 
count of 15 followed this. The third entity that appeared in the articles was “Yemen,” which had a 
lower relevancy score of 39.5% along with the 48-word count (for a complete list of Entities see 
Appendix 4). A sentiment analysis of the entities in the headline documents shows that only one 
entity had a ‘positive’ orientation; the entity was “Somali Authority Embolden Al-Shabab.” Six 
entities were classified as neutral. Next, the classification found that 18 entities were considered 
to have ‘mixed’ sentiment. Finally, 25 entities had ‘negative’ sentiment associated with them. 
Figure 3.3 is a tree map of the entity classification, and it is colour coded to reflect the polarity of 
the entities’ orientation. Specifically, green is positive, gray is neutral, purple is mixed and red is 
negative. 
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Figure 3.3: Sentiment analysis entities tree-map of all headlines 
 
Findings 2: Keyword extraction 
Next, AlchemyAPI extracted the keywords from the newspaper headlines. The extraction of 
keywords is based on the phrases and topics derived from the corpus. The keyword extraction 
moves beyond the entity extraction in that it pulls the most relevant topics in the data. Each 
keyword was assigned a ‘sentiment score.’ More specifically, a score of above 1 was labelled 
“positive,” scores of under 0 were assigned a neutral score, a score of between -1 and -20 were 
assigned a “mixed” score, and any score lower than -21 was tagged as negative. This stage of the 
analysis moves beyond actors in the discussion to the words in the documents. Just like the entity 
analysis, the keyword analysis found “Somalia” to be the most relevant at 91.3%, followed by the 
“Somalia government” at 79.3% and “Somali pirates” at 71.8%. Notably, the classification of the 
first two keywords was ‘mixed,’ however, the third keyword, “Somali pirates’ was classified as 
negative (for a complete list of Keywords see Appendix 5). Figure 3.4 is a tree-map of the 
keywords found in the documents as well as their polarity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 3:  57 
Figure 3.4: Sentiment analysis keywords tree-map of all headlines 
 
Findings 3: Taxonomy classification 
The next level of analysis was the taxonomy of the headlines. Taxonomy classification assists in 
understanding the placement of documents. Semantic analysis involves grouping similar concepts 
into related categories. AlchemyAPI software automatically classifies content into a taxonomy that 
can go as far as five levels. Results from the headlines show three major categories that were two 
levels deep. Accordingly, one classification was “law, government and politics”; and 
“government.” The next set was “society”; and then “unrest and war.” Although, the third 
categorization was found to be “travel”; “tourist destinations”; and “Africa,” this third extracted 
taxonomy, however, did meet the confidence criteria thus labelling confidence level to be “no.” 
Table 3.3 summarized the taxonomy found in the document. 
Table 3.3: Sentiment analysis of taxonomy of all news headlines 
Label Score Confident 
/law, govt and politics/government 0.503934  
/society/unrest and war 0.45586  
/travel/tourist destinations/africa 0.351799 no 
Findings 4: Concept tagging 
Another classified category was concepts, with concepts tagging based on the document as well 
as from databases such as DBpedia, Freebase, Yago and websites. Importantly, the concepts are 
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also derived from word relationships drawn from the corpora as well as the databases. Thus, the 
concepts selection and relevancy rating can be based on ideas not explicitly mentioned. This 
feature is helpful for this research because it shows how the language’s meaning is becoming 
entrenched across various databases and thus, more easily retrieved with the help of new 
technology. The concepts feature of the program classified “Somalia” as the first concept with a 
relevancy score of 97.4%, followed by “Piracy in Somalia” at 48.7% and “Piracy” was third at 
41.7%. Notably, the remaining six concepts had a relevancy rating of between 32.5% and 38.2%. 
Table 3.4 details the concepts along with their relevancy according to the AlchemyAPI analysis. 
Table 3.4: Sentiment analysis of concepts in all news headlines 
Concept Relevance 
Somalia 0.973843 
Piracy in Somalia 0.487405 
Piracy 0.417395 
Somali people 0.381641 
East Africa 0.376003 
Kenya 0.342998 
Yemen 0.34048 
Red Sea 0.325036 
Findings 5: Document sentiment 
Another analysis focused on headlines was a general sentiment analysis of the entire documents. 
This type of analysis is supposed to provide a general overview and but a drawback is missing the 
nuance of the various sentiments that could be contained in the over 1,400 headlines. However, 
this additional layer of analysis is useful to understand the general sentiment of the entire 
document. For the headlines, the result shows that most of the documents had a generally negative 
sentiment. However, this determination was somewhat mixed because the sentiment score was 
generally low, at 39.7% (see Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5: Sentiment analysis score of all news headlines 
Score Type 
-0.396665 negative 
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Findings 6: Targeted sentiment 
The final analysis undertaken in this study was a targeted sentiment analysis of the headlines. In 
contrast to the document sentiment in the earlier section, the targeted sentiment picks the keywords 
and assigns a polarity to it. The results from this analysis found 99 target keywords in the 
documents, with each assigned a sentiment score and labelled with sentiment type. Of the targeted 
keywords, 21 had a mixed sentiment with a negative orientation, 19 were determined to be neutral. 
Finally, of the 99 keywords found in the targeted keywords, 2 had a mixed-positive orientation, 
and 3 were classified as positive. Table 3.6 summaries the findings from the targeted keyword 
sentiment analysis for the complete list; please refer to Appendix 6. 
Table 3.6: Sentiment analysis targeted keywords in all news headlines 
Negative Mixed-Negative Neutral Mixed-Positive Positive Total 
54 21 19 2 3 99 
 
3.5.3 Leximancer Content Analysis 
Another segment of analysis for this mix-method study was computer-aided content analysis of all 
the newspaper articles in the data set. The content analysis method is “an empirically grounded 
method, exploratory in process, and predictive or inferential in intent” (Krippendorff, 2012, p. 1). 
Additionally, the content analysis approach is designed to extract the re-occurring terms from the 
text which can be tabulated into a frequency co-occurrence matrix (Stockwell, Colomb, Smith, & 
Wiles, 2009, p. 424). Furthermore, content analysis is appropriate method in the analysis of text 
and communication text (Nasir, 2005). This approach is useful in categorizing and classifying data 
into concepts of the phenomena (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Within 
Information Systems research, this approach has been employed in examining public outsourcing 
projects (Albertus, Ngwenyama, & Brown, 2015), in management information systems (Nasir, 
2005), and in virtual collaboration (Gallivan, 2001). In Critical Discourse Analysis, content 
analysis is an appropriate method in understanding the “socially situated interactions, and more 
global, societal structures, respectively” (Van Dijk, 1999, p. 460). Additionally, the CDA as a 
hermeneutic approach is intertwined with theory and methodology (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 
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2010). Thus, a content analysis of newspaper articles is a crucial aspect of understanding discourse 
in media regarding Somalia.  
Computer-aided content analysis has blurred the separation between the qualitative CDA 
approach and the quantitative approaches (Bos & Tarnai, 1999). One approach of computer-aided 
content analysis is accomplished through grounded theory. Grounded theory is a methodological 
process in which theory is generated from within the data itself. Due to a large amount of text 
(3,946 pages) in the data set, manually labelling and coding the documents would be time-
consuming. 
Thus, an automatic, unsupervised approach to data extraction was selected for this study. 
This study employed Leximancer software to seed the major themes and concepts emerging from 
within the data. More specifically, “[t]he system goes beyond keyword searching by discovering 
and extracting thesaurus-based concepts from the text data, with no requirement for a prior 
dictionary…” (Chen & Bouvain, 2008, p. 304). One key benefit of Leximancer software is to 
analyze the data utilizing a grounded theory method to uncover concepts from the data set itself. 
For example, as a text-mining tool, the software can reliably show patterns emergent from within 
the data. Specifically, Leximancer employed a dual approach to determine the concepts and 
themes. The first approach is the software builds a dictionary list, which is used to create the 
thesaurus, which supports concepts based on co-occurrence in the text. The second approach is to 
build similar concepts that build out a semantic network or themes (A. E. Smith, 2003). 
Leximancer Findings 
The first step of the content analysis was placing the data into the Leximancer software. The 
newspaper articles were combined into a single portable document format (pdf) file by newspaper. 
This would provide a clear understanding of the themes and concepts present as well as assist in 
comparing each newspaper. The Leximancer program automatically removes common words such 
as “and,” “if,” “a,” “the,” which are present across all newspapers. Next, excluded from the 
analysis were words such as “date,” “author,” “by” as well as the name of the newspaper (i.e. 
Guardian) that appeared in all the newspapers. After the generation of the concept map, I kept the 
theme visibility at an automatic 33%, and ensured all concepts within the theme were set at 100% 
visibility. All themes that appeared first had a connectivity score of 100%. To clarify, the 
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difference between a theme and a concept in this study, a double quote indicates a theme and a 
single quote indicates a concept. 
The individual newspaper analysis showed that the theme “Somalia” appeared as the first 
theme in eight of the 14 newspapers. Moreover, the same theme appeared as the second theme in 
three of the four remaining list of themes. The theme “Somalia” did not appear in the top five 
themes of Reuters articles. The second theme had themes such as “Failed” in the AFP, “Political” 
in the BBC. “Government” appeared as the second theme in three sources: FT, TEL, and WPO. In 
the remaining themes, themes regarding war, force and military were present (see Appendix 7). 
Several themes included world, international, country and countries were prevalent in the 
newspaper articles. For a complete list of themes and concepts from source, refer to Appendices 
3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. 
Once the evaluation of individual newspapers was completed, all articles combined into 
one document for analysis. The results from the combined articles showed that once again, the 
theme of “Somalia” was first. Within this theme, concepts of ‘Somalia’ appeared 6,466 times 
followed by ‘government’ appearing 4,993, ‘country’ at the 3,129 and ‘failed’ appearing 2,805. 
The theme of “Foreign,” the concepts of ‘foreign’ appeared 1,504 times, ‘power’ at 1,365, 
‘became’ was the third concept in this theme at 1,171. The third theme was “international” which 
had the concept of ‘international’ appearing 2,508, followed by ‘community’ appearing 2,134 and 
the third concept was ‘security’ which had a hit count of 2,134. Table 3.7 summaries the top five 
themes, as well as the top five concepts within each theme. 
Table 3.7: Five major themes and five concepts references across all news sources 
Theme 1: 
Somalia (100%) 
Theme 2: 
Foreign (93%) 
Theme 3: 
International (86%) 
Theme 4: 
People (84%) 
Theme 5: War 
(59%) 
Somalia (6466) Foreign (1504) International (2508) People (3385) War (2483) 
Government 
(4993) 
Power (1365) Community (2134) Forces (1688) World (1993) 
Country (3129 Become (1171) Security (2134) Troops (1722) Time (1914) 
Failed (2805) Former (1114) Political (2002) Aid (1537) United States (1529) 
 Nation (970) Support (1448) Piracy (1053)  
 
Figure 3.5 is a concept map of these themes, and the dark red theme is the most prominent. Within 
the articles of this theme, the ‘failed’ concept is connected to the country as well as law. Through 
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the map, it is clear to see that most articles regarding Somalia show that stories are mostly negative 
reinforcing the sentiment analysis conducted earlier. The concepts in the news sources showed that 
crisis, conflict, and power appeared most frequently and had the strongest connectivity in the 
document. 
 
Figure 3.5: Leximancer concept map of all news sources 
 
 
3.5.4 Atlas/Ti Coding and Analysis 
The final method completed for this study is based on the heuristic analysis of the newspaper 
articles. For this coding, I utilized Atlas/TI (version 8) software to code the articles manually. 
Atlas/Ti software allows for a closer content analysis of the data, as well as creating a network 
view of the code (Friese, 2014). Moreover, it allows for the document to be coded automatically 
though naturally grounded keyword searches as well as through emergent codes that arise from a 
close reading of the document (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2013). The Atlas/Ti software 
similarly provides results to be quantitatively analyzed through a co-concurrence table that 
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provides a ratio of the codes. Moreover, the Atlas/Ti software allows for a combination of 
understanding the qualitative document by linking the discursive element along with the 
quantitative results to assist in understanding the results (Friese, 2014; Saldaña, 2012).  
In addition to the grounded coding, some of the selected codes were based on the 
Leximancer results, others were created based on a priori codes, while some were coded in vivo, 
based on a close reading of the articles. Upon completion of the coding, the newspapers were 
placed into four document “families”: four North American Newspapers (ANP), four British 
Newspapers (BNP), four wire services (Wire), and the BBC and NPR (Other). These coding 
families were chosen to gain insight into the difference between various news sources. One 
objective was to determine which source was more likely to describe Somalia in terms such as a 
failed state along with its associated traits. Additionally, I attempted to explore the characteristics 
associated with Somalia across various sources. Finally, an objective of this level of data analysis 
was to create an understanding of the concepts and definitions of a failed state. 
Once the iterative coding was completed, 55 concepts were coded across the four document 
families for a total of 44,816 individual codes in the 1,471 news sources (see Appendix 8). The 
codes included any mention of Somalia, failed state, issues such as terrorism, famine, and piracy 
that are often associated with the country that emerged from the Leximancer and sentiment analysis 
as well as the literature review. Highlighted were other codes such as individual actors, and 
positive concepts in the country, such as the establishment of law and order. There was a noticeable 
difference between the coding families. As part of the analysis of the codes, a co-occurrence table 
was created.  
Atlas/Ti findings 
As expected, the code that appeared the most in the document families was “Somalia,” followed 
by “failed state” and “Somali.” However, I was interested in finding various components that 
comprise the term ‘failed state’ along with concepts that have negative connotations associated 
with them, including corrupt, clan/tribal, violence, and warlords. This narrowed the focus from the 
initial 55 codes to 8 codes (see Table 3.9) which resulted in 25,887 quotations. The same codes 
resulted in a co-occurrence matrix table (see Appendix 9). 
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Table 3.8: Atlas/Ti concepts in four code families 
 *ANP *BNP *OTHER *WIRE TOTALS 
Clan 147 175 367 265 954 
Corrupt 68 91 85 108 352 
Democracy 122 71 101 90 384 
Dictator 103 104 146 204 557 
Failed State 828 954 1368 1270 4420 
Famine 123 177 71 98 469 
Hopeless 7 15 4 6 32 
Military 351 289 277 333 1250 
Peacekeeping 102 128 133 202 565 
Piracy 246 651 407 706 2010 
Refugees 71 78 67 55 271 
Somalia 1305 2060 3204 2928 9497 
Somaliland 79 68 520 63 730 
Terrorism-
International 
433 445 52 462 1392 
Terrorism-Local 164 368 186 473 1191 
Ungovernable 1 4 4 2 11 
Violence 185 182 183 389 939 
Warlord 159 198 182 324 863 
TOTALS: 4494 6058 7357 7978 25887 
 
From these codes, I created a network map, as a visual representation of the codes and their 
association with each other. Figure 3.6, shows the link between “Somalia” and the concept “failed 
state,” which has several sub-themes associated with it. For example, many newspapers have 
presented the argument that because it is a failed state, the issue of piracy off Somalia’s littoral is 
one result. Another example is that warlords have taken over parts of the country; there is a refugee 
crisis that caused by its failed status. Terrorism, a component of international terrorism, is another 
issue associated with Somalia’s failed status. Thus, this network view developed within Atlas/Ti 
software allowed for an analysis of the causes and associations between the codes. 
 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 3:  65 
Figure 3.6: The link network map of causes and components of a failed state 
 
 
The network map also explored Somalia’s association with issues such as corruption, dictatorship, 
clan loyalties, and being ungovernable. Guided by results from the literature review, Somalia is 
presented as a country lacking a modern democratic state. Five codes were directly coded in the 
same quotation, while 33 codes co-occurred in the same document. One exemplary quote is 
“Albright, an academic specialist on Central Europe, urged America to "stay the course in Somalia 
and lift its people from a failed state to an emergent democracy." Albright, clearly on unfamiliar 
terrain when she detected the mirage of democracy in Somalia's tortured history, typified the 
unreadiness of [President Bill] Clinton strategists to grasp...” (WPO4). The quote contained within 
itself several claims about Somalia that reinforced several negative traits.  
Somalia: a definition of a failed state 
The results confirmed the other two studies that there is a high co-occurrence between Somalia 
and failed state. They were 14,990 codes that co-occurred for the highest ratio of .12 (Appendix 
10 is the complete co-occurrence matrix table). For the code families, the highest observation 
found was in the “Other” category (1368). A possible reason for the higher number of codes in the 
“Other” family was due to the source being transcripts of news reports, which resulted in a higher 
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repetition of the term ‘failed state’. The lowest observations were found in ANP sources (828).  
Figure 3.7 is a ratio tree-map from all news sources by code families. 
 
Figure 3.7: Atlas/Ti concepts tree-map in four code families across all news sources 
 
A thread that permeates the discussion across the various news sources is that Somalia is what 
happens when society fails. For example, Somalia has become “the modern world's closest 
approximation of Hobbes's state of nature, where life was indeed nasty, brutish, and short” 
[BBC62]. The breakdown means all essential services typically carried out by an organized 
structure have ceased to function. 
Another idea communicated is that a type of regression leads to it being a “breeding ground 
for other vices and criminal activities, including terrorism” [AFP11]. These concerns then lead to 
the implication that the country is a lost cause: “Everyone lost hope in Somalia, and no one 
believed the failed state would recover anytime soon” [BBC172]. An overarching argument 
presented is that the country requires an approach that leads to a state, as Kenya’s foreign minister 
Moses Wetangula in 2010 stated that other nations should “help Somalia ‘become a state’” 
[AP104]. However, there are specific root causes attributed to Somalia’s failure of a state.  
Interestingly, throughout the period of analysis, there have been several countries 
compared to Somalia as failed states. The study found that countries such as Haiti, Yemen, Syria, 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 3:  67 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Mali have been compared to Somalia. For example, “Some critics even 
go so far as to call Haiti a failed state, comparing it to Somalia or even Afghanistan” (GM7). By 
making Somalia the quintessential failed state, whenever a country experiences a violent episode 
many point to the country as a warning for what could be. 
Trait 1: Dictatorship 
A significant contributor to the country’s failure is its history with the military dictator Siad Barre, 
who is blamed for institutionalizing these traits of failure. Propagated in several news sources is 
the idea of dictatorship as the basis for the failed status. These examples include statements such 
as “Somalia, a nation of about 10 million, is unambiguously the world's only failed state since 
1991 when dictator Mohamed Siad Barre was toppled, thereby sliding the nation into a patchwork 
of fiefdoms governed by unruly warlords” [AFP13]. The code table reveals that most news sources 
link the country’s rise of warlords with its history with dictatorship. Specifically, the highest ratio 
of codes that co-occurred was dictator and warlord. Thus, when it comes to statehood, the notion 
exists that the state could work as long a strongman controlled the level of power: “when Siad 
Barre finally decided to call it quits, all hell broke loose and the dismantling of the Somali State” 
[BBC227]. However, the autocratic leader that controls the country still needs a base of support, 
rewarded through corruption. 
Trait 2: Corruption 
Somalia’s link to the term corrupt has contributed to its current malaise. Specifically, because of 
corruption, the term co-occurs with terms such as refugees, dictators and local terrorism. 
Democracy is often mentioned as a reason to reduce corruption. When examining the difference 
between the code families, wire services (108) were more likely to state corruption as being linked 
to the “Somalia” code and once again, the least mention of the term in ANP (68) sources. 590 
quotations co-occurred between Somalia and corruption. 213 codes were directly coded resulting 
in a 0.02 ratio. The association with corruption is considered one of the root causes that led to state 
failure, as noted by the Associated Press in 2010 when examining what led to the country’s famine 
"Corruption is a major part of the problem in Somalia," said Rashid Abdi, a Somalia analyst at the 
International Crisis Group” [AP115]. Indeed, the suspect populace is often presented as rooted in 
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a society that that does not allow righteous people to emerge into the government, as “‘most of the 
same corrupt officials are expected to be members in both the parliament and the cabinet,’ said 
Mohamed Mubarak, a Somalia analyst.” [FT110]. These characteristics are used to explain why 
the country is having difficulty retaining international development assistance. For example, in the 
same article it posited that the country had “hired British and US consultants to discredit a UN 
report that claims rampant corruption in Mogadishu because it threatens to imperil donor funding 
and the return of foreign-held assets, including gold, totalling billions of dollars” [FT110]. This 
flaw with the country is another characteristic that has led to the country becoming a failed state. 
Trait 3: Tribalism 
Across the news sources is the idea that corruption is linked to the “clan” structure of the country. 
There were 590 co-occurring quotations linked between two of these directly connected 47 articles. 
There is a recurring perception that the country is a standard-bearer of corruption as noted in one 
source, “Somalia is regularly listed as the world's worst failed state and its most corrupt country…” 
(TIM90). Another illustrative example was: “The precise cause of the power struggle is unclear, 
but politicians have pointed to wrangling over alleged corruption, personal loyalties as well as 
Somalia's complex clan politics, where each community expects to be represented in the corridors 
of power” (AFP127). A similar idea is “[Siad] Hussein's frustration is now vented at Somalia's 
rotten political system, where corruption is rampant, and the selfish interests of power brokers too 
often trump national interests (REU130). Additionally, this corruption has fueled the rise of 
tribalism: “Somalia has had over 21 years of instability that has shattered its economy, 
infrastructure, lives and led to many splintered regions as well as a rise in religious and tribal 
extremism.” (BBC159). By tackling this corruption, international donors and agencies would be 
able to assist the country in achieving stability. One example echoed by Somalia politicians is: 
"The time to say Somalia is not peaceful has come to an end," he [President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 
Ahmed] said, after he and eight others signed the document, which commits the notoriously 
corrupt Somali authorities to a strict timetable of reforms” (TEL39). Thus, the interconnected 
notions of clan, tribalism and corruption are very much at the heart of the country’s failure.  
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Trait 4: Ungovernable 
A potent strain with the news sources has been that the country and its people are ungovernable. 
This characteristic is presented as a sign the country cannot be governed by modern state functions. 
These sources point to the concept of ‘state’ as being foreign to Somalis. This would explain the 
difficulty in creating and fostering a state. Although the number of articles is relatively small, 11 
codes, with three quotes co-occur with Somalia. This attitude was summed up in the British 
newspaper, the Times of London: “Somalia is the world's premier failed state, a seemingly 
ungovernable mess that has spawned terrorism, piracy and now a famine that is driving a growing 
proportion of the population out” [TIM66]. The lack of governance, defined by an internationally 
recognized government is seen as one of the problems afflicting the country: “But Somalia remains 
lawless and thus largely off-limits, and after two decades with a failed state in that country, 
companies can hardly be blamed for investing in short-term measures” [BBC121]. When 
describing the country, the BBC monitoring service noted that Somalia’s transitional government 
was addressing perceived problem of un-governability. The articled observed that “When Somalia 
started falling apart in the early '90s, it was unimaginable then, that the country would remain 
ungovernable to date” [BBC55]. It then concludes with the surprising reflection that Somalia can 
now be “aptly be described as [a] functioning” [BBC55]. Meaning there are now contours of 
government institutions with trappings of an administrative state.  
Trait 5: (Lack of) Democracy  
One solution often offered is implementing a Western-style democratic system of governance, and 
a reason for its Somalia’s move to a failed status is that the country contradicts the norms of 
democracy. The data show that 33 democracy codes co-occurred with the term Somalia. There 
were in total 384 codes across all code families, and North American sources were more likely to 
be the ones mentioning democracy as either the explanation or solution for Somalia’s problems. 
For example, the “decision we must make is whether to pull up stakes and allow Somalia to fall 
back into the abyss or to stay the course and help lift the country and its people from the category 
of a failed state into that of an emerging democracy. For Somalia's sake, and ours, we must 
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persevere." [Former US Secretary of State Madeline] Albright said” [NYT3]. Although, in 1993, 
Washington Post opinion columnist Charles Krauthammer pushed back by writing: 
 “Apart from the fact that it could take 100 years to turn Somalia from its current precolonial 
state of nature into an emerging democracy, there is this question: Why? Why must the 
United States do this? ‘For Somalia's sake, and ours, we must persevere,’ intoned Albright. 
This is noble, foolish Utopianism. The job of a U.S. ambassador is not to terminate the 
abominable injustices of the world. It is to protect and defend the Constitution, the people 
and, yes, the interests of the United States.” [WPO1] 
Yet, one argument posits that Somalia is incompatible with ideals of democracy. Democracy is 
presented as unworkable because of the tribal nature of Somalia, as illustrated in the Financial 
Times: “Many countries, smarting at their failure, gave up on Somalia altogether. With hindsight, 
UN officials talk of their naivety in thinking Western-style democracy could replace clan 
allegiances” [FT1]. Thus, the benefits of averting the current chaos in the country are 
unquestioned: “Let's get real: democracy is messy and starting it off again in Somalia is going to 
be very mucky but at least let's get it on the road. We have to live with whoever emerges” [FT101]. 
Although the risks of having a corrupt or Islamist government exist, this solution to the country’s 
problems would better than the current situation.  
Characteristic 1: Violence 
One characteristic that frequently appears because of the failed status is violence. For the purposes 
of this study, definitions of violence include situations such as war, bombings and military action. 
939 codes in total were found across the four code families, with the highest numbers in the wire 
services. The higher references in wire service reports could be attributed to wire services reporting 
on bombing or acts of violence that occurred in the country without necessarily attributing 
causality. When examining the coding matrix, the results show that the violence code is attributed 
to clan (66/0.04), refugees (42/0.04), and corruption (42/0.03). A linkage is ascribed to the civil 
war that led to the collapse of the country’s government. One example of this is “Somalia has been 
embroiled in civil war for more than 20 years. Diplomats call it a ‘failed state,’ a state with rampant 
famine, violence, and chaos… that could create a system by which to keep the order” [BBC203]. 
Moreover, continued violence is seen as a vital indicator of a failed state status: “Since 1991, the 
13 previous attempts at forming a functioning central government had failed amid clan-driven 
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violence and the resistance of gun runners and other war profiteers” [NYT79]. Another example 
of this type of argument was presented within the BBC: “With a two-decade-long history of 
instability, upheaval and violence, Somalia has become the poster child of the failed state” 
[BBC160]. When a decline in violent activity is witnessed, this often seen as a sign that the country 
might emerge from the cycle of violence: “Many Somalis, Western and Arab diplomats and aid 
workers were rooting for the Horn of Africa country that had been in a perpetual state of violence 
and anarchy for 20 years. Had Somalia's turning point arrived?” [REU147]. Within the 
newspapers, we see a correlation between points about tackling violence in order to foster 
centralized government. 
Characteristic 2: Warlord 
Arising out of the violence were descriptions of leaders vying for political and economic control 
in the country as warlords in several news sources. The code appeared 863 times in the various 
news sources, with the most appearance in wire services. The violence code had the most co-
occurrence with violence; this was used to explain the reason for violence happening in the 
country. Several sources pointed to the uprising against Siad Barre as being led by warlords, for 
example: “The arid, impoverished Horn of Africa nation had not had a functioning government 
since 1991, when clan-based warlords overthrew a socialist dictator” [AP69]. These warlords are 
presented as flourishing after the fall of Siad Barre. “In a lot of ways, Somalia has been a failed 
state for too long, awash as it was with murderous warlords” [BBC163]. Indeed, the warlords are 
a significant characteristics of failed states: “The 56-year-old academic [President Hassan Sheikh 
Mohamud] promised to bring Somalia, best known as a byword for failed state, back into the 
international fold, but he inherits an ongoing war, a humanitarian crisis, feeble institutions and 
deeply entrenched warlordism” [AFP113]. Thus, these individuals have been grouped together to 
determine they are a component contributing to state failure.  
Characteristic 3:  Refugees/Hopelessness 
One direct consequence of state failure is the displacement of the country’s population both 
internally and externally. This phenomenon is exacerbated because of civil conflict as well as 
drought and famine that afflicted Somalia on several occasions. Although the total number of codes 
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(271) was relatively fewer than the other codes, the refugee code appeared the most in British news 
sources, while the wire services had the lowest number. The refugee code appeared in similar 
numbers across all news sources. The hopelessness code appeared about refugees. However, some 
argued that the opposite was, in fact, true: “mentioning [Somalia] has the words "suffering," 
"warlord," and "al-Qaeda" attached? Somalia may indeed be a dysfunctional state, but that hardly 
makes it hopeless, as the news media would have us believe. Rather, as Farah's latest novel, 
"Knots," suggests, there is hope for Somalia and its people.” [BBC108]. Even with that hopeful 
note, most have described country’s situation thusly: “The clamour from aid agencies for funds 
and access to halt what they are calling the world's worst famine in 20 years has put a spotlight on 
the ingrained crisis in Somalia, a failed state held hostage by Islamist extremists, pirates and 
warlord politicians in which aid has been repeatedly diverted” [FT84]. Thus, the refugee trait is 
characteristic of a failed state. 
Characteristic 4: Piracy 
Although piracy is not part of the general characteristics of what a failed state is, it often becomes 
an important part of the discussion on Somalia and state failure. More specifically, without a 
government that could offer protection for its coastline, it left a vacuum for pirates to overtake it. 
The rise of piracy becoming synonymous with Somalia began in the middle of the 2000s, with 
2010 codes appearing across all articles; by far the most appearances were within wire service 
articles. The wire services relayed information about the risk posed to the marine shipping industry 
and tracked the story of the ships being held for ransom. The North American news sources (246) 
had the least amount of codes. When examining the code co-occurrence table, refugees were more 
likely to appear together with the rise of piracy. The next co-occurrence was with failed state. One 
illustrative example posited, “Somalia has also become synonymous with piracy and a danger to 
key international shipping lanes” [AFP129]. Another noted, “Without central government since 
1991, Somalia has become the epitome of a failed state, and the chaos onshore has fueled rampant 
piracy in the busy shipping lanes off the coast.” [REU69]. Indeed, piracy has given warlords and 
corrupt officials with funding to continue funding their illicit activity: “The piracy is fuelled by 
the anarchy in Somalia, a failed state where criminality is thriving as a weak interim government 
struggles to establish its authority.” [FT52]. Moreover, the country became intertwined with this 
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image: “Improving Somalia's tarnished world image reputed as the abode of violent armed groups 
and piracy by projecting the new Somalia as a responsible and respectable member state in the 
world community.” [BBC157]. Piracy will continue without a central government coming into 
force: “Experts say piracy is just one symptom of the general collapse of law and order in the failed 
state of Somalia, which has not had a functioning government in 19 years. They say attacks on 
shipping will continue as long as there is no central government capable of taking on the well-
armed and well-paid pirate gangs.” [CP29]. This has also become part of the argument presented 
by the US government “Current orthodoxy sees piracy as a product or symptom of failed or rogue 
states. The inference from Obama's statements is that the world must fix the Somali pirate problem 
at source, by fixing the anarchy of Somalia itself.” [GUA53]. As a result, piracy is linked directly 
to Somalia as a failed state.  
However, some contradictions have also appeared within the news sources. One source 
argued that piracy is part of the funding for terrorism: “Most European countries take the view that 
piracy is intrinsically linked to the economic and political crisis in Somalia, a failed state. They do 
not, however, believe that al-Qaida is involved in any of the piracy incidents.” [GUA48]. It is 
suggested that this is merely about the opportunity to make money, not a direct result of failed 
status: “[piracy] the latest symptom of what afflicts an utterly failed state – a free-for-all on land 
that has consumed the country since the central government imploded in 1991. As any warlord 
there can tell you, the violence is almost always about cash. ''We just want the money'' is their 
mantra.” [NYT55]. Many countries have sent naval ships to take part in protection force that 
resulted in the arrests of many Somalis: “Somalia itself is a failed state with no working justice 
system, although hundreds of pirates have already been taken to the overcrowded prisons of the 
semiautonomous region of Puntland. A handful of captured pirates are also being held in Yemen 
and the Maldives.” [CP31]. Ultimately, the solution is to create a new Somali government 
“Another solution to the piracy problem, some officials say, would be to restore the rule of law to 
the failed state of Somalia. However, so far, no one has stepped forward with an effective plan to 
accomplish that.” [NPR25]. The solution to these issues is by fostering a state that meets with the 
traditional definitions of the concept as a way to save the country. 
Characteristic 5: Terrorism 
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Following the September 11th terror attacks and the rise of Al Qaida and Osama Bin Laden, the 
fear that Somalia could harbour terror suspects was one of the driving factors of understanding the 
characteristic of the failed state. The connection between Islamists in the country and international 
terrorism was employed to understand Somalia. The terror bombing in Kenya and Tanzania by Al 
Qaida placed a spotlight on the country next door. There were 1,191 code frequencies in all 
sources, and the wire services had the most mentions (473) followed by other sources (368). After 
the connection to international terrorism, Somalia, clan and corruption co-occurred the most. The 
fear of the country being a lawless base for terror groups was summed as “The United States 
worries that Somalia could be a terrorist breeding ground, particularly since Osama bin Laden 
declared his support for Islamic radicals there” [AP75]. The vacuum is described as, “We have 
seen what has happened in Somalia and in Iraq. In the former, the power vacuum has created a 
state of permanent chaos, so much so that Somalia exists in name only. It is the ultimate failed 
state where competing tribal leaders and rival Islamist groups battle vainly to control and because 
no one group is strong enough, succeed only in creating more death and destruction” [BBC114]. 
The comparison to Afghanistan is ever-present as “One can see moreover, why Somalia presses 
so many American buttons. As a failed state in transition from warlords' rule to an Islamist emirate, 
it resembles Afghanistan. The humiliation of the failed US intervention in Mogadishu in 1993 - 
the Black Hawk Down episode - ranks with the headlong retreat of US marines from Beirut a 
decade earlier.” [FT33]. The notion that country could serve as a base was furthered by a British 
prime minister, David Cameron: “The Prime Minister described the east African nation as a "failed 
state that directly threatens British interests," citing attacks on tourists and aid workers, and 
radicalisation of young Britons by militant Islamist groups with roots in the region.” [TEL42]. 
Accordingly, Somalia’s association with terrorism serves to bring the country back into the 
spotlight as place that should be feared. In part, because the internal structures within the country 
do not conform to the expectations, some argue that the country could easily fall into the hands of 
people who want to do the world harm. 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this study, I critically examined how Western, English speaking news media affected discourse 
about Somalia. After analyzing 14 English news sources based in the United States, Great Britain 
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and Canada, an empirical understanding of how the country is presented and portrayed emerged. 
Through a mixed-method approach utilizing Critical Discourse Analysis, the study has confirmed 
that media narratives about the country are negative in tone, violent in description and have 
reinforced negative stereotypes regarding Somalia and its people. Furthermore, within these news 
sources, I determined the main causes of a failed state, a term often used in association with 
Somalia, along with its main characteristics. 
When examining trends over time, there is an increase corpus of data displaying stories 
about Somalia’s failure as a state. Notably, these stories point to a marked increase when overlaid 
onto major global events. One example was the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States; Somalia 
became a centre of focus because of concerns that terrorists could seek refuge in the country. 
Another example was the famine that afflicted it along with the rise of the Al Shabab Islamist 
group, which resulted in efforts to assist Somalia. The issue of piracy prompted an international 
response to “protect” country’s coastline. The increase in these news mentions is interrelated with 
the country’s local political situation as well as the international nature of some of its 
consequences. 
Having established that Western news mentions about the country are driven by significant 
events about the country, I then sought to understand the tone and the sentiment utilized in the 
headlines in these stories. This study found that the few keywords and entities analyzed using 
AlchemyAPI have positive sentimentality. However, all the headlines from all news sources had 
a high negative score (-0.397). When delving into the emergent concepts in the headlines, it 
showed that the issues of piracy in Somalia frequently appeared in these headlines. Furthermore, 
the second-highest taxonomy of these headlines was (“society/unrest and war”) also negative.  
The computer-aided content analysis of all documents using Leximancer software of all 
1,471 articles that span close to a quarter-century showed that the dominant themes had strong 
connotations to war, military pirates and failed governance. These trends were across the board in 
all news sources, re-iterating the idea that Somalia is an ungovernable haven for pirates. The 
negative themes and concepts in the news reports were observed across all 14 sources. An 
interesting observation from the news reports was that it often linked to international implications. 
The internationalization of the country was one sign that Somalia is often at the intersection of 
local problems that are international in scope. For example, the issue of terrorism is often linked 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 3:  76 
to the more extensive religious-inspired networks that operate worldwide. The issue of piracy has 
linked the movement of goods through a vital passageway. 
The Atlas/Ti coding and analysis allowed for a closer study of the news articles resulting 
in a richer description of the concepts and themes regarding Somalia. The coding analysis resulted 
in an understanding of what the news sources claimed to be the leading causes of Somalia’s failed 
status. As a result, the study found that the five main causes were corruption, dictatorship, the 
tribal/clan structure and that the country was ungovernable. Notably, these trends were not limited 
to a type of news sources but appeared across the various code families. When examining the 
characteristics, according the news sources, what most often became associated with the news 
sources included violence, warlords, refugees, piracy and terrorism. These characteristics were 
used to define Somalia and were extrapolated to explain a failed state.  
The media is one of the most vibrant parts of the public sphere; in Jurgen Habermas’s 
Theory of Communicative Action (TCA), an open and free media is crucial to the functioning of 
a society. Thus, whenever a distortion emerges within the public sphere, the effects to society and 
state can be damaging. The media, which plays an intermediary role within society, creates and 
reproduces certain ideas and notions that become entrenched in social norms. As Habermas (2006) 
noted, “Ideas enter into social reality via the idealizing presuppositions innate in every-day 
practices and inconspicuously acquire the quality of stubborn social facts” (p. 413). Accordingly, 
the descriptions of Somalia have become part of social facts as described by Habermas. For 
example, the idea that Somalia is a failed state is repeated frequently in the Western news media. 
The narrative and discourse have reflected a type of language that re-enforces the picture of a 
country that is in an intractable mess. 
Results of this study further show how Western media play a crucial role in the “othering” 
of African countries more generally but also Somalia more specifically as noted by Ogundimu 
(1994); Ogundimu and Fair (1997); and Brookes (1995). The hegemonic discourse that is about 
the dark continent is evident in the language that frequently appears in news sources including the 
allusions to violence, barbarism and backwardness as discussed by Jarosz (1992) and Nabudere 
(2007). The strong, native language appeared in opinion pieces and especially in financial papers 
such as The Wall Street Journal and Financial Times. 
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The idea of what constitutes a modern state has been traced over time, and its characteristics 
can be defined; this, however, does not apply clearly to the concept of a failed state. The modern 
state should have three components, a defined territory, its legitimacy should be unquestioned by 
its citizens, and it should be recognized by other countries. Somalia is viewed as a failure because 
it is violence-prone, a substantial number of its citizens do not view the state as legitimate, and its 
territory is mostly unprotected. This goes back to the idea that a functioning state should ensure 
social conflict in the form of violence is eliminated or minimized. However, the concept of state 
is contested and does not seem to apply to Somalia. More specifically, structures within Somalia 
are often ignored or minimized in the media sources. This seems to blind international explanations 
about the country, most evident in the news media. By not acknowledging the ground structures 
that are delivering services to Somalis, the solutions to improving the social and economic issues 
in the country will remain challenging. As Chapter 2 illustrated, the Western form of state is 
relatively new to the Somali people.  
3.6.1 Limitations and contributions 
There were some limitations to this study. Although sources were randomly selected and 
systematically interrogated, a large number of new media were excluded for a variety of reasons. 
This study would have been enhanced with an examination of the visuals that media employ when 
describing the country. Another limitation was the examination of other media in other languages 
to gain insight into how they discuss Somalia.  
However, in this study, I critically analyzed the discourse surrounding the Western news 
media. This study has enhanced our understanding of the discourse and the framing of the country. 
Although previous studies have examined discourse around piracy in Somalia (Rothe & Collins, 
2011), and the political process (B. G. Jones, 2008), the constitutional development process 
(Stremlau, 2016) as well the ‘othering’ of Somalia (Besteman, 1996), this study compressively 
examined the discourse through the concept of the failed state. More specifically, this study 
contributed to the definition and characteristics of a failed state. Moreover, it added to our 
understanding of the language used by knowledge carriers concerning Somalia. 
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Chapter 4:  Study 2: Institutional and organizational structures within 
Somalia that support economic and social activity: Evidence from 
Somaliland 
 
Abstract 
This study explores the existing social structures in Somalia. Through in-country key informant interviews 
from various sectors and industries, I sought to discover the visible and invisible institutions that are central 
to delivering social and economic services in Somalia. This study found evidence of social structures as 
elucidated in Anthony Giddens’s Structuration Theory. Additionally, the study employed a grounded-
theory, case study approach to understanding the institutions and how they function. The research recruited 
30 key informants from four sectors: Education, Government, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
and Industry. This research employed both purposeful as well as snowball sampling. This study presented 
evidence of how the economy works in the country. This study provides evidence of institutions that allow 
for the financial services to be offered. Finally, this study offers examples of how the ICT sector contributes 
to the economic activities of the country, along with its mediating role in Somali society. 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The second study of this thesis examines evidence of institutions and societal structures in Somalia. 
Although the country is perceived as having very few institutional structures, there is evidence of 
structures that allow for markets to function and social services to be delivered. Through a multi-
method approach, this study scans for evidence across sectors to explore existing institutional 
structures. Institutions as a concept can be distilled as the rules of the game (Ostrom, 2007). More 
specifically, the rules of the game can be formal in the sense of the regulatory bodies, organizations 
and agencies or they can be informal in the as in the norms and customs of a particular society, 
referenced as Habermasean term of lifeworld (Campbell, 1998; Habermas, 1991). By illustrating 
evidence of how structures such as the monetary system, social services, education system and 
justice are functioning and delivered this study will delve past superficial perspectives of Somalia 
that were evidenced in the first study. Moreover, these institutions and structures enable the ICT 
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sector to deliver goods and services to consumers. Accordingly, the empirical evidence of this 
study will critically examine the role of ICT in all the areas of the economy. The third chapter 
showed that the term state is socially constructed reinforces the West’s definition which dominates 
the discourse. 
One of the most important responsibilities that a modern government conducts is the 
control and supply of the monetary system (Wray, 1998). It is through the control of the monetary 
system that the government exerts its influence on the economy of the country. Prior to the 
government’s collapse, the central bank, as well as all financial institutions, were tightly controlled 
by the government (Leeson, 2007a; Qassim, 2004). However, the economic mismanagement, 
along with border wars with its neighbours resulted in the systemic collapse of banking system 
(Abdi I. Samatar, 1992). The Somali government attempted and introduced various policies that 
would be designed to support the financial system however the banking system was virtually 
closed to the general public in the late 1980s (Omer, 2004; Qassim, 2004). In fact, in 1989 the 
Commercial and Savings Bank, the country’s only commercial bank declared bankruptcy 
(Mubarak, 1997). Accordingly, by the time the government institutions ceased to exist, a 
decentralized financial system had established a presence within the country. Since then, the lack 
of a regulated financial sector has hampered the economic potential of the country by limiting 
access to capital (Mubarak, 1997). Different regions of the country have issued their own local 
currency. Somalia’s various decentralized currencies are pegged to the American dollar which 
allows for international trade (Kulaksiz & Purdekova, 2006; Sayid & Echchabi, 2013). Even with 
these concerns, the Somali population has access to a financial system, and financial transactions 
are still occurring in the country. For example, people in the country have developed a 
sophisticated mobile banking system that is used to buy goods or to pay salaries and even to 
distribute aid by some International NGOs. This leads to the first question: What institutional and 
organizational structures have allowed economic and social activity possible in Somalia under 
conditions of failure? To answer that question this study seeks models of formal and informal 
structures already existing in the country.  
In part, because Somalia does not have a robust centralized government apparatus to collect 
statistics about the economy, population and other basic economic and social indicators, this study 
set out to create a database of relevant information about Somalia. Moreover, I reviewed literature 
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from various national and international agencies to gather as much information about the economy 
and social sectors in the country. Currently, data is spread out across the various Somali 
government agencies, United Nations agencies, donor countries, Non-Governmental Agencies, 
and private companies. Aspects often missing from current databases include information about 
the various social and economic sectors. This is particularly the case of the ICT sector, where 
information about subscription numbers, the price for calls and data rates are often are not tracked. 
I collected and analyzed secondary data from various departments, ministries and international 
agencies to understand the institutions within the country. Consequently, I conducted in-country 
data collection in order to gather the necessary information that is often not publically available. 
The Somali economy has shown signs of resilience despite the lack of a centralized 
government. One example, of a completely private market currency, is the Somali Shilling (SoSh) 
(Little, 2003). Urban areas were more affected by the state-controlled currency. However, the rural 
economy adjusted more quickly to the situation because rural areas had previously instituted 
exchange networks that extended credit to other members of the community thus were more 
accustomed to the concept of a local currency. Although the economy is still considered to be 
recessionary, overall GDP has consistently grown at over two percent, after the initial crash that 
proceeded the fall of the government in 1990 (Little, 2003). Since then, the economy has come to 
revolve around three main engines which are livestock (40%), remittances (35%) and the 
telecommunication sectors (Menkhaus, 2011; UNDP, 2012; World Bank, 2015a). However, it 
should be noted that the economy still struggles to absorb a majority of the residents of the country. 
For example, one study estimated that 67 percent of youth between the ages of 14 and 29 are 
unemployed (UNDP, 2012; World Bank, 2015a). 
Education is an important determinant of the social and economic development of any 
country, with some positing that education is fundamental human right (Abdi, 1998; Cummings & 
van Tonningen, 2003). Countries are encouraged to create space and invest in high-quality 
education in order to foster development in the country. In Somalia, formalized accrediting 
agencies for all schools, from primary to tertiary, are weak or non-existing. Nonetheless, schools 
continue to exist, students are being trained in all manner of fields and skills (Cassanelli & 
Abdikadir, 2008; Cummings & van Tonningen, 2003). With a weak central coordinating agency 
such as the national and regional Ministries of Education, the education system has faced several 
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issues, particularly in regard to gaining legitimacy among the population. As such, the quality of 
education offered has been questioned (Cassanelli & Abdikadir, 2008).  
However, in the mid-1990s, as communities and families took direct ownership of the 
education system and began to finance private schooling, it began to improve. Moreover, as the 
diaspora community increased remittance amounts, more children entered the private education 
system, increasing the enrollment rates from 10% in 1998 to 20% in the mid-2000s (Lindley, 
2007). The diaspora community played an essential role in investing in the schooling of children. 
The so-called Formal Private Education Networks in Somalia (FPENS) includes a network of 150 
schools with more than 90,000 students (Cassanelli & Abdikadir, 2008). It should be noted that 
some parts of the country have better-organized education delivery modes. For example, 
Somaliland has created a primary education that reaches a more substantial part of population 
while the south is still struggling to establish a formal education system (Bradbury, 2008). Thus, I 
am to understand the education system and how the students are certified. Additionally, the 
certification process for teachers needs to be investigated and what methods are used need to be 
explained. Finally, I aim to understand the role of ICT in the delivery of parts of the curriculum.  
This study explores how social services are delivered in the country. These social services 
include the delivery of medical care along with the emergency services. Additionally, this study 
focuses on how people access them, how are they regulated, and how people perceive social 
services. By exploring how the education system is working, this will help inform how the doctors, 
nurses and other providers of social services are trained. The role of technology needs to be better 
examined in this process, as well. Through an analysis of the underlying institutions that have 
emerged, this study can then explore the role of ICTs.  
Anecdotal evidence of informal and formal institutions along with societal structures that 
are contrary to the popular view of Somalia need to be empirically established. The method 
employed for the second study is a multifaceted, grounded approach that examines the public data 
about education levels, the economic indicators of the country and as well literary analysis of 
publically available data. From this Grounded Theory approach, I aim to posit an explanatory 
theory to explain the economic and social impact of the ICTs in the country. Consequently, this 
study aims to link the first study surrounding the discourse of Somalia’s failure and critically 
surface the on-the-ground situation. Specifically, this study presents data and data analysis on how 
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the economy is functioning and how many people are being educated, served and use the monetary 
system. Other examples include co-ops and savings institutions that people access to create 
investments or put towards new technologies and innovations. This study also studies how the 
court system works and how justice is delivered in case of disputes. More specifically, what are 
the dispute resolutions mechanisms and how do citizens access them. What approach do these 
dispute resolution mechanisms gain and maintain their legitimacy? Thus, this study brings to the 
fore the institutions and social structure of Somalia that replace, work in conjunction and in parallel 
to the formalized weak state structure. 
4.2. Background and Context 
Somalia’s human development indicators show that the country is afflicted by poverty, 61% 
percent of the urban population is poor, and 80% of the rural population is living under poverty, 
for an overall poverty rate of 80% (UNDP, 2010, 2012, 2015). In the last United Nations 
Development Programme/World Bank Socio-economic survey conducted in the country, people 
living under extreme poverty, those living with less than a dollar a day, are estimated to be 43.2% 
of the population (UNDP & World Bank, 2003). Accordingly, the UNDP estimates that half the 
population is in urgent need of aid and require some form of international assistance (OCHA, 
2012). The country’s per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is one of the lowest in the world 
at $503 US dollars (Current US$) in 2016 (World Bank, 2016). A variety of factors have led to 
such a significant drop, including in social and economic indicators, a famine in 2011 as well as a 
spike in the civil conflict (UNDP, 2012). See Appendix 12 for regional economic and population 
indicators. 
The country is very dependent on remittances from abroad to supplement any income they 
might be generating. Remittance services play an indispensable role in the current global economy. 
The World Bank estimates that over $325 billion is transferred worldwide every year, with $40 
billion remitted from developed countries to Africa (Mohapatra & Ratha, 2011). One study 
conservatively estimated that the large Somali diaspora community, estimated at 1 million, 
contributes large remittances into the country every year (Hassan & Chalmers, 2008; IMF, 2013). 
For example, Somalis living in the United States remit around $215 million annually (Orozco & 
Yansura, 2013). It has been estimated that, on average, residents in Somalia receive $3,000 per 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 4:  83 
year (Orozco & Yansura, 2013, p. 10), which is a large amount compared to the country’s per 
capita GDP of $503 (World Bank, 2017a).  
Consequently, remittances, international agencies such as the United Nations, the African 
Development Bank and other international NGOs have postulated that these billions can be 
harnessed to effectively help developing countries such as Somalia economically and socially 
develop. For example, in 2015 remittances directed towards the country outstrip Official 
Development Assistance ($1.25 billion), Foreign Direct Investments ($516 million) and exports 
($547 million) (CIA, 2015; FSNAU, 2013). In Somalia, remittances play an outsize role in the 
economy, for instance, the UNDP concluded: “Without this external support network, the economy 
would have imploded long ago” (UNDP, 2012, p. 25). This figure results in some households 
receiving up to 40% of their incomes from the funds transferred from abroad (AfDB, 2013). 
Somalia receives one of the largest transfers of remittances on a per capita basis in the 
world (UNDP, 2012; Yusuf, 2015). Slightly more women receive remittances than men. 
Interestingly, almost 100% of Somali remittances are sent through Somali services, not the large 
money transfer agencies such as Money Gram or Western Union. Specifically, the money transfer 
agencies are not the traditional financial institutions with international transfer codes but rather are 
retail locations often apart from the financial institutions of their host country. The unique system 
that has been utilized by Somalis to send and receive money has been the result of a lack of 
standardized financial institutions that are linked in the international financial system. More 
specifically, a system built on trust has developed to become one of the most efficient systems to 
transfer money. Although Dahabshiil, one of the largest Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) is 
family-owned, most MTOs are independently owned by a group of shareholders (Orozco & 
Yansura, 2013). This system is based on an intricate communication method that began with a 
physical-delivery method during the period in which the country was at war. Next it evolved as 
the Somalis became more dispersed internationally and built social networks across boundaries. 
Then the money transfer system embraced technology, particularly telephone communications to 
deliver the remittances. Now, mobile banking has been implemented and has transformed to 
become an almost instantaneous delivery directly to the recipient. 
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4.3. Theoretical Framework  
This study employs Anthony Giddens’(1986) Structuration Theory as the most appropriate to 
explain the situation in Somalia. The concepts that form and underlie the theory such as power, 
agency and structure are central to understanding the institutions that bind the social practices 
within geographic region of Somalia. The country provides a case study to understand how 
Giddens’ concepts and theory can elucidate and be applied in what is termed as ‘stateless’ society. 
Central to Structuration Theory is the duality of structure and agency (Bryant & Jary, 1991; 
Lyytinen & Ngwenyama, 1992) and which is essentially distilled as society “as neither existing 
independently of human activity nor being an activity of it” (Dyck & Kearns, 2006, p. 87). The 
actions of knowledgeable humans and social system structures, along with how they are produced 
and reproduced, is the core of understanding this theory. Specifically, this means that the social 
systems are restricted by social structures are extended by human agency without one having 
primacy over the other. The socials systems are aided by routines that are ingrained within social 
events (Ogden & Rose, 2005). Although Giddens’ theory has a variety of components, I will be 
focusing on concepts of agency, power, structure and modernity that are directly relevant to this 
study (M. R. Jones & Karsten, 2008; Pozzebon & Pinsonneault, 2005). 
4.3.1 Agency 
Human agency, according to Giddens, the role it plays in both the practical and discursive is what 
makes social structure possible. Humans monitor their own actions through two levels of 
consciousness, practical and discursive (Lyytinen & Ngwenyama, 1992). Agency, or action, is a 
“continuous flow” of conduct, instead of a series of distinct acts joined together (Giddens, 1979). 
The actors, through practical consciousness, know “how to do things in a variety of contexts of 
social life but cannot do so in words” (Browne, 2017, p. 64). An example of practical 
consciousness is when students first walk into a classroom, they without much thought look for 
seats that face the front of the classroom, presumably where the teacher will be placed. The subtle 
understating of the ‘rules’ of social systems and then rationalizing these social rules. However, 
discursive consciousness is the articulation of actions and intentions through language. This 
includes the reflexive monitoring of action. As such for the purposes of this study, agency is 
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defined as “as the transformative capacity of the subject; the practical basis of agency is the 
possibility of choosing between alternatives and pursuing different courses of action” (Browne, 
2017, p. 64). Included within this definition is the understanding of the innate human 
understanding or knowledgeability of the social norms, and this is not necessarily being able to 
explain these norms. 
4.3.2 Structure 
The concept of Structure within Structuration Theory is an integral part of the duality of the theory. 
According to Giddens, structures are the “generative rules and resources that members draw upon, 
but also thereby, change in their production of society” (Bryant & Jary, 1991, p. 7). Social systems 
are recursive and are produced and reproduced by individuals (Ogden & Rose, 2005). The social 
system can be distilled to the standardized connection between individuals and groups (Browne, 
2017). The social system is embedded in the actions and arises in a particular space-time (Giddens, 
1979). Over time-space, these actions become entrenched thus becoming institutionalized, as 
Giddens (1979) notes “the same structural characteristics participate in the subject (the actor) as 
in the object (society)” (p. 70). Structures produce and re-produce socials systems recursively 
(Giddens, 1986).  
Social practices are built on systems that are reproduced across time and space, along with 
the structures that join social relations. Giddens (1986) argues that societies “stand-out because 
definite structural principles serve to produce a specifiable overall ‘clustering of institutions’ 
across time and space” (p. 164). Societies and social interactions are then not necessarily bounded 
by one particular form of social structure or mode of governance. Thus, social structures are woven 
with agency and the social structures themselves. As Giddens (1986) argues: 
“Structures exist only in practice itself and in our human memory, which we use when we 
act. Structure is not an external frame. Structures emerge in our memory, traces only when 
we reflect discursively on a previous action. In other words, structure does not exist, it is 
continuously produced via agents who draw on this very structure (or rather structural 
properties) when they act.” (Giddens, 1986, p. 164) 
There are three types of structures in social systems: signification, domination and legitimation 
proposed by Giddens (see Figure 4.1). Signification refers to the rules and norms that govern 
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discursive and symbolic order needed for communication (Whittington, 1992). The modality, or 
the properties of the structure, is linked to language and the cognitive ability to effectively get a 
message across. Next, domination is the resources that are brought to bear when exercising power, 
along with “providing legitimacy for the social processes involved” (Scapens & Macintosh, 1996, 
p. 680). This is linked by the capacity or capability to exercise power or the control of scarce 
resources. Finally, Legitimation is the rules that provide that sanction certain modes of behaviour, 
both written and unwritten that are enforced by institutions (Busco, 2009; Englund, Gerdin, & 
Burns, 2011). This is connected to the ability to validate authority.  
Figure 4.1: Giddens' Duality of Structure (1986) 
 
4.3.3 State and Society 
Another concept that is relevant to this study is Giddens’ (1987) articulation of the term ‘state.’ 
Giddens interestingly notes that states are necessary extensions of organizations and noted 
organizations are “a collectivity in which knowledge about the conditions of system reproduction 
is reflexively used to influence, shape or modify that system reproduction” (p. 12). The concept of 
the state, according to Giddens’, includes the understanding that is part of the social system that is 
subject to that power. Additionally, the state contributes to the reproduction of social systems. As 
Whittington (1992) concludes a “nation-state is no autonomous island” (p. 695). In order to 
understand the linkage between society and the state we need to examine the emergence of the 
state.  
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When tracing the trajectory of state, Giddens argues that society can be divided into three 
broad categories seen through time-space. Specifically, Giddens argues that societies can be 
viewed as a collection of institutionalized practices centred around human action (Craib, 2011). 
Giddens’ perspective emerged as a critique of Karl Marx’s evolutionary, historical materialism 
approach to society, which led to Giddens theorizing that society tends to structured over time-
space and could be placed into brackets (Giddens, 1981). The first is the Tribal Society, which is 
based on the communal practices and kinships (see Figure 4.2). Tribal societies are organized 
around the band groups and user groups to sanction. The second category is the Class-divided 
Society, in which start to see the emergence of a state. There is a growing divide between the city 
and periphery where the kinship and tradition still play a role. These structures and their principles 
are witnessed in the various societies, including the class-divided societies. The development of 
the city coincides with the development of the state and the consolidation of power and economic 
interdependence. Moreover, the discussion of resources and the control of those resources is vital 
to the structures. The final categorization is the Class Society; within this level we see an 
entrenchment of capitalism. In class societies we witness two classes, one that owns the means of 
production or private property. The state takes root with the power of surveillance which involves 
a more sophisticated collection of information about its subjects. This surveillance is then used to 
sanction. There are also more interdependences in the division of labour along across national 
boundaries (Giddens, 1981). 
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Figure 4.2: Giddens' Types of Society (1981) and Craib (2011) 
 
There is a distinct separation between the notions of society and that of nation-states, which is 
regarded as being part of an expansion of the administrative state (Barkin & Cronin, 1994). 
Administrative power is defined as “the control over the timing and spacing of human activities 
through manipulation of the settings in which they take place” (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 250). The 
administrative aspect has extended the power of the state particular because it allows the state to 
conduct surveillance and monitor its citizens. As the state has expanded, things such as statistics 
and technology have been instituted in order to more effectively monitor its own citizens (Green, 
1997). The term ‘surveillance’ is employed by Giddens to mean the gathering of information that 
is then used to supervise human activity (Rosenberg, 1990). The state then utilizes its 
administrative power to sanction and extend its power through a variety of mechanisms, including 
violence.  
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Moreover, states have three main components: (i) a defined territory, (ii) recognition by 
others to that territory, and (iii) a common identity (Giddens, 1986, pp. 164-165). The structures 
within societies can be defined along with three main categories that include the principles that 
any society utilizes the institutional articulation and the features that cut across time and space. 
The delineation of a nation-state’s administrate power is marked at its boundary (Giddens, 1986, 
p. 175). The state’s power within the territory is determined if the state is perceived as traditional 
or modern. Specifically, if a state can enforce its power to sanction, then it has created nuanced 
monitoring powers. This is what Giddens terms as sovereignty (Luther, 2015; Luther & White, 
2011). State sovereignty is the basis for the existence of nation-states and requires monitored set 
of relationships between states (Giddens, 1987, p. 263).  
In this study’s case, Somalia, with its defined lack of the administrative state with its 
legitimation processes, is then replaced with other forms power. Thus, the lack of a particular type 
of state apparatus that could monopolize power is replaced by other forms of social structures. For 
Somalia, familial ties, religious norms, and customary traditions have re-emerged. These then act 
as the legitimization processes, and provide the understated rules that are relied upon as the basis 
of social interactions among people. The duality of Structuration Theory is evident in Somalia’s 
case because of state has ceded it power.  
4.3.4 Modernity 
This study will employ the concept of modernity from Giddens in order to understand the social 
and institutional structures present in the context of Somalia. Although Giddens directly points to 
our current definition of modernity as having arisen from how European society organized itself 
in the seventeenth century, it has come to permeate time-space as an institutionalizing force 
(Giddens, 1991). Specifically, he terms this process as Time-space distanciation. Furthermore, 
modernity has moved social and cultural practices beyond their local space and institutionalized 
them across the world (Tomlinson, 2003). A consequence of modernity has been to entrench 
organizing principles of the nation-state and modes of production (Tomlinson, 2003).  
Notably, Giddens (1994) argues that modernity “has rebuilt tradition as it has dissolved it” 
(p. 56). However, modernity relies on tradition an is often legitimizes power in Western societies. 
For example, tradition becomes a form of truth that requires guardians who have unique privileges 
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to it. Thus, modernity institutionalizes cultural practices and our understanding of identity and 
belonging. These components form the differences that are the contours of the modern nation-state 
that are public and undergird the discourse (Tomlinson, 2003).  
An emergent concept, within modernity, is globalization. Giddens (1991) defines 
globalization as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in 
such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” 
(p. 64). Globalization is a driver for change and development brought about by modernity. For 
example, innovations in transportation have made distances closer, and Information 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) have compressed time (Tomlinson, 1994). All these are 
assisted because of risk, a concept according to Giddens that is important to the capitalist systems. 
In Somalia, the effect of the modernity and globalization impacting local conditions and Somalis 
are adjusting to this new reality. The organizing components and structures of globalization and 
modernity such as division of labour, the world economy, and nation-state are witnessed in the 
country. As such, an aspect of the study explores these resulting effect in the preceding sections. 
4.4. Methodology 
This study, as illustrated in the nomological net (Figure 1.2), aims to interrogate the institution and 
social structures present in Somalia as elucidated by Giddens. This research employed a grounded 
theory, an interview research approach that allowed participants to answer questions about their 
experiences about Somalia, with a particular focus on the ICT sector. The questions were designed 
to understand the underlying structures that make the economy, financial sector, justice systems, 
and how social services are delivered in Somalia. 
4.4.1 Research Approach 
This inductive study utilized semi-structured interviews from a cross-section of sectors in Somalia. 
The qualitative approach selected allowed for ecological validity in order to capture individuals’ 
opinions regarding their organization’s setting. Ecological validity embeds this question in the 
research design: “Do our instruments capture the daily life conditions, opinions, values, attitudes, 
and knowledge base of those we study as expressed in their natural habitat?’" (Cicourel, 1982, p. 
15). Within Information Systems research, a qualitative approach is appropriate for this type of 
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study because it offers insights into both the ICT industry as well as other sectors in the country 
more generally. As an exploratory study, this study aimed to study the institutions and conditions 
in the country. Exploratory research “tends to utilize relatively small samples of subjects that 
permit the research to get ‘up close’ first-hand information” (Ruane, 2005, p. 12).  
Furthermore, this study utilized a case study approach. A case study is defined as “a 
detailed study of a single social unit” (Payne & Payne, 2004, p. 31). Case study is appropriate for 
this type of study because it serves to illustrate the current Somali situation. Specifically, the case 
study approach is employed because the situation in Somalia poses some unique challenges 
including complex, intertwined issues that can not be answered through causal questions (Blaikie, 
2010; Paré, 2004).  Although this study can not be generalized to other parts of Somalia, Africa, 
the developing world or even fragile countries, it does serve as offer an example of how an ICT 
sector can function in weak states.  
This research employed both purposeful sampling as well as snowball sampling. The aim 
of a purposive or purposeful sampling technique is “to sample cases/participants in a strategic way, 
so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed” (Bryman, 2015, 
p. 418). Although purposive sampling is not intended to be generalizable, it does allow for insights 
that might otherwise not be readily available (Bryman, 2015). IS researchers have also employed 
this approach because it allows for the empirical situation to guide the data collection (Matavire & 
Brown, 2008; Paré, 2004).  
Once in Somalia6, I used the snowball technique was useful in identifying key informants 
that were not known to the researcher. Snowball sampling is described as “strategy built around 
referrals” (Ruane, 2005, p. 117). This is particularly the case when seeking key informants that 
might not be easily identifiable or in segments of the population that are closed. An example of 
this was the members of the government bureaucracy that were later identified once an interview 
with one member of the government was interviewed. Although the snowball sampling technique 
has some deficiencies such as creating an echo chamber by talking to the same type of individuals 
with similar ideas (Ruane, 2005), it allowed me to gain insight into a closed structure.  
                                                 
6 For a personal reflection of on the ground research process in Hargeisa, see Narrative Report in Appendix 13.   
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While collecting data, I also relied heavily on opportunistic technique as well (Bryman, 
2015; Paré, 2004). I discovered some participants while walking around the centre of Hargeisa and 
discovering companies that are directly involved in the ICT sector, for example. This type of 
methodology allows for the data collection that would not otherwise have been possible if I solely 
focused on the pre-selection of key informants.  
4.4.2 Researcher’s Background and Assumptions 
I am of Somali background, and I have certain assumptions that have been framed by my personal 
experiences. My perspective has been coloured by the northern part of the country, where my 
family is originally from. The Northern-centric research setting influenced some of the responses 
from participants including, for example, discussions with government officials who are part of 
the breakaway region’s government. Somaliland and its self-declared independence status have 
been at the heart of an extended discussion of what it means to be Somali. This also coloured some 
of the responses about the future of Somalia and Somali people more precisely, and some 
respondents were quick to point to a future that is not tied to what they term “South-Central 
Somalia.” However, I believe being aware of those biases and assumptions provide unique 
insights.  
4.4.3 Site Selection 
The interviews took place in Hargeisa the capital of the breakaway region of Somaliland. Hargeisa 
was selected because of its relative safety. The city is home to a large number of government 
ministries, a variety of industries and a number of international NGOs. Hargeisa has an estimated 
population of 800,000 inhabitants (Republic of Somaliland, 2016). The city is home to most of the 
country’s ICT sector. The information and communications sector contributes an estimated $31.2 
million to the Somaliland economy (Republic of Somaliland, 2016). Hargeisa is also home to the 
largest money transfer agencies in Somaliland; these include Dahabshil, Amaal Express, Juba 
Express, and Tawakal Express. Additionally, the ICT sector includes companies such as TeleSom, 
SomTel, NationLink and SomCable. Hargeisa is also home to regulatory agencies such as the ICT 
Commission or the industry associations such as the Somaliland Chamber of Commerce. The 
Somaliland government estimate that the city is home to half (9 out of 18) of the universities in 
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Somaliland and a number of these university students are studying either computer science, 
telecommunication engineering or ICT. Hargeisa served as the location for all the interviews.  
4.4.4 Participant Selection 
Participants of the study were selected from several sectors, including key informants from a 
number of backgrounds. Because I did not reside in Hargeisa, I knew I needed the assistance of 
locals as part of my recruitment strategy in order to speak to key informants in government, NGOs 
and industry. I travelled to Hargeisa between November 25 and December 19, 2016. With the help 
of hosts at my guest home, who were connected to me through extended family members, I set out 
to interview 30 key individuals in the various sectors? After initially encountering difficulty in 
arranging interview times with several participants, I changed strategies in order to create a more 
conducive opportunity. These included going to offices very early in the morning and not 
interviewing anyone past 11:00 AM, this allowed for officials both in government and outside 
government to speak to me before it became their busy time. I relied heavily on a preselected list 
of companies, ministries and agencies I needed to interview. These were often the most visible 
companies inside Somaliland and outside the region. Throughout this process, I was keeping track 
of the types of individuals I had interviewed to ensure I would get a wide selection of industries, 
different company sizes and types of services provided. I should note, none of the interviewees 
were women, most companies and agencies simply did not have women working in a management 
capacity willing to talk with me. After my first interview with a government official, I decided to 
widen my scope of questions because they mostly did not want to be recorded. Individuals working 
in the money transfer industry also did not want to be recorded as well. Some decided to provide 
written responses to my questions.  
4.4.5 Recruitment Procedure 
The study relied on a recruitment approach that was based on a strategy to target the relevant 
government agencies, the leading industry actors and the largest NGOs. By identifying these 
organizations early, through preliminary research including web searches and asking for input 
from my hosts, I compiled a list that had ten companies and four government agencies and then 
from there I then targeted key individuals with those organizations that could assist in identifying 
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the right participant to answer my questions. Some organizations were more open to interviewing 
than others; however, with the promise of anonymity for both the individual and the organization 
most were willing to speak to me on the record and agreed to be recorded using a tape recorder.  
4.4.6 Interview Settings 
The interviews mostly took place in the participants’ offices for convenience, and I, along with a 
local translator, would visit each head office and ask to speak to someone about the ICT sector. 
Through other connections I made while in the country, I set-up interviews with several industry 
representatives in the ICT sector. The local translator also had connections with several 
universities that helped me speak to deans and presidents of the tertiary institutions. After securing 
a number of industry, NGO and university key informants. I set about speaking to government 
representatives; these key informants included the Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Energy, and 
Ministry of Planning. Some interviews took place in coffee shops because the participants asked 
to meet outside the office. Once I completed interviews with the large firms, I then walked around 
the central business district of the city looking for organizations that worked directly in the ICT 
sector. This resulted in interviews with companies that set-up IT networks for both homes and 
businesses; a television company and finally the largest provider of power in the country, 
SomPower. 
4.4.7 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The study employed a qualitative approach, particularly semi-structured interviews, to gain an 
understanding of the Somali context. The semi-structured interview technique allowed me to gain 
an understanding of the underlying structures that allow for the economy to function and deliver 
social service to its consumers. Semi-Structured interviews allow for concepts and theories to 
emerge from key informants directly and for a more robust understanding of their true meanings 
and intentions (Blaikie, 2010; Bryman, 2015). Although semi-structured interviews can have a 
drawback in that the respondents only address the questions asked by the interviewer, which could 
be narrow in scope. For this study, I had four broad questions (see Appendix 11) that I used as 
entryways into conversations with key informants; however, these broad questions were 
supplemented with questions that were specific to the features of their job or industry or sector.  
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4.4.8 Note-taking Experience 
The participants were asked if I could take notes about our conversation, and a majority agreed to 
be audio recorded. However, three participants within government agencies preferred not to be 
audio recorded but still agreed to be interviewed. One of the audio recorded interviews did not 
record, and I had to rely on my notes that I had taken while talking to the participant. When taking 
notes, I took notes directly relevant to the questions rather than writing the participant's entire 
answer verbatim. At the end of each day, I typed the interviews into Microsoft Word and added 
notes about the times and places of these interviews. I also noted anything that stood out in the 
interviews within the Microsoft Word write-ups.  
4.4.9 The Data 
The final data collected included the first grouping, five key informants from the non-government 
sector. These interviewees worked for both local and international NGOs in such areas as media, 
emergency/relief, business association and youth skills/employment organization. The participants 
have been with their organizations for as little as a year and others over five years. There was a 
close correlation to formal education with the job the participants held and their current roles 
within their organizations. For example, the media NGO graduated with a journalism degree and 
received a graduate degree in Media Management which was based outside of Somalia. The 
emergency/relief interviewee had a bachelor’s degree in Post-Conflict studies, and they were also 
one of two non-Somalis interviewed. Full list of interview participants’ codes referenced in the 
proceeding sections including; their education, specialization, tenure and current titles, please see 
Appendix 14. 
The second group interviewed were members of four post-secondary institutions that had 
a heavy focus on ICT education. These universities (Alpha, Ardmas, Golis and Hargeisa) had 
between 3,000 to 10,000 students, and they had been established at least ten years. Three of the 
post-secondary (Alpha, Ardmas and Golis) institutions were private; one was locally operated 
while the other two were branches of private Ethiopian Universities. Hargeisa University is the 
only government-supported university in Somaliland, and a significant portion of their revenues 
was collected through tuition fees and support of the diaspora. The interviewees included a 
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university president and three deans of the ICT department. The newest interviewee was in their 
position for two months while the longest-tenured interviewee had been in that position for more 
than twelve years. Their specializations included graduate degrees in Information Technology, 
Distributed Systems, and Database Management. The average age for the education sector 
interview participants was 40 years. 
The third group of individuals interviewed were officials from various government 
ministries. These included Ministries such as the Ministry of Technology, Ministry of Planning 
and the ICT Commission, an arms-length government agency. I started with a focus on government 
ministries and agencies that dealt explicitly with the ICT industry in order to gain an understanding 
of Somaliland’s government policies and practices with regard to the telecommunication sector. 
Then I expanded the interview pools to include other individuals who worked for the Ministries of 
Trade and Investments, and the Ministry of Energy and Minerals. These individuals ranged in age 
and experience; some had been in their positions for one year while another had been with their 
organization for over eleven years. It should be noted that three of the individuals who worked for 
the government requested not be recorded; however, they allowed me to take notes. Of the six 
respondents, three had business degrees, the other three had either Information Technology (IT) 
degrees or engineering degrees, most having studied in either Ethiopia or India. 
The final group of individuals were people working in private industry. The largest group 
of key informant interviews were from this grouping. Respondents included four people working 
at the various telecommunication companies based in Hargeisa, covering most of the Somaliland 
population. These companies were also the largest companies in the country by sheer market share, 
reach and customer base. A second important segment of the economy is the money transfer 
companies within Somaliland. The four individuals accounted for another segment of the country 
that were interviewed. Finally, four individuals at large and significant companies within 
Somaliland were interviewed, to offer their perspective for this study. Like the other grouping of 
key informants, most of these people had degrees in the business or IT, most had studies 
internationally, and a significant portion had graduate degrees. I interviewed everyone from a teller 
at a remittance company all the way to the head of IT at a large telecommunication company. The 
person with the shortest time at their organization was four months while the longest was there for 
over 15 years.  
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4.4.10 Coding Procedure 
Once the audio recordings were transcribed by a transcription service, I reviewed and cleaned all 
the transcripts. First, I began by listening to a sample of the audio transcripts to ensure they 
matched up with the transcripts. Next, any word or phrase that was transcribed as “inaudible” by 
the transcription service, I listened to that part of the audio carefully in order to write in the missing 
words or phrases. Since English is the not first language for most of the interviewees, a large 
majority of the inaudible parts were often names, places or companies that the Toronto, Canada 
based transcription service did not know how to record. I also edited some minor grammatical 
issues that emerged in the transcription, filler words such as ‘you know’ or ‘umm’ were removed.  
Finally, I converted all the documents into a portable document file (pdf) to be transferred into 
Atlas/TI (Version 8). 
Atlas/Ti is a Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis software (QAQDAS) to help to 
speed up the coding and analysis process for text data (Barry, 1998). Atlas/Ti was utilized to 
understand the relationships between the actors, themes and networks from within the corpus of 
data. The software allowed for a grounded theory approach that was relevant to this study. The 
automatic search feature within the Atlas/Ti allowed for a faster coding process. Notably, the in 
vivo coding capabilities ensured that the themes and concepts relevant to this study were captured 
(Friese, 2014).  
After the first level of coding, it resulted in more than 117 codes from the 22 transcripts. 
These codes were placed into nine categories, including Positive, Negative, ICT, Diaspora, 
Economy, Financial Sector, Education/Justice and Social Services. These broad categories were 
chosen in order to link this study back to the research objective of uncovering the social structures 
and institutions that exist in the country. The positive and negative code families were created to 
understand the participant’s general perspective of the country. Once the first round of coding was 
completed, the second round of merged codes that were deemed to be similar in nature. Since the 
coding took place over several weeks, the coding procedures deferred slightly each time thus 
requiring a third and final pass of the documents. This resulted in the final 66 codes total (see 
Appendix 15). These were analyzed with the view of establishing the social structures that are in 
place to support various institutions in the country. Social structures and people operating within 
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them as defined by Anthony Giddens in The Constitution of Society are witnessed in Somalia, 
with a specific focus on Somaliland.  What these social structures are and how people, or agents, 
interact with them are crucial to uncovering the on the ground reality within Somalia. 
4.5. Empirical Results 
The data collection took place in Hargeisa, Somaliland. The Somaliland economy is dominated by 
livestock, which accounts for 28.4% of the region’s GDP (Republic of Somaliland, 2016; Wilson, 
2016). Somaliland’s terrain is different from other parts of Somalia because it is more arid, making 
it not as suitable for agriculture as in the two river regions of South-Central Somalia. The livestock 
industry, particularly camels, cattle, sheep and goats, is a significant contributor to its foreign 
currency exchange income and, more than 65% of the local population relies on the livestock as 
means of their livelihood. The next biggest contributor to the economy at 21.9%. is wholesale 
trading, which includes the selling of goods and products. The economic activity often lacks direct 
intervention from the state and relies on individuals and groups that work in parallel to the 
government. An example of how small the Somaliland government’s role in the economy is its 
annual budget of $1 billion in 2015, almost 40% of those funds were spent on security (military 
and police). Most of this revenue comes from import taxes at ports of entry. Specifically, $678 
million of the government’s total revenue was sourced from import duties compared to just $290 
million from all direct and indirect taxes in 2014 (Republic of Somaliland, 2016). 
4.5.1 Economy 
Private Sector 
The private sector is perceived to be the bright spot in the self-declared country (World Bank, 
2015c). The supposed virtues of private business are discussed as the main reason Somaliland 
functions. When comparing the public and the private sectors, the public sector is perceived to be 
subordinate to the private sector. One interviewee summed this perspective as “the private sector; 
they control the government” (D14). In reality, the same participant stated that the government 
“cannot” control the private sector. Others noted how little the government influences the day to 
day economic activity is created by the private sector “most of them are commercial, generated by 
the commercial activity by the private sector” (D13). The same interviewee estimates that the 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 4:  99 
government controls less than 10% of economic activity in the region. This comparison between 
the private and public sectors often elicits a positive reaction for the private sector and a negative 
one for the public sector. Although, it should be noted that a significant amount of the literature 
about the great Somali private sector has been written by economists and scholars affiliated with 
the World Bank (see Mubarak (1997); Nenova and Harford (2005); World Bank (2015c). The 
World Bank has a particular Neo-liberal ideology of being pro-business and anti-government that 
has manifested in reports about Somalia more broadly. This perspective appears to be reflected in 
some of the sentiments of the research participants for this study who view government as problem 
to a free market. This type of sentiment was summarized by one interviewee who states 
“Economically, Somali people they are doing the business but politically, I think we are not good 
politically” (D14). Partly due to its history, people in Somaliland have come to view the state with 
suspicion and thus are quick to argue that the political state’s role is to be in the background and 
for the private sector to lead. Additionally, one of the biggest sectors is the private sector is the 
ICT sector. Many point to the power associated with the telecommunication companies who have 
more power over the financial sector, for further discussion see section on the financial sector.  
Entrepreneurial 
The data from the interviews illustrated how social structures in the economy have been working 
in spite of the lack of strong state institutions. The economy is dominated by small actors, people 
who run shops and offer services, as one interviewee called them ‘freelancer’ (D2). One key 
informant noted that business is made up of “individual traders, there’s no big companies… so it 
is now small sectors, you know, business sectors” (D10). These small actors are often self-
employed and credit the entrepreneurial trait among Somalis. Other key informants have noted the 
economy survives on these small businesses, especially ones that are funded by the diaspora (D16). 
The “business-oriented” Somalis and their entrepreneurial drive have been attributed to the 
political situation in the country which necessitates, for their own survival, the need to create their 
own businesses (D10). The minimal influence of the state in the economy through monetary and 
regulatory control of businesses has often been cited as a factor in the country’s business climate. 
For example, the business climate is often summarized as “here there are no restrictions; anyone 
can start up their business with anything they want” (D15). The role of government is minimal 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 4:  100 
when it comes to institutions that enable a ‘friendly’ business climate in the country. The relatively 
low cost of access to the mobile phones in the country has made it easier to go into business. For 
example, one key informant noted that: “without any regulation you can do so many things with 
the help of technology…that’s the only way you can reach, you know, other countries” (D10). 
This type of belief that with few government restrictions, many saw technology as the basis of the 
economy. 
Business Climate  
I wanted to understand how the economy is working although the input of state structures and the 
participants noted that the was partly due to the country’s ‘Business climate.’ One government 
agency official noted: “There are a lot of companies…for example remittance companies… 
telecommunication and traders… the business people who export, import. Hotels also, in 
Somaliland you have seen so many hotels growing, especially the big hotels…, Livestock that 
business people are doing” (D10). From across the various interviews, people noted that the 
economy was functioning and that people with business acumen could succeed in the Somaliland 
economy. As another responded pointed out, “If you have the idea and the money, it’s very easy 
to start a business in Somaliland. You know, no restrictions, rules and things. You just need to 
have your location and money and idea.” (D20). This form of growth of an economy is described 
as “economically, the country will probably develop quite rapidly actually along a capitalist 
business model.” (D4). The businesses being created often require assistance from a variety of 
investment sources, one of the most prevalent in Somaliland is the support of the family members 
in the diaspora. One government official noted that one of the largest companies in the country, 
TeleSom, was started by a member of the diaspora: “Diaspora mainly are the one who started to..., 
initiat[e] this company and by providing small collections of money, contributions to establish the 
companies” (D12). Although many noted that the businesses are being created and there is 
evidence of an economy, many noted that some barriers exist to businesses.  
Barriers to Business 
When it comes to the country’s economy, some pointed to the existence of barriers that have 
negatively impacted the overall health of the economy. Some interviewees were quick to note that 
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a lack of government regulations has been replaced by other forms of restrictions. These barriers 
can limit the growth potential of the small business. For example, one tangible example is the cost 
of electricity, often tied to a volatile international oil market, a key informant noted the “price of 
electricity increases when the price of oil increases in Somalia” (D18). The uncertainty created by 
being tied into the international oil market is cross-cutting across various sectors of the country. 
However, a barrier some of study participants have provided includes the cost of importing many 
manufactured goods. The country’s lack of a local manufacturing base means it imports most of 
the electronics, vehicles, and even canned food and bottled drinks it needs. The uncertainty 
associated with importing most business inputs was noted: “Logistics. Just getting anything here 
into this country is a huge, huge mess more or less” (D17). Another barrier some participants spoke 
was the import tax charged at the ports of entry into the country, which are the government’s most 
reliable source of income. One technology industry participant noted that “computers in Dubai are 
relatively cheap, but when you bring [them] here, add with the tax, it will go…up” (D20). Thus, 
the cost of the import tax along with expense of transporting these goods, often from Dubai, adds 
to cost of doing business in the country. 
International Trade 
The country is connected to the international trade system. The private sector through various land 
crossings into both Ethiopia and Djibouti along with the airport in Hargeisa, and large seaport of 
Berbera. The trade networks connect the country to Dubai, China and India. The speed of the 
internet has allowed consumers in Somaliland to order goods and then receive them in a relatively 
short time, especially with regular air connections at the Hargeisa airport. Connection to the global 
market facilitated by the internet allows people in Somalia to buy any product as “there are good 
and efficient innovations, you can just get products from China, from anywhere, from Dubai, like 
this [phone], using WhatsApp and…[other] technologies” (D20). One key informant interview 
noted that getting goods is can arrive in as little as one day “It depends on flight. If you send at 
this moment, tomorrow though it’s still a flight, you can get tomorrow” (D9). However, an issue 
some people pointed out is that some multinational companies do not want to send goods directly 
to Somalia or Somaliland in particular. A business manager noted, “I can’t give you a specific 
time, that’s our biggest issue. There’s no standardized time, I cannot say DHL is gonna have it 
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within [a few days], even the issue with recognition, half of the countries will not want to ship to 
you directly” (D17). Although some have pointed out that more multinational companies are 
starting to do business within the country. For example, Dubai Ports World was granted a 30-year 
concession by the Somaliland government to run the largest port in the country for $442 million 
(DP World, 2016). In the meantime, people often find a workaround to source equipment and 
materials. This movement of goods is also heavily dependent on networks of trust, similar to the 
financial networks that will be discussed in further detail below. 
 
Figure 4.3: Atlas/Ti economy code and related codes 
 
4.5.2 Financial Sector 
The financial sector plays an important role in the daily function of modern societies. The role of 
money in any given society is often at the heart of the fight for scarce resources. These scarce 
resources inform the social and economic hierarchy in many societies. As part of the role of social 
structures, governments apply controls on financial systems as a way to wield power over the 
members of that society. According to the World Bank, 31% of adults in Somalia have access to 
formal financial institutions (Allen, Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, & Peria, 2016; Demirgüç-Kunt & 
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Klapper, 2012). In Somalia and Somaliland, the government has very weak controls over financial 
systems and is often relegated to informal regulation. The concept of ‘Fiat’ money does not appear 
to fit the situation in Somalia because it requires the backing of a sovereign entity to back it (Luther 
& White, 2011). However, even with the lack of a centralized, government coordinated financial 
sector, the people in the country still use a network of financial institutions that are part of the 
fabric of society. In the following sections, I will examine the financial sector of the country and 
the underlying social structures that make them possible.  
 
Banking 
The banking system is reliant on a few large companies that serve as the backbone of the country. 
The way foreign money is secured in the country is through three main techniques identified by 
Owuor (2013), include one, the Hawala network.  
This Hawala network is dominated by 17 large organizations across all of Somalia, and 
they use a system of trust and familial affiliations to extend loans, send money and secure the 
finance. The second approach the financial sector works is through ‘investment in-kind’ which 
“entails the actual delivery of materials or goods and even labor from other countries because the 
equivalent does not exist in sufficient quantity in Somalia” (Owuor, 2013, p. 4). The third approach 
is through the transfer of foreign currency into the country. This approach is less secure than the 
other two approaches.  
When I asked the interviewees to provide examples of the banking system, some noted that 
that people in the country use a system that is mostly informal, one that is facilitated by a few large 
private businesses. For example, the largest financial organization in the country Dahabishil does 
have a bank attached to it. However, according to an interview participant, they provide no access 
to credit (or credit cards) to individuals (D19). The companies primarily rely on mobile phones, 
but it should be noted that institutions have started issuing physical bank cards as well. Companies 
such as Dahabishil and Zaad offer banking as an ancillary service to their telecommunication 
system. This particular model was described as: 
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“not having access to any financial institutions. We have nothing to access finance. So Zaad 
included, participated and contributed access to finance. ‘Cause in economic terms, having 
the money, in your pocket, it’s leakage to the economy of the country. If you sit on the 
money, then the money doesn’t really circulate in the market. That is a leakage to the 
economy. So Zaad makes it easy for money to [circulate in] the country and also it [is] 
financial inclusion. So the people who live in the countryside or rural areas, in the urban 
areas, are interconnected financially. So it’s contributes financial inclusion to many people 
that was excluded” (D23) 
Another form of banking utilized in the country is the traditional pooling of financial resources as 
a means of accessing financial resources. The same key informant notes that in rural areas “it’s 
cash for work, we have a lot of, I mean, experience where we are looking at a lot of work on self-
help groups, depending on which organization you talk to, self-help groups would be like, you 
know, Rural Banks and internal savings.” (D23). The informal nature of the financial institutions 
in the country has its drawbacks according to one study participant. This was summarized by an 
individual who owns a technology firm in Somaliland as:   
“But if you don’t have money, access to finances, it’s very tough, you know, you cannot 
get…banks and financial institutions who can support you in starting your business. And it’s 
a challenge because…the businesses in Somaliland lack expertise and the knowledge skills 
of running business…’s traditional business (D20) 
The lack of access to formalized capital and the weak central bank is often cited as an impediment 
to the financial system in the country. The Central Bank of Somaliland is often criticized for being 
a bank in name only. Some point to the Somali currencies as examples of what Fredrich Von Hayek 
(1976) called ‘denationalized’ money (Mubarak, 1997). The Somali currencies operate with the 
market being primarily responsible for monetary value with the central bank relegated to printing 
the money. Thus, the informal banking sector is thriving in part because of electronic money and 
by a system that is based on the social norms of Hawala.  
Electronic Money 
The electronic (or mobile) money has thrived in the country since it was introduced in 2009 by 
Telesom (Pénicaud & McGrath, 2013; Studio D, 2015). This form of currency is increasingly 
replacing the hard currency throughout the region. Additionally, more people in Somalia have 
access to mobile money accounts than accounts in financial institutions (Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper, 
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Singer, & Van Oudheusden, 2015; Sayid & Echchabi, 2013). Prior to this, Somalia was a cash-
heavy society in which large amounts of American dollars and local Shillings were used. This 
older Hawala system relied on the physical transfer of cash or equivalent goods (Waldo, 2006). 
The move to a mostly electronic form of money has allowed many in the country to move money 
easier (Guleid & Tirimba, 2015). An example of the money away from cash to mobile money is 
that 70% of Telesom’s costumers buy airtime through mobile money instead of through scratch 
cards. It is estimated that almost seven million transactions took place on March 2013, the last 
publically available data (Pénicaud & McGrath, 2013). 
When participants were asked about the mobile in the country, one independent business 
provider noted, “You know, cash now is useless, in our Zaad account and Edehab, Zaad, … it’s 
the most… dominant, TeleSom. So I think more than 50 percent of the customers are using it” 
(D20). The convenience of electronic money is often pointed to as a noteworthy factor for the 
telecom providers as well, and one interviewee noted that “cash payments, can you imagine 
holding dollars all the time in your pocket. So basically this Edehab was a solution, a very good 
solution that made first of all, customers life easy in the sense of transferring. I mean there is no 
charges too. So basically this whole wireless mode we are all in…there was a need for it and it 
covered it” (D19). The business case for the service for the telecom providers could be distilled to 
ensuring that they provide access to an additional product for their own customers. As a 
communication key informant stated “it’s just something to maintain customers such as ringtones 
and USSD, Facebook applications and so on” (D19). Yet, the ease of use and convenience has 
been a strong factor in the adoption of mobile money has helped the user to “immediately finds 
his money inside the mobile itself” (D2). 
The use of electronic money in the country is the backbone of the humanitarian agencies 
in the country. The aid agencies have implemented processes that distribute monetary aid to 
recipients across the country. When I posed the question about how much of their monetary aid is 
distributed through mobile money, one key informant in the NGO sector noted that it is a “hundred 
percent” (D22). If people in affected regions do not have access to mobile phones, one approach 
is that the NGO provides a cellphone to a trusted person in a village setting who serves as the point 
of distribution to people who might not have access to a cellphone. As one key informant from 
one telecom company stated that mobile money makes currency circulation easier so that “people 
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who live in the countryside or rural areas, in the urban areas, are interconnected financially. So it 
contributes financial inclusion [for] many people that were excluded” (D23). The delivery of social 
and humanitarian aid using electronic money is viewed as more secure and less prone to ‘leakage.’ 
This includes delivering aid to areas of the country that are still experiencing civil conflict.  
The system of electronic money transfer was forced to comply with international standards 
in order to be legal in Western countries. Some governments in the West, particularly the United 
States of America, were fearful that the transfer of money electronically to Somalia would assist 
in financing terrorism in the geopolitical region of north-east Africa and across the world (Gelb, 
2016; Neumann, 2017).  Rules included “know-your-customer’ which instructed that all senders 
and receivers be identifiable, and traceable (Cockayne & Shetret, 2012). In Western countries, the 
national ID with address would be required to send money, and in Somalia, the recipient would 
need to provide ID, their family name (usually four names that trace their family lineage) and a 
family member who can vouch for their identity. The security fears that electronic money would 
be used illicitly were put to rest by these rigorous rules in order to show that remittance money 
would go to help regular people. As one key informant noted, “As long as you are a citizen and 
you have an ID card and you are registered… demography information, we collect biographic 
information, fingerprint and all these things. So and everyone can have instead of not everyone 
has a bank account, but everyone can have Zaad account” (D21). Through a concerted effort from 
NGOs and Somalis living in Britain, these security processes have ensured that the British 
government did not prosecute British banks that were used for the money transfer.  
Money Transfer Organizations  
Money transfer organizations are one of the biggest segments of the economy. Somalia relies 
heavily on the remittances to pay for children’s education, social services, and provides investment 
funds for small businesses. More specifically, it has been estimated that close to 40% of families 
in the country rely on the $1.3 billion remittances per year (Gutale, 2015). Generally, remittances 
are the second-largest source of external funding in developing countries; however, in Somalia, it 
is the largest source of foreign exchange (Maimbo & Ratha, 2005a). Oxfam (2015) noted that the 
amount of money sent to Somalia in the form remittances exceeded all the development aid, 
emergency assistance and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) put together. Moreover, remittance 
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serves between 25% to 40% of the national economy in addition to serving as a financial cushion 
during humanitarian emergencies (Hassan & Chalmers, 2008). Thus, remittance companies 
account for a large segment of the financial sector in Somalia (Hammond, 2011). 
A key informant noted that the remittance industry is “big because the remittance is a big 
business in this country, in Somali society in general” (D21). The Somali remittance companies 
have created large companies that serve many East African nations, and these companies include 
World Remit, Dahabshil and Amaal Express.  The system itself has been around for centuries, as 
noted by several key informants one put it this was “Remittances [have been used for] centuries it 
was there to transfer money” (D10). The difference between the old version of Hawala and the 
modern is often attributed to the speed and reliability with which recipients can receive funds. 
Technology has facilitated the increased speed of transfer of funds, in as little as minutes from 
anywhere in the world to most parts of Somalia, not just urban centres. Technology has now 
infused into the money transfer system “the mechanism, we use technology, automated from big 
cities to villages and there’s so many people working and facilitate that, providing and when they 
introduce new technology, it [is a] new job opportunity for example” (D10). Additionally, an 
interviewee noted technology is often adopted first with the Money Transfer Organizations 
(MTOs) sector “remittance itself has in one way notified the advancement of the technology and 
what-not, so a person, rather than you call this that, that now, you just simply get a message” (D2). 
The speed and convenience of the MTOs is what kept coming over and over in the interviews 
across sectors and industries, for example: “So without diaspora, of course, I don’t think nothing 
could happen; for example, the relatives, for example, which now I would be sitting here, may I 
receive money from London in one minute through one of the local providers transfer into mobile 
money…Then I receive my money, I texting him, yes, I receive it” (D12). The transfer of funds is 
designed to be as hassle-free as possible. 
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Figure 4.4: Atlas/Ti financial sector code and related codes 
 
4.5.3 Education and Justice Systems 
Education 
The education system is an area that was affected by the Somali civil war, and the school system 
languished without state support as the multilateral and humanitarian’s agencies focused on direct 
relief of people suffering the effects of the war (Cassanelli & Abdikadir, 2008). The education 
system witnessed a decline in funding prior to the civil war, and after the war, some school 
facilities were turned into emergency accommodations for internally-displaced persons (Hussein, 
2015). A study by UNESCO concluded, “at present, there is no coherent educational system in 
Somalia. Planning and implementation are piecemeal, mirroring the wide assortment of schools 
run by local and international NGOs, or by private individuals on a for-profit basis” (Padilla & 
Trigo-Arana, 2013, p. 10). Despite these issues, the education system has shown signs of 
resilience, with communities taking direct action to educate their children. The communities came 
together to offer education services to area children, and they were later supported by family 
members in the diaspora. 
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The education system has rapidly expanded through a combination of private or non-profit 
services. The growth of the education system was best summarised by a key informant as “there’s 
so many private schools, universities, I think they’re now even competing with the shops, there’s 
so many” (D3). The education system has been praised for assisting in keeping the youth off the 
streets and providing them with the necessary skills needed to make them employable. For 
example, the same interviewee noted “this country, the great population is youth, so [schools are] 
where the youth go and where they get busy. So I think if there weren’t all these schools, there 
could be chaos in the country because of lack of opportunities” (D3). According to the United 
Nations Population Fund (2014), the Somali population is relatively young, and it is estimated that 
45.6% of the population is under the age of 14 and 75.1% of the population is under the age of 30 
(see Figure 4.5). 
Figure 4.5: 2014 UNFP Population Estimation Survey: Population by age group 
 
After the civil war in Somaliland, post-secondary institutions formally started operating in 1996, 
and have proliferated since with many universities and colleges opening across the country 
(Hussein, 2015). I interviewed five key informants in the post-secondary education sector 
specifically, and I found all had graduate degrees, one received it in the United Kingdom while the 
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other four had earned their degrees in India. The key informants I interviewed were often part of 
the university administration and provided insight into the students that were attending the school 
and the teacher providing the instruction. One university administrator noted they employ 
‘qualified’ instructors. All the universities I interviewed noted that they have admissions tests 
before accepting students. Hargeisa university's policy is to “not only take the secondary school 
graduates, we give them admission test” (D8). This is to ensure students have a minimum 
education background before starting university. 
Some universities are locally initiated with little oversight of the government; others are 
internationally based and are accredited in their home countries. An example of this is Ardams 
University which is accredited in Ethiopia and Mount Kenya University in Kenya. Students in 
those universities gain a Kenyan or Ethiopian degree while studying closer to home. The only 
publicly funded university is Hargeisa University, which has also signed several agreements with 
universities such as King’s College London which administers and monitors final medical exams 
(Newsome, 2013). However, all these institutions do charge tuition, with few if any available 
scholarships to assist students who can not afford the cost. Some NGOs are taking on this role of 
assisting with educating young adults who can not afford the cost of post-secondary education. 
For example: “International school where we brought this school to Somaliland now, we set it up 
somewhere near here. We …are supposed to teach vulnerable students, like those people who came 
from minority groups, we aim to enhance their employability skills through ICT training” (D15). 
This is an example of a local NGO that is taking on the role of delivering services to children who 
might not have access to education. Another NGO noted they are providing resources to teachers 
(D20). 
However, some argue that the government is not investing in the education system as much 
as they should, and some argued that the government does not hire staff based on educational 
attainment. One key informant in the ICT sector argues, “Yes, because there is a lot of people 
working with government and they don’t have any education background” (D14). This was a 
criticism that appeared on several occasions, within my notes that employees of the government 
gained those jobs through nepotism and other connections rather than merit. Another issue posited 
by one key informant posited that the education system is training graduates well: “I call it now 
the era of mass education. We are making a lot of graduates, our schools are producing a lot of 
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people which do not have quality” (D20). They argued that students in secondary schools are all 
being passed with little to no failure. 
The universities have created different programing that utilized ICTs, and the students are 
given hands-on training that includes: “Programming, they develop so many different programs. 
It has been very special of us, if you came to us, then we can show you the kind of programs that 
they build before. That’s the two major areas which they can-, part of them they go to the 
networking, and the others go to program” (D6). When private companies were asked about the 
training provided to employees once they are hired, most provide an apprenticeship type of 
program.  
The education system that leads to employment opportunities for its graduates is 
considered a success. I aimed to find out if the government and industry are hiring locally educated 
staff, one of the largest telecommunications companies noted that staff “are all local, local product. 
From here, local universities [one] is the head of IT department services and technical department, 
from University of Hargeisa” (D20). In my interviews, I specifically asked key informants about 
ICTs training, and some of the key informants noted that “if you visit the universities…you will 
see young students learning technology. They are very good at it. (D18). The innovative nature of 
the school system also pointed to the following example “I was just talking to my [colleague], and 
he was telling me that there’s a girl in Hargeisa University who has money to manufacture hair oil 
from carrots.” (D3). Overall, many people pointed to the education system as improving the 
economic and social standing of the country.  
Justice 
The justice system in Somalia has developed into a two-track system. One system is administered 
and enforced by the government, which is often considered weak and ineffectual (Besteman, 2017; 
Stremlau & Osman, 2015). After independence, the Somali legal system was based on a 
combination of Italian and British legal systems in addition to the Sharia (Islamic) law. In the wake 
of the weakened government, businesses have all utilized three methods to enter agreements, first 
through the reliance on international agencies, second though clans/local networks and third 
through the simplification of the transactions to avoid third parties (Nenova & Harford, 2005; 
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Stremlau, 2016). A constitution was approved in a referendum in 2001 that codified the legal 
system (Le Sage, 2005).  
A second more prevalent system is the traditional system called cultural system Xeer 
(Bradbury, 2008, p. 23; Laitin, 1976, p. 449; Leeson, 2007b). The Xeer system does not have 
formalized institutions with community elders overseeing its implementation (Le Sage, 2005). 
This combination of written and unwritten rules are part of the justice system in the country. People 
in the country can choose which system they would like to use in settlement of disputes, enter into 
agreements or seek justice. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has termed this to be an 
‘informal justice’ because of the multitude of approaches that are not codified (Le Sage, 2005).  
In the case of Somaliland, individuals and businesses are depended on this Xeer system to 
ensure that contracts are adhered to. When asked about the basis for optimism in the country, one 
informant noted that “Security and trust. Security in the sense that this country has good security 
system and trust, the nature of the Somali and the trust and kinship has allowed this country to 
flourish for it, whereby people trust each other with money, people trust each other with 
everything” (D5). This key informant was pointing to a sentiment that these structures have made 
it feasible and easier to do business in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 4:  113 
Figure 4.6: Atlas/Ti education, Justice and Social service sectors code and related codes 
 
In this study, one group of individuals has pointed to as allowing the functioning of businesses in 
the country. For example, the enforcement system is entrusted to the elders “usually take care of 
stabilizing or you can say pacifying whatever conflict that usually rises, the people themselves 
don’t have a [problem] obeying these elderly people when it comes to-, that is a fairly important 
part” (D2). The Somali Xeer system is geared towards the restitution for the victims rather than 
the punishment for crimes (Powell, Ford, & Nowrasteh, 2008). One example of how this is applied 
is when it comes to libel laws, as one informant noted that one could simply put unfounded 
information on television.  
“So you cannot put anything-, you are accountable to your tribe…even if you do 
something…the elders come in, the government say are you doing this outside the court or 
doing it within the court. If they say we are doing it outside the court, they say everything 
will go [to the tribal system], ‘cause you know, they can solve complicated problems that 
the government cannot solve like this” (D20). 
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The business system relies on the clan system to raise funds for investments. As one manager 
noted, the clan system allows for a network that can assist in aiding your entrepreneur idea: “you 
have a bigger circle of individuals who can trust you firstly because of the tribal connection. Just 
in any business in the world, you hit your friends and your family first. We just have a slightly 
extended family that you can reach out to” (D17). However, this does not mean that the 
government is excluded from the legal process, both criminal or civil. According to a key 
informant, Telecommunication companies such as TeleSom prefer to use the legal system to 
provide the company with the needed legal cover to issue public shares (D21). This contradiction 
was noted by an interviewee in a ministry who stated: “So maybe it will be very difficult to 
understand [people follow] the rule of law of the country without having a complete legal 
framework” (D13). This sentiment seems to underlie the multitude of regulatory regimes that apply 
and yet are not necessarily codified.  
4.5.4 Delivery of Social Services 
The provisioning of social services is an area studied in order to understand how society in a weak 
state operates. With the retreat of the international aid organizations after the UN peacekeeping 
mission left the country in the 1990s, the country came to rely on private enterprises to deliver 
emergency healthcare, education services and other social services (Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI), 
2016; G. Smith, 2014). Specifically, social networks took on an increasing role delivery of social 
services to fund these for-profit enterprises (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; H. A. Warsame, 2012). The 
country as a whole faces a high poverty rate, and the UNDP estimates that 43% of the populations 
live under the extreme poverty line while the number increases to 73% living under $2 a day 
poverty measure. The government receives official development assistance to assist in reducing 
these numbers. The ODA is geared to towards humanitarian assistance. These figures experience 
highs and lows depending on the country, facing an almost cyclical famine (Dalrymple & Watts, 
2016; UNICEF, 2016).  
As non-state actors, the remittance industry is often pointed to for its role in the day-to-day 
funding of Somali needs. The number of households that receive remittances in Somalia is 
estimated to be 40% (Sheikh & Healy, 2009). The UNDP noted that large educational institutions 
and medical facilities had opened mainly through the remittances. An example includes Armoud 
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University in Hargeisa, which is allowing students to gain international credentials locally. The 
Coalition of Grassroots Women Organizations (COGWO) another example of a local community 
that brings women to assist people in Somalia through sponsoring people in need of medical 
assistance (Sheikh & Healy, 2009). A final example of the role in the delivery of social service, 
that Somaliland government has a dedicated agency with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that 
accepts donations to “tackle poverty and promote social justice” (The Somaliland Diaspora 
Agency, 2018). All these examples show how the remittance industry has become entrenched in 
the daily lives of Somali society outside of direct contributions to individuals. 
In the interviews, when I asked about how the country delivers social services, one key 
informant noted that “everything is going, you know, left and right, but I think it’s the will of the 
people that makes the country still work” (D1). The locals have come together to work on 
delivering social services because the need was there; however, they also realized that the 
international community and the local government were not going to come to their aid. In the 
Somaliland context, this is also in reference to the fact that its self-declared independence has not 
been recognized internationally. An interviewee noted, “Half of the support people do not want to 
come here because there’s an embargo on Somalia so then they’re not allowed even to come to 
Somaliland” (D17). For example, the American government has placed restrictions on financial 
institutions from working in certain countries, including Somalia.  
However, there was an optimism about the country’s situation that was summed by another 
interviewee: “Here, you’ve got the security, you’ve got the economic stability, a good banking 
system, telecommunications, … all the ingredients are in place for stable and kind of slow growth” 
(D4). The role of religion in mandating the assistance of family members and the community-at-
large was cited as one possible explanation. One interviewee attributed this to people in the country 
having a “good understanding of the religion” (D13). The expectation that people must help each 
other is provided as an example of the delivery of social services.  
In the interviews I noticed the optimism many had with regards to the future, especially the 
country improving both economically and socially. This included “I think the future is bright for 
the country in regards to [the] economy because there are so many initiatives that are going on” 
(D3). Another stated, “Personally thinks this country has a great future ahead. The security of this 
country is good, and it has a vibrant private sector, and he expects great development of this nation” 
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(D5).  Some pointed to a lack of international intervention as one reason the country has coalesced 
around the local model of development. “is running without interventions from others” (D23). This 
was summed up by “This is a country which has already established a very good solid background 
in terms of potential for further development. There is a lot of, I think, enthusiasm and also the 
foundations, the key foundations really when you look at it is peace” (D22). The localized form of 
social service form has created optimism that it will lead to a more stable country. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This study aimed to explore the existing social structures in Somalia. Through in-country key 
informant interviews from various sectors and industries, I sought to discover the visible and 
invisible institutions that are central to delivering social and economic services in Somalia. This 
study found evidence of social structures as elucidated by Anthony Giddens’s Structuration 
Theory. Additionally, the study employed a grounded-theory, case study approach to 
understanding the institutions and how they function. The research recruited 30 key informants 
from four sectors: Education, Government, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 
Industry. This research employed both purposeful as well as snowball sampling. 
4.6.1 Summary of the Findings 
Structuration Theory provided us with three dimensions to study the structures that exist in the 
country. The legitimation, signification and domination concepts of the theory were evident in the 
country especially in the various sectors studied. The legitimation process was particularly evident 
at the intersection of the local and the international in the Hawala sector. The Hawala network is 
a lifeline to many in the country; however, they must follow international financial rules. The 
signification process relied on the Somali cultural norms and Islam to ensure that individuals 
followed certain principles. An example of this was that people could trade across borders and 
trust that their products would arrive as agreed. The domination process could be seen in how the 
few companies monopolized access to communication networks and often access to the financial 
services facilitated by those same networks. 
Utilizing Giddens’ concept of structure, I found Somali’s knowledge and intricate use of 
the system of family lineage and clan system was central to the functioning of the country. This 
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system allowed them to operate using norms and rules that were used to enter into contracts and 
bidding agreements. The interview participants noted that the trust-based system in which ensured 
that they could operate businesses that relied on unseen or unheard partners. This system of trust 
networks also allowed individuals to access a larger family system for investment funds, and this 
was seen as providing the needed go-ahead to start businesses. Moreover, this system allowed the 
members of the diaspora to contribute to the local Somali economy.  
The interviewees noted that people rarely travel to other countries themselves to buy goods 
and then return them to the country; instead, people relied on a network of people whom they 
placed the order with and the products would be shipped to different parts of the country either 
through the air or sea. Because of the lack of traditional financial institutions, people relied on 
investments from extended family networks to establish their businesses.  
As a social structure, the economy has been decoupled from government control. This 
study has confirmed that the role of the state in the economy has been reduced drastically. Thus, 
elements of social structures that were traditionally embedded and institutionalized because of the 
state were often taken over by the private sector. The government is removed from the private 
sector and is usually left to make decisions at the periphery. The economy is run by small actors 
that are supported by family members and goods and services that required substantial investments 
that were often controlled by a few large companies. 
The financial system relies on a few large companies that were independent of the 
government. These companies offered traditional banking services such as deposit and savings, 
but they did not offer or extend credit services to individuals. However, these companies operated 
mobile money services that they offered to their customers often for free. Although they were 
constricted by the local norms, particularly religious traditions about charity and social good, these 
companies had to follow international rules about ‘know-your-customer” provisions. This points 
to the companies adhering to the legitimation process of the globalized system. To operate within 
the globalized system, these company agents needed to reflexively monitor their actions. This 
resulted in these companies taking on the roles that are considered to be the purview of the state. 
Typically, the state, particularly through its central bank, would licence financial institutions to 
adhere to international standards. However, the evidence points to the private sector taking this 
role. 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 4:  118 
The person and how they chose to participate in the social and economic sector was based 
on the individual actors. Using Giddens’ agency concept, it played an essential role in 
understanding the practical norms that are expected of everyone. Customarily, institutions 
associated with the state were expected to introduce and enforce codified laws; however, in the 
case of Somalia, these codified laws are unenforced because the state is weak. Various key 
informants noted that the state is weak and is primarily is relegated to often few services primarily 
geared towards guarding of the territory such as military and police. However, individuals are 
working in a system that allows them to understand the Xeer cultural custom in the country. For 
example, the responsibility is back to the individual and rules are enforced by elders. Many pointed 
to the role elders play in dispute resolution.  
Within Somali culture, the individual agency the practical and discursive elements are 
crucial to understanding the institutions that exist. The individual is expected to understand the 
myriad of social rules and norms that will allow them to live within the country. The individual is 
acting with multiple levels of understanding. Knowing the norms and rules are essential because 
their extended family is often party to them and will have to be involved should the individual fail 
to live up to those rules and norms. The individual, in this case, is part of what Giddens calls a 
‘continuous flow of conduct.’ In the case of doing business, the individual is expected to send the 
money to suppliers that are more often than not unknown to the individual and then to trust they 
will receive the goods.  
Additionally, I found that the ICT sector plays an important mediating role in the country’s 
institutions. Utilizing Giddens’ Structuration Theory, I found evidence of institutions despite 
conditions of failure. ICT sector plays an important role in ensuring that people have access to 
products and can send and receive money. This study confirmed that the ICT sector had enabled 
people to send and receive money at increased speed, and mobile telecommunication is central to 
commerce in the country. The ICT sector is crucial to doing business in the country, and it 
facilitates the goods that are imported to the country. Technology education has been increasing 
in response to the need in the country.  
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4.6.2 Research Contribution 
This study has contributed to our understanding of the social structures that allow for social and 
economic services to be delivered in the country. This study has provided evidence of institutions 
that allow for the financial services to be offered. This study presented evidence of how the 
economy works in the country. Through examples of how the ICT sector contributes to the 
economic activities of the country, this study showed the mediating roles that it plays in the Somali 
society. The study provided evidence of how the justice system works in the country. This study 
confirmed the disputed resolution mechanism at the heart of the Somali justice system.  
4.6.3 Limitations and Challenges 
This study faced multiple limitations. The first example, I interviewed a relatively small number 
of key informants. I believe that this study would have benefited from interviewing more 
individuals. This study focused on executives, and I think interviews with people not connected 
with the five sectors selected would have provided nuanced insight. Other individuals who come 
in contact with these institutions and structures would provide insight into the daily lives of 
Somalis. The study would have also benefited from a longer data collection time frame in Somalia. 
Finally, these interviews were relatively short an average of 20 minutes per interviewee; I think I 
should have spoken to them longer.  
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Chapter 5:  Study 3: The roles of technology in economic and social 
systems of Somalia: A case of remittance by Somalis in the Diaspora. 
 
Abstract 
This study aims, through a survey and key informant interviews, to better understand the role played by the 
diaspora in Somalia’s economic and social system. By examining how the remittance system works and by 
studying what methods Somalis employ including recent innovations such as mobile banking, we also 
establish the role of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the Somali money transfer sector. 
This study explores the institution behind the Hawala system, and how it is enabled by technology. Thus, 
this study is guided by the central question: What role does technology and the diaspora, through the 
remittance system, play in this economic and social system of Somalia? In order to answer this question, I 
began this study by setting a baseline understanding of the Somali population in Canada and the Greater 
Toronto Area (GTA). I gathered data from a variety of sources such as the United Nations and Statistics 
Canada to trace the Somali population in Canada. Once that was established, I then created an inventory of 
the Hawala business gathered from secondary sources and online business listings along with the Somali 
remittance sector worldwide. Next, a survey of 143 Somalis who have remitted internationally in 2017 was 
conducted. The survey was divided into four sections: inclusion criteria, reasons for remittances, technology 
used and demographics. Finally, small–sample interviews were conducted with members of Somali Money 
Transfer Organizations (MTOs) in the GTA to understand the business climate. The interviews aimed to 
get specific inputs from people with direct knowledge about the remittance system more generally and 
technology utilized. 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The third study of this thesis examines the role the Somali diaspora plays in the country through 
extensive analysis of the remittance system and how technology is utilized in the money transfer 
process. Additionally, a focus on the information and communication, along with social networks 
utilized by Somalis living in Canada, is studied. Somalia relies heavily on the remittances sent by 
Somalis in the diaspora to pay for children’s education, social services and provides an investment 
funds for small businesses. For instance, it has been estimated that close to 40% of families in the 
country as a whole rely on the $1.3 billion remittances per year (Gutale, 2015, p. 128). Remittances 
are the second-largest source of external funding in developing countries; however, in Somalia, it 
is the largest source of foreign funding (Maimbo & Ratha, 2005b). Oxfam (2015) noted that the 
amount of money sent to Somalia in the form remittances exceeded all the development aid, 
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emergency assistance and FDI put together. Moreover, in 2017 remittances accounted for 26.7% 
of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP); these figures increase during humanitarian 
emergencies serving as a financial cushion when needed most (Federal Government of Somalia, 
2018; Hassan & Chalmers, 2008). Consequently, remittance enterprises account for a large 
segment of the financial sector in Somalia. And yet, the remittance system functions in spite of the 
lack of centralized, state-regulated financial system.  
The economic and social impacts of the Somali diaspora on the institutional structures 
within Somalia are rarely studied. Similarly, the power and support structures along with the tools 
that are created as a result of the remittance system need to be explored. ICTs have changed how 
the remittance sector works. This is true for the remitters, the transfer industry that facilitates the 
transfer of funds and the recipients in Somalia. The adoption and implementation of new 
technology have allowed for the funds to be received much more quickly. The remittance has also 
allowed people in the diaspora to play a crucial role as initial investors bringing these new 
technologies into Somalia. 
How this system functions and its role as the economic backbone of the country needs to 
be better understood. Thus, this third study aims to examine the remittance system and its 
underlying process. More specifically, this study will analyze the crucial role served by ICTs in 
the delivery of billions of dollars into the country. This study employed a variety of theories to try 
to understand why Somalis send remittances. First, I draw upon Social Network Theory along with 
Altruism Theory in order to explain the main reasons families send money home to help their 
family members in Somalia.  
This study aims, through interviews and surveys, to better understand these networks. By 
tracing the networks and studying how they employ a modern tool such as the mobile banking, I 
also establish the role of ICT in the Somali money transfer sector. This study explores the 
institution behind the Hawala system, and how it is enabled by technology. This study is guided 
by the central question: What role does information communication technology and the diaspora, 
through the remittance system, play in the economic and social ecosystem of Somalia? In order to 
answer this question, I begin this study by setting a baseline understanding of the Somali 
population in Canada and the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). I used the data from a variety of 
sources such as the United Nations and Statistics Canada to trace the Somali population in Canada. 
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Once that was established, I then created an inventory of the Hawala business gathered from 
secondary sources and online business listings along with the Somali remittance sector worldwide. 
Next, a survey of 143 Somalis who have remitted internationally in 2017 was conducted. The 
survey was divided into four sections: inclusion criteria, reasons for remittances, technology used 
and demographics. Finally, small–sample interviews were conducted with members of Somali 
Money Transfer Organizations (MTOs) in the GTA to understand the business climate. The 
interviews aimed to get specific inputs from people with direct knowledge about the remittance 
system more generally and the technology utilized.  
Overall, this third study provides the social context of Somalis living in the GTA; defines 
Hawala; provides an in-depth explanation of the methodology used and share the study findings. 
The study utilizes theories such as Altruism and Social Ties as most appropriate to explain what 
motivates people to send money to people in Somalia. Moreover, I utilize Diffusion of Innovation 
theory to explain why ICTs are adopted in the remittance sector. Additionally, I offer a framework 
to explain the motivations for sending money. 
5.2. Context 
5.2.1 Hawala 
Hawala, an informal money transfer system, plays a vital role in several economies around the 
world (De Goede, 2003; El-Qorchi, 2002; Razavy, 2005). Hawala comes from the Arabic word 
“transfer” (El-Qorchi, 2002). While in Hindi, it means “trust” (Looney, 2003). The money transfer 
system operates similarly around the world and has a few meanings; examples include, hundi in 
Pakistan or padala in the Philippines (Ladanyi & Kobolka, 2014). Although it originated centuries 
ago, the modern version of the Somali Hawala system is traced to the partition of India and 
Pakistan when the legal transfer of money between the countries ended (Schramm & Taube, 2003). 
The Hawala system has often operated in areas that did not have access to formalized banks and 
financial institutions (Maimbo & Ratha, 2005a). Hawala operates differently from other informal 
money transfer networks. A differentiating factor of the Hawala system from other types of 
remittances systems is that it is characterized by the transfer of money without the immediate 
movement of currency. Specifically, the money does not physically leave the sending agents' 
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accounts immediately instead of relying on a trust network that will ensure that the equivalent 
amount will reach the receiving agent (Maimbo, 2003). In short, the Hawala system is an informal 
channel to transfer funds from one location to another (El-Qorchi, 2002).    
The system is proliferated for a few reasons, and these include the trust, speed and 
reliability of the approach (Jost & Sandhu, 2000). One reason for its relative success and endurance 
is that the system cuts down on the amount of bureaucracy required for the sender to meet. Another 
reason is that the system is often preferred due its convenience, with locations and agents being 
easily accessible. Although the money transfer system is used to send money to Somalia, it can be 
reversed to assist in investment or cover unexpected expenses (Ladanyi & Kobolka, 2014).  
However, the Hawala system has come under heavy scrutiny as source financing for illicit 
behaviour and terrorism. The Hawala system can offer anonymity of both the sender and the 
receiver. The system’s opaqueness, speed and lack of records have risen concerns for being a 
conduit for criminal and terrorist financing. For example, fears that the Hawala sector was being 
used to fund terrorism led the United States government to close down one of the largest Somali 
money remittance companies in the US. In 2001 Al Barakat7, which was based in Dubai, UAE 
handling more than $140 million in remittances annually was suspended by the US government. 
The company had almost nine million dollars frozen(BBC, 2006; Omer, 2004). Additionally, 
Western governments have placed heavy restrictions on banks that facilitate the Hawala brokers, 
thus effectively driving them further underground (De Goede, 2003). For countries that rely on the 
Hawala system rather than the formal banks to transfer money, these restrictions have been 
criticized for hurting people dependent on the transfers (Gutale, 2015). 
Dubai, United Arab Emirates is home to a large number of MTOs handling most money 
transfer transactions (Looney, 2003). Dubai acts as a conduit for these funds to the Indian 
subcontinent and East Africa. The UAE is one of Somalia’s largest trading partners, most imports 
within Somalia pass though Dubai (Nenova & Harford, 2005; Omer, 2004). In most cases, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) serves as the financial capital for Somali MTOs. After the September 
11, 2001 attacks in New York, the UAE implemented regulations that ensured the all MTOs 
operating within the country were registered to curtail funds that might be used to finance 
                                                 
7 In 2006, the U.S. government removed Al Barakat and all of its agents from terrorist financing list noting that there 
was no evidence in it involvement with terrorists. 
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terrorism. However, the UAE government stated, “Regulations should be effective but not overly 
restrictive” (International Monetary Fund, 2005, p. 95). The MTOs can send physical cash or wire 
a transfer to a bank account based in the UAE that acts as clearinghouses (Hassan & Chalmers, 
2008). The money is then transferred as products that can then be exported to Somalia. The Hawala 
system serves to link the products that are consumed in the country with money from around the 
world.  
In the case of Somalia and its diaspora, the Hawala system is the financial backbone of the 
country. In a country without a centralized postal system, formalized banking system or personal 
identification system, the Hawala system has several advantages. First, individuals without a fixed 
address can use the system because all that is required is code or phrase from the sender to access 
the funds (Oxfam, 2015). Another advantage is that the Hawala system works in places where 
large money transfer institutions do not serve. For example, there are no internationally recognized 
MTOs such as Western Union desks or Money Gram in Somalia. A third advantage is that it has 
a relatively low cost, the commission charged the sender is around five percent. Thus this low 
commission ensures the cost of transfer itself is reasonable for the senders. A fourth advantage is 
that the large Hawala systems are now web-based to facilitate the quick transfer of money. Once 
the money arrived, the client is called, usually on mobile telephones which are widely available. 
If the amount is large, a clan elder is called upon to verify the person’s identity. In order to create 
a fast efficient system, technology has enabled this process to move at a higher speed.  
The Hawala system is illustrated in Figure 5.1, the system could be summarised as a 
follows: The first step is that Individual A in Region A gives money to be sent to the Broker A 
along with a fee; the second step is that Broker A provides a confirmation code to Individual A; 
the third step, the Individual A in-turn shares the confirmation code with Individual B; the fourth 
step is that Broker A instructs Broker B to release funds to Individual B, the funds exchanged can 
sometimes be in the form of a loan between brokers; the fifth step is that Individual B presents the 
confirmation code from Individual A to Broker B; the sixth step is for Broker B to release funds 
for Individual B; the seventh and final step is for Broker A to reconcile the ledgers, primarily 
through a carrier system, to Broker B. 
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Figure 5.1: The Hawala model 
 
Adapted from: (El-Qorchi, 2002; Oxfam, 2015; Razavy, 2005). Solid lines are interactions with individuals, 
while broken lines are interactions between brokers. The diagonal line divides the two regions. 
 
Adapting to new policies, regulations and new consumer demands as they have emerged, the 
Hawala has survived. Recently, ICTs have made the Hawala process faster and more efficient. The 
money transfer system has been dramatically transformed by fax machines, telephones, emails and 
more recently, mobile phones. The World Bank (2017a) estimates that 90% of Somalis own at 
least one mobile phone, most (62.4%) own a basic mobile phone, some 30.8% own a smartphone, 
and 13.1% own a feature phone. It is estimated that 73% of the Somali population over the age of 
16 use mobile money services, but when only people with mobile money are surveyed that number 
rises to 83.0%. The three main regions of the country have different mobile phone companies that 
dominate each of their respective regions. In South-Central, 99.5% of the local population owns a 
SIM card from Hormuud. In Puntland, 97.9% of the local population owns a SIM card serviced by 
Gollis. In Somaliland, 96.2% of the people own a Telesom SIM card. People in Somalia, like many 
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in Africa, own multiple SIM cards and use networks and promotions to call each. In fact, Somalis 
own an average of 1.4 SIM cards per person. 
Within the region, 68.6% of the population use mobile money to transfer money 
domestically, and 24.9% have used it to send money internationally. According to the same World 
Bank study, 9.2% of international transfers originated from Canada, although most came from the 
United States (32.5%) (World Bank, 2017a). Thus, the reach of the MTO networks has been 
expanded and is much faster, and most funds are delivered almost instantaneously. Due to the 
utilization of ICTs, these types of transactions can now be completed in less than 24 hours (Razavy, 
2005).  
In any discussion about the remittance network, one essential group is the diaspora. 
Although the benefits to Somalis in the country are undeniable, as Hammond (2011) noted: 
“While one can argue that improvements in governance might increase the positive impact 
of remittances on the country, the value that remittances already hold for thousands of 
Somalis living in and around Somalia—even in the absence of peace and well-established 
structures of governance—is impressive” (p. 130).  
The Hawala industry in Somalia contributes significantly to the economy in the country. The 
remittances are estimated to contribute 26.7% to the country’s GDP. In 2017, the World Bank 
(2017c) estimated that the $1.4 billion is remitted to Somalia yearly. The amount of money is 
relatively small, on average Somalis remit around $233 per month to family members in Somalia 
(World Bank, 2017b). Oxfam estimated that Somalis in the United States sent the most amount of 
money comprising 20% or $213 million of funds remitted to the country annually. However, the 
Somalis in Germany sent, on average, more money annually, $4,383, to Somalia compared to other 
countries. Canadian Somalis remitted close to $49 million to Somalia or an average of $2,185 
annually per person (Oxfam, 2015).  
Since 2009, the World Bank has been tracking the cost of remittances worldwide. The 
World Bank Remittance Price Worldwide database makes data available in each quarter. The 
database was the result of the Group of 20 (G20) countries committing to reduce the cost of sending 
remittance by five percent over five years. The database tracks 48 sending countries and 105 
receiving countries (World Bank, 2018a). For Somalia, the World Bank tracks remittance from 
five countries and ten Money Transfer Organisations. Among other variables, the database 
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contains costs associated with sending the equivalent of 200 United States Dollars (USD), the fee 
charged in the local currency, the foreign exchange margin and the total cost. The average cost to 
send the money to Somalia from all countries tracked by the World Bank is 7.81%. The country 
with the lowest total cost to send $200 in the United States at 5.71%, and this can be partly 
explained by the fact that there is no cost associated with currency exchange. Australia had the 
highest total cost to send money to Somalia at 11.20%. Sweden had the highest cost associated 
with the foreign exchange, see Table 5.1 (World Bank, 2018b).   
Table 5.1: The number of firms, fees and foreign exchange margin and the total cost to remit to Somalia 
Country Amount (USD) Firms 
Fee in local 
currency 
Foreign exchange 
margin (%) 
Total cost 
(%) 
Australia 200 3 16.0 4.20 11.20 
Netherlands 200 3 4.23 3.53 6.55 
Sweden 200 8 57.38 5.64 9.02 
United Kingdom* 200 7 6.36 2.05 7.35 
United States 200 5 11.60 0 5.8 
Average 200 5.2 - 3.44 7.81 
Source: World Bank (2018b); *Excludes observations from Transfer Galaxy (cost rate of 0.6 GBP, 
although it had a higher amount for the exchange rate compared to competitors) 
As the largest Somali MTO Dahabshil has agents in all five countries tracked by the World Bank, 
World Remit is tracked in all countries except the U.S. Dahabshil has some of the highest total 
cost to send money in all five countries observed, ranging from 6% in the U.S. to 16.1% in 
Australia. On the other hand, World Remit has some of the lowest total cost to send money to all 
the countries it was tracked. Specifically, World Remit has a total cost of 4.54% to send money to 
Somalia during the first quarter of 2018 compared to 8.05% for all the other MTOs operating in 
the U.K. Since 2011, the average total cost to send money to Somalia has been between 6.37% and 
9.16%. The World Bank had been tracking MTOs remitting to Somalia more consistently since 
the first quarter of 2013, during that year, had some of the lowest total cost to send money to 
Somalia. One reason for the lower total cost during that year is related to the lower foreign 
exchange margin charged by the MTOs. Figure 5.2 summarized the average cost to send money 
to Somalia by quarter and year since 2011.   
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Figure 5.2: Average cost to send money to Somalia by quarter and year (2011 – 2018) 
 
Source: World Bank (2018b) 
 
5.2.2 Somali population in Canada 
The Somali diaspora numbers around the world unknown; however, it is estimated to be in the 
millions. As the security situation in Somalia deteriorated in the late 1980s, millions left the 
country and settled in different countries (see Appendix 16). According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of Somali refugees that sought asylum in other 
countries saw a significant increase when figures jumped from around 3,100 in 1986 to more than 
60,100 in 1987. Most of these refugees settled in neighbouring countries. Over the last three 
decades, Kenya hosted almost 6.5 million Somalis, Ethiopia 5.6 million and more than 2.9 million 
have claimed asylum in Yemen (UNHCR, 2018). Figure 5.3 shows the total number of Somali 
refugees worldwide. A large spike witnessed in 1987, exemplified in Figure 5.3, is attributed to 
the internal civil conflict, particularly in the northern part of the country which increased in 
intensity (Toole & Waldman, 1990). Ethiopia estimated that during an eight-month period from 
May 1988 to January 1989, between 300,000 and 500,000 Somalis crossed into Ethiopia (Gersony, 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Pe
rc
en
t
Year
Average cost to send money to Somalia
1Q
2Q
3Q
4Q
Year Average
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 5:  129 
1990). Notably, the boundaries between Somalia and its neighbours were created through 
colonialism. These neighbouring countries had their own sizeable ethnic Somali population 
leading to tensions about the number of Somali refugees crossing the border. For example, Kenya 
created the Dadaab refugee camp, now the world’s largest, in response to fears of Somalis, creating 
a secessionist movement in its Northeastern province(Mwaruvie & Kirui, 2012). While Ethiopia 
feared the low-level conflict with its ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region would worsen with the 
influx of Somali refugees. 
Figure 5.3: Number of Somali refugees (1974 - 2016) 
 
Source: UNHCR, 2018 
 
As the number of Somalis fleeing the country increased, some of the refugees were resettled in 
countries around the world. One of these countries was Canada, resettling Somalis from refugee 
camps in East Africa. This was also in addition to offering asylum to Somali migrants, who arrived 
in Canada (Danso, 2002). The Canadian government offered refugee status to the first Somali 
family in the Fall of 1986, and that number increased to 9,823 by the end of the 1980s (Ali, 1994). 
The number of refugees admitted to Canada increased drastically in the 1990s, with almost 53,000 
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Somalis being accepted into the country between 1994 and 1997. According to the UNHCR 
(2018), Canada was a major destination for Somalis, since 1987, a total of 141,000, have claimed 
or were granted refugee status. Figure 5.4 is a treemap of the number of refugees admitted into 
Canada between 1994 and 2016. 
Figure 5.4: Somali refugees in Canada by year and total numbers of arrival 
 
Source: UNHCR, 2018 
However, Somali migrants and refugee claimants were met with obstacles as they entered Canada. 
Of the Somalis who entered Canada from 1993 to 2009, almost all came as refugee claimants and 
only 2% to 4% were Government-Assisted Refugees (GAR) (Ontario Council of Agencies Serving 
Immigrants (OCASI), 2016). GAR refers to refugees that are chosen outside the country for 
relocation and settlement by the federal government and are financially assisted for some time, 
usually for one year (CIC, 2014). The Canadian government has often been accused of treating 
Somali refugee claimants differently than other claimants (Aiken, 2007; Danso, 2002). To 
illustrate, as the number of Somali refugees coming to Canada increased and the conditions in 
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Somalia deteriorated, the Canadian Minister of Immigration was asked to allow more Somali 
refugees into the country but he is quoted as saying that they are “nomads who didn't want to come 
to Canada” (Hudson, 1992, p. A14). Another example was that the Canadian government passed 
Bill C-86, which required Somalis and Afghanistan refugees who did not possess official 
identification papers such as passports to wait five years before applying for residency. As some 
noted, this requirement was difficult for some because the last official passport issued by the 
Somali government was 1989, and it expired 1994 (Aiken, 2007). Women were more 
disproportionately affected by this law, eighty percent of those without documents were women 
(Spitzer, 2006). Moreover, because of this law, Somalis had to endure a long wait for legal 
documents compared to other refugee claimants because they were not allowed to sponsor spouses 
or children (Brouwer, 1999).  
Currently, in Canada, ethnic Somalis are estimated to number 62,550. A slight majority, 
34,560 or 55.3%, of Somalis in Canada, are immigrants; most (36.5%) arrived between 1990 and 
2000 (Statistics Canada, 2018b). The migrants that arrived in Canada were relatively young, with 
60.6% of Somali migrants falling under the age of 25. Some 32.5% of Somalis do not have a 
certificate, diploma or degree, compared to the Canadian population at 8.2%. When examining the 
admission and the category type, most migrants are refugees, 21,095. After the refugee admission 
category, 4,640 Somalis were sponsored by family members (Statistics Canada, 2018a). For a full 
list of Somali migrants by admission and applicant type, see Appendix 17.  
5.2.3 Somali population in the GTA 
Within Canada, the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) is home to the largest ethnically Somali 
population in the country. According to the 2016 census, of the 62,550 people with Somali 
ethnicity in Canada, 25,555 or 40.8% reside within the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) 
(Statistics Canada, 2018b). The Toronto CMA covers the city of Toronto along with the 
surrounding 23 cities, towns and townships, and it also has the largest population in the country 
with more than 6.4 million people. Somalis initially settled in certain areas of the region, 
particularly in the West-end part of Toronto (Etobicoke), the centre of the city (Regent Park) and 
in the east (Scarborough). In study by Robert Murdie (2002), found that Somalis proximity to 
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family and friends was an important factor in where they settled. As the numbers of Somalis 
increased in the city, these pockets of the city became the de facto centres for the Somali diaspora. 
Over time, a number of Somali entrepreneurs opened businesses to serve the local 
population. This was especially evident when it came to the parts of the city dominated by the 
Somalis. One particular business that sprouted up once the number of Somalis increased was the 
remittance system. The need for money in Somalia increased drastically as the situation worsened. 
The Hawala system in Somalia was modelled after the system created by Somalis in the Arabian 
Gulf states (Hamza, 2006). In the 1970s, Somalis went to the Gulf states during that region’s oil 
boom as migrant labourers. The system proliferated, converting hard currency in the Gulf states 
into merchandise that was then exported to Somalia. Later on, the Hawala system ensured money 
and goods entered the country as the worst effects of the civil war took hold and the number of 
people fleeing the country increased.  
5.2.4 Hawala in the GTA 
The Somali population in Canada increasingly relied on informal transfer networks to send money 
from Canada to Somalia. The Hawala system in Canada and Toronto generally works as described 
above. However, the system in Canada had some unique features that were different from other 
countries. At the time of this study, there were 13 Money Transfer organizations that operated 
within the Greater Toronto Area. The headquarters for these companies are based around the 
world; however, none of the MTOs have a headquarter within Canada.  
The formalized MTOs often are agents with storefronts that deal with other businesses such 
as retail or transportation logistics (Omer, 2004). Most MTOs had less than five agents or locations 
across the city (Hamza, 2006). World Remit is an online MTO that serves parts of Somalia based 
in the U.K. with no physical location in the GTA. World Remit accepts bank transfer and then 
sends the funds electronically to either a financial institution in Somalia or a Mobile Money 
account (Mackenzie, 2015).  
The MTO with the most amount of listed agents is Tawakal Express, which has 18 across 
the city. However, according to the most comprehensive study about the MTO sector done by Buri 
M. Hamza (2006) for the ‘Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption’ 
found that Dahabshil transferred the most amount of money on a monthly basis at around 3.5 to 4 
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million US dollars. The other MTOs averaged between 400,000 to 800,000 US dollars per month 
(See Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2: Name of Somali MTO, number of locations, headquarters  and estimated amounted remitted 
Name Headquarters  Number of Locations Amount 
Amaana Express   Dubai, United Arab Emirates 1  
Amal Express Dubai, United Arab Emirates 5 $700-800,000 
Al- Mustaqbal Express Dubai, United Arab Emirates 4 $600,000 
Dalsan Trading Nairobi, Kenya 1  
Dahabshiil Hargeisa, Somaliland 7 $3.5-4,000,000 
Iftin Express   London, United Kingdom 1  
Juba Express   Dubai, United Arab Emirates 3  
Kaah Express Nairobi, Kenya 1 $400,000 
Salama/Olympic 
Money Express 
London, United Kingdom 1  
Taaj Express   Dubai, United Arab Emirates 1  
Tawakal Express   Dubai, United Arab Emirates 18  
Towfiiq Dubai, United Arab Emirates 5 $400-500,000 
World Remit London, United Kingdom Online  
Source: Hamza (2006); Omer (2002); Author-Bolded agent’s locations 
When examining the process of creating a Hawala network, Hamza (2006) found that the Canadian 
based companies operate similar to other businesses and are required to gain a financial transaction 
licence as required by financial institutions that retain money such as banks. The MTOs have to 
retain records of any funds of over $10,000 and must report any suspicious activities. In January 
2015, the Canada Revenue Agency also required any company transferring funds electronically be 
reported to the tax agency (Canada Revenue Agency, 2015). Hamza (2006) noted that most of the 
MTOs had policies that funds that are above USD $2,000 would require two forms of 
identification.   
5.3. Methodology 
This study, as illustrated in the nomological net (Figure 1.2), employed a mixed method approach 
to understanding the Hawala system and how the diaspora in Canada utilize it. For this study, a 
survey questionnaire of Somalis who have sent money internationally in 2017 was conducted. I 
supplemented the survey with a short questionnaire for MTO providers within the city. The 
objective of this third paper is to gather information about how GTA Somalis utilize the MTOs, 
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the main reasons for sending the money, the socio-economic make-up of the individuals sending 
money. Additionally, I aimed to examine role of the diaspora in the remittance system. By 
examining, evidence of how institutions such as the monetary system, social services, education 
system and justice are supported by the diaspora, this study will contribute to our understanding 
of Somalia.  
Parallel to this, I analyze the crucial role served by ICTs in the delivery of billions of dollars 
into the country. More specifically, this study focuses on the communication and social networks 
that are utilized by the Somalis currently living abroad in order to facilitate the money transfers 
and foster social relationships through a unique money transfer system.  
5.3.1 Research Approach 
The survey questionnaire is an appropriate method for this study in order to understand the 
perspective of a large number of participants in a short time. The structured survey questionnaire 
allows for data collection “on a number of units and usually at a single juncture in time, with a 
view to collecting systematically a body of quantifiable data in respect of a number of variables 
which are then examined to discern patterns of association” (Bryman, 2015, p. 85). The self-
administered survey questionnaire was chosen as most appropriate to permit the participants to 
answer the questions at their own pace. The self-administered survey questionnaire can also be 
useful in gaining unbiased responses (Couper, Traugott, & Lamias, 2001).  
As a quantitative approach, the survey technique “seeks to regularities in the human lives 
by separating the social world into empirical components called variables which can be represented 
numerically” (Payne & Payne, 2004, p. 180). The qualitative approach allowed for a more 
generalizable explanation of the phenomena. However, questionnaire surveys can be associated 
with negative side effects, for example, a low response rate, poor survey design and the participant 
reluctance to answer certain questions.  
The data collected from survey questionnaires fall into two categories, the “human 
behaviour and human characteristics” and “products of human behaviour and human 
characteristics” (Mouton, 1996). Manheim (1977) argues that human behaviour can ensure that 
observable behaviour can be examined using questions and interviews. Data sources and collection 
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requires it to be reliable and must meet a reliability test. The reliability test needs to be able to 
meet the question raised by H. W. Smith (1975) “Will the same methods used by different 
researchers and/or at different times produce the same results?” (p.58). The survey design needs 
to ensure that the design meets a criterion validity; this is in reference to designing an instrument 
that estimates an important behaviour (Mouton, 1996). Although, the survey design must also meet 
the construct validity which is important answering the question: “how does the researcher really 
know that the items included in the scale or questionnaire actually measure the construct that they 
are supposed to represent?” (Mouton, 1996, p. 128). The questionnaire design could account for 
this through the cross-validation of questions.  
To supplement the information from the survey questionnaire, a small sample of four (4) 
of MTO agents were interviewed to understand better the Hawala system and the process that 
allows it to function in Canada. These agents were selected because they are some of the largest 
MTO and handle a large portion of the money that is transferred to Somalia. The survey of users 
allows us to understand the perspective of the customers; however, the agents are best positioned 
to enlighten on issues that affect the Hawala business. According to Crouch and McKenzie (2006), 
this type of small-sample interviews within social science research is appropriate in understanding 
the social condition. Nevertheless, they argue that researchers should be aware the pitfalls of this 
type of data and should not be geared towards “establishing ‘objective facts” (485). Within IS 
field, small sample research has been employed in various studies(Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 
1987; Marshall, Cardon, Poddar, & Fontenot, 2013). The concepts of chain interviews and 
snowball sampling were crucial to this study’s methodology. Semi-structured and conversational 
interviews were employed for gathering data. As a rule, this methodology is employed since 
“questions emerge from the immediate context and when asked in the natural course of things; 
there is no predetermination of question topics or wording” (Mikkelsen, 2005, p. 171). The 
interviews provided information that adds to our understanding of the Hawala process. For the 
survey questions and the interview questionnaire see Appendix 18. 
The qualitative approach was utilized because it would allow the researcher to understand 
the process utilized by the Somali diaspora when sending funds to Somalia. This approach also 
allowed me to understand the amounts sent by the diaspora, the methods they use the most and the 
motivations for sending the funds.  
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5.3.2 Survey Design 
The survey was designed using Qualtrics, a survey tool that allows for the survey to be completed 
using a variety of methods, including on paper, online page as well as a link emailed directly to 
participant sample. The Qualtrics survey software has been used in a variety of studies, including 
Information Systems studies such as Vijayasarathy and Butler (2016), K. Parsons, McCormac, 
Butavicius, Pattinson, and Jerram (2014) and (Ortigosa, Martín, & Carro, 2014). Although the 
survey was designed to be completed using a variety of approaches, all the people chose to 
complete it using the paper version rather than doing it online. Some of the survey respondents 
stated they felt more comfortable with the paper version of the survey rather than an electronic 
version. 
The survey questions were designed to ascertain not only the practical elements of the 
sending remittances to Somalia, but also how they relate to the people in Somalia. The literature 
posits a few theories as to why people remit, I was interested in the social networks that allow for 
the system to function. Somalia’s history has shown that it a country in which state institutions are 
weak, and the Hawala system is one example in which people have supported and aided each other. 
The literature also shows that communication is key to why people give, so I was curious about 
the frequency and ways in which people communicate. I also utilized some questions from a 
variety of sources such as the International Monetary Fund, UN and the World Bank to create a 
comparable set of questions. Finally, I wanted to find out how ICTs play a role in how people are 
sending. Thus, the survey was divided into four sections: the first sections were the inclusion and 
exclusion questions that determined the individual’s eligibility for this study. Once the participants 
confirmed they are over the age of 18, were ethnically Somali and had sent money internationally 
in 2017, I then asked then a series of 10 questions related to the how and why they sent these 
remittances. Next, I asked questions about the types of technology utilized to send the funds and 
how they normally communicate with the family members or friends receiving those funds. The 
final section of the survey included demographic questions related to participant’s income, 
education and age. 
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5.3.3 Participant Selection 
Using purposeful sampling, the survey participants targeted for this study were Somali individuals 
16 years or older. Purposive or purposeful sampling technique necessitates the aim “to sample 
cases/participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions 
that are being posed” (Bryman, 2015, p. 418). These individuals live within or near the Greater 
Toronto Area (GTA). The paper version of the survey was distributed using various Somali MTOs, 
businesses and through key informants that were connected to particular Somali organizations such 
as a community Somali Women of Weston neighbourhood gathering that take place once a month 
in the Etobicoke part of the city. The researcher utilized local Somalis to gain acceptance of the 
survey. However, there was hesitance amongst some of the participants about disclosing personal 
information, particularly relating to the income and amounts sent. In these instances, I assured the 
participants their names would not be collected, and no identifiable personal information be saved. 
Additionally, the participants could skip any question on the survey expect the mandatory three 
questions at the beginning of the survey. 
5.3.4 The Data 
The data was collected from across the GTA, and the study utilized purposeful sampling. There 
were a total of 143 survey respondents, and this resulted in a margin of error of 8.17% with a 
confidence level of 95% assuming the Somali population in the GTA is 25,555. It should be noted 
that some respondents chose not to answer certain questions, and as such the frequency of some 
variables may not total to 143 for all questions. 
Once collected, the data was then cleaned and analyzed. This study utilized descriptive and 
inferential statistics to gain an understanding of the questions at hand. The first step was to conduct 
a frequency counts, commonly called a univariate analysis, of the data. This then allowed me to 
conduct measurements of central tendency (mean, median and mode). The next level of analysis 
conducted was bivariate analysis. The study also utilizes multivariate analysis.  
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5.4. Findings 
5.4.1 Participant demographics 
The first level of analysis of the data was the demographic profile of the survey respondents. The 
survey respondents were 60.6% male and 39.4% were female. Most of the respondents were 
between the ages of 35 to 44 (27.0%), while other age groups were relatively similar; those over 
the age of 55 (24.8%), 25 to 34 (24.1%) and 45 to 54 (24.1%). While examining the respondents’ 
personal income for the 2017 year, 19.4% earned personal incomes of $20,000 or less, while nearly 
half of respondents (45.3%), earned between $30,000 and $50,000 annually. When asked about 
their current employment status, most of the respondents were employed (66.2%). Specifically, 
35.0% were employed as a staff member, 14.0% were self-employed in a professional capacity, 
8.4% were self-employed as a non-retail business owner and 3.5% stated they were self-employed 
retail business owners. For the employment status, the next largest category of respondents were 
housewives at 9.4%, another 9.4% of the respondents were retired, 8.6% were currently 
unemployed, and finally, 4.3% were students. 2.2% chose ‘other’ category, which included 
individuals who were on long-term disability (see Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3: Survey participants gender, age, income, and employment status (frequency and percent) 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Male 83 60.6 
Female 54 39.4 
Total 137 100.0 
Age Frequency Percent 
25-34 years old 33 24.1 
35-44 years old 37 27.0 
45-54 years old 33 24.1 
55 years or older 34 24.8 
Total 137 100.0 
Income Frequency Percent 
Less than $20,000 27 19.4 
$20,000 to less than $30,000 34 24.5 
$30,000 to less than $50,000 63 45.3 
$50,000 and over 15 10.8 
Total 139 100.0 
Employment Status Frequency Percent 
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Student 6 4.3 
Housewife 13 9.4 
Unemployed 12 8.6 
Employed 92 66.2 
Retired 13 9.4 
Other 3 2.2 
Total 139 100.0 
When respondents were asked how long they have been remitting money, most people surveyed 
(59.2%) have been sending money for 5 years or more. 13.4% of participants have been sending 
money between 3 to 5 years, followed by people who have been sending money between 1 to 3 
years. Whereas, people who have been sending for less than a year comprised 9.8% of the survey 
participants (see Appendix 19). When I examined how long people have been sending money by 
their age ranges, it shows that respondents between the age of 25-34 were most likely to have sent 
money for less than a year (57.1%). Respondents between the ages of 35 to 44 were more likely 
to have been remitting funds between 3 to 5 years (31.6%). The respondents between 45 and 54 
years along with those 55 years and over were more likely to have been sending money more than 
five years at 30.0% respectively (see Appendix 20). 
Most respondents sent money about once a month (55.4%), followed by people who sent 
every two to three months (18.7%). 59.3% of survey respondents sent $500 or less. It should be 
noted that this question was changed at the mid-point of the survey, to gain a better understanding 
of amounts smaller than $500. Accordingly, of the 71 individuals who sent $500 or less, more than 
half of the respondents (43) selected amounts below $500, and the results showed that most people 
(11.4%) sent about $100 to $200. These relatively small amounts are consistent with other studies 
show that most people sent relatively small amounts that make a huge difference in the lives of 
people in the receiving countries. The other amounts sent that were more than $500 include: 11.4% 
for people sending $501 to $750 dollars; 10.0 % for $751 to $1000, 10.7% for $1001 to $1500 and 
8.6% for people who sent more than $1501 (see Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4: Average mounts remitted in 2017 
Amounts Remitted Frequency Percent 
100 or less dollars 8 5.7 
101 - 200 dollars 16 11.4 
201 - 400 dollars 11 7.9 
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401 – 500 dollars 8 5.7 
500 or less dollars 40 28.6 
501 - 750 dollars 16 11.4 
751 – 1000 dollars 14 10.0 
1001 - 1500 dollars 15 10.7 
More than 1501 dollars 12 8.6 
Total 140 100.0 
The vast majority of Somali people in the Greater Toronto Area sent money using Somali money 
transfer agencies. 92.9% of the respondents used Somali Hawala services to send money. There 
were a small number of people who used money transfer agencies such as Western Union and 
Money Gram (4.3%). The survey respondents were asked to name one Hawala agency they use 
the most; Dahabshiil was most frequently used at 27.7%; this was followed Bakal Express at 
13.9%. However other agencies were also used including Amaana Express and Amal both at 
12.4% of the time. It should be noted that the part of the country the MTO operates influences the 
number of users. For example, people who send money to Puntland will often use Salama Express 
because they have a more extensive network in that part of the country. When people were asked 
about any other MTOs that they use regularly, most once again noted they use Dahabshiil (32.9%), 
followed by Bakal (19.6%), Amaana (14.0%), and Amal (11.9%) (see Table 5.5). For a full list of 
other Somali MTOs used see Appendix 21. 
Table 5.5: Somali MTOs most frequently used to send money 
Somali MTOs Frequency Percent 
Amaana Express 17 12.4 
Amal Express 17 12.4 
Bakal Express 19 13.9 
Dahabshiil 38 27.7 
Iftin Express 5 3.6 
Juba Express 6 4.4 
Kaah Express Money Transfer 8 5.8 
Salama/Olympic Express 4 2.9 
Taaj Express 15 10.9 
Tawakal Express 8 5.8 
Total 137 100.0 
The survey participants used MTOs storefronts to send internationally. A large majority 81.7% 
sent money by using cash or debit at the transfer agency office. The relatively small number sent 
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money using online services (7.7%). About 6.3% used mobile money transfer to send money. All 
the people who chose “other” wrote “Hawala,” the Somali MTOs. 
When I asked survey respondents if Somali Hawala services are trustworthy, a large 
majority (81.2%) stated that they are very trustworthy. 15.9% of respondents stated that Somali 
MTOs are somewhat trustworthy, and 1.4% stated that they believe Somali MTOs are somewhat 
Un-trustworthy or do not know.  
People who used Somali MTOs noted when sending money, and 66.2% were asked a form 
of identification such as a passport or driver’s license. A notable amount, 33.8%, of people were 
not asked for any form of identification when sending money. However, a near-unanimous amount 
of individuals, 98.6%, received receipts as proof of the amount of money they sent. When asked 
what other information was required to send funds using Somali MTOs, 83.2% of individuals 
noted they needed to provide their family name. 93.7% stated they were asked for their telephone 
number. 28.0% of individuals that use Somali MTOs were asked to provide their home addresses 
in order to send money.  
The remittances are often fast for the recipients to receive. Most survey respondents noted 
that it takes less than 24 hours to receive the funds (47.9%). Moreover, a number of individuals 
(23.9%) noted that it often takes less than an hour to receive the funds. Another 11.3% of 
respondents stated that it takes between 3 to 6 hours for the funds to be received in Somalia. Some 
14.8% of individuals said that it takes about 1 to 2 days for the recipients to receive the funds. 
On the receiving end of the funds, I asked what information is required from the people 
receiving the money, 42.0% noted that the receiving person has to provide a code to collect the 
money. 62.9% of the people needed to provide the senders full name to access the money. 59.4% 
needed to provide some form of identification in order to get the money. Only 26.6% needed to 
present a witness or trusted individual in order to collect the money.  
Most remitters, 30.4%, receive confirmation from the recipients acknowledging that they 
have received the money. 28.1% of senders receive confirmation that the money is received 
directly from the MTO agents. Some people (16.3%) confirm the money is received by directly 
texting or calling the receipts. 25.2% of people who selected “other” selected multiple 
confirmation options (see Table 5.6). 
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Table 5.6: Confirmation methods of funds received 
Somali MTOs Frequency Percent 
Calling family/friends directly 41 30.4 
Text/email messaging family/friends 22 16.3 
Confirmation from the money transfer 
company that funds have been withdrawn 
38 28.1 
Other 34 25.2 
Total 135 100.0 
5.4.2 Reasons for sending 
The main reason why Somalis in the GTA send money to family and friends in Somalia was to 
assist in with family expenses, 38.1%. Another main reason why people sent money to Somalia 
was to assist in buying food (25.9%). The education of children is the third leading reason for 
sending the money by 7.9% of the respondents. People who selected “other” chose to list multiple 
reasons for why they send the money along with things such as “funeral” or “Ramadan.” When 
they were asked to list any reasons why they send money, 62.2% of the respondents included 
“Sending money for family expenses”, 64.3% selected to assist in buying food as one of the 
reasons, 55.2% stated they sent the money to educate children, 55.2% also selected medical 
assistance of family members as one of the reasons for sending money. 42.0% sent money in 
celebration of Eid. Other reasons included assisting in marriage (9.1%), paying off debts (9.1%), 
construction/repairing of a house (7.0%). See Table 5.7 for a summary of the main reasons for 
sending money and for a full list all the reasons for sending the money, see Appendix 22. 
Table 5.7: Main reason for sending money 
Reasons for sending money Frequency Percent 
For family expenses 53 38.1 
To assist in buying food 36 25.2 
Education of children 11 7.9 
Medical treatment 7 5.0 
Celebration of Eid 3 2.2 
To assist in marriage 2 1.4 
Lending of money to a family member 1 0.7 
Other (SPECIFY) 26 18.7 
Total 139 100.0 
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5.4.3 Online/Mobile MTOs 
An important part of the survey asked participants if they utilize technology to send money as well 
as which services they use. A notable number of individuals have used online or mobile banking 
to send money to Somalia, 38.6% of participants have used mobile or online money transfer. When 
the survey respondents were asked to name the service they have used, 35.1% have used 
Dahabshiil’s eDahab service to send money. 33.3% have used EVC Plus to send money to Somalia. 
12.3% have utilized Sahal to send money. 8.8% have used Zaad, and only 1.8% have used the 
online-only World Remit (see Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8: Mobile money services utilized by Somali Remitters 
Online MTOs Frequency Percent 
EVC Plus 19 33.3 
Dahabshiil 20 35.1 
Sahal 7 12.3 
World Remit 1 1.8 
Zaad 5 8.8 
Other 5 8.8 
Total 57 100.0 
5.4.4 Communication 
The use of technology in communication is unparalleled, and as discussed earlier, people sending 
money from the GTA to Somalia utilize technology in nearly all aspects. I surveyed people in the 
GTA to see how often they communicate with family members in Somalia and what type of 
technologies they use when they communicate with them. First, I asked how often they 
communicate with family members, and most people (49.3%) stated they communicate at least 
once a month with their family members. Nearly a quarter (23.6%) of respondents stated they 
communicate with their family about once a week. 
The survey respondents were asked about the types of telecommunication services they use 
to communicate with family members in Somalia. The question allowed for multiple responses. 
Most individuals use mobile phones, 49.0%, to communicate with family members. This was 
followed by Mobile applications such as Viber, WhatsApp, and Facebook Messenger at 41.3%. 
20.3% of Somalis in the GTA use internet applications such as Skype, Google Talk or E-mail to 
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communicate with family members. Finally, 12.6% of the respondents use telephone landlines to 
communicate with family members (see Table 5.9). 
Table 5.9: Communication technologies used by GTA Somalis to communicate with people in Somalia 
Communication services Frequency Percent 
Landline telephone   18 12.6 
Mobile cellphone 70 49.0 
Internet (Skype, Google Talk, Email, etc)   29 20.3 
Mobile applications (Viber, WhatsApp, 
Facebook Messenger)   
59 41.3 
Other 1 0.7 
5.5. Theoretical elaboration 
Remittances are sent to family members and friends for a variety of reasons. Remittances 
contribute to social and economic development and play an essential role in filling gaps that cannot 
be delivered by governments. For example, individuals remit in cases where there is no 
government-sponsored old-age pensions. Additionally, remittances are often used to send children 
to school, feed family members and assist members to create businesses. Among the theories that 
have emerged to explain social ties, altruism, family ties, and social capital. In order to ascertain 
the main reasons for why Somalis in the GTA send money, I posit a few hypotheses to test. The 
following sections will examine these theories and offer some hypothesis about why Somali people 
in the Greater Toronto send money. Figure 5.5 illustrates the conceptual framework that is 
discussed in the following sections of the chapter. 
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Figure 5.5: Conceptual Framework 
 
I divided the amount sent to Somalia into two variables, amounts below $500 and amounts above 
$500. These amounts were selected because amounts often sent as part of remittances to Somalia 
a relatively small, with most around $200 per month. Thus, these two amounts would be most 
indicative of the characteristics of the individuals sending the money. 
5.5.1 Social Ties 
Social Network Theory attempts to study the links between individuals, groups and organizations. 
They are four main assumptions that flow from the theory as described by Dunn (1983). First, the 
relations between individuals are the basis of the knowledge structures and processes. Second, 
relations are themselves structured that can be quantified. Third, structured relations are 
behavioural properties along with cognitive ones. Fourth, cognitive and behavioural properties 
arise out of structured relationships. SNT borrows from a variety of methods and can be interpreted 
in matrix and algebra theories (Dunn, 1983). These linkages are understood to be measurable in 
ways that understand clusters and point to interactions. The links and their connections are often 
labelled as nodes.  
SNT can be traced to Granovetter (1973) and his theory on ‘Strength of Weak Ties.’ 
According to (Granovetter, 1973), the stronger the ties between two individuals the stronger the 
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links in the social world (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). The theory is built on the premise that 
people are closer to other people who are similar to them. There are also members of that serve to 
bridge the distinct networks, although they may not necessarily be strong ties.  
Burt (1992) expands on some of the previous work by Granovetter on SNT and contributes 
to the idea that “structural holes” theory. An individual with strong ties in a closed network is often 
worse off than individuals with weak ties connected to more networks even if they might have the 
same number of ties. Additionally, Burt posits the reason for this is the closed network is often 
sharing similar information while the individual connected to more groups accesses more 
information a variety of networks. 
Proposition 1: When family members communicate more frequently, then it is likely they will 
remit more. 
A chi-square test using a significance level of 95% (p = 0.05) was conducted to test if there was a 
difference between the communication frequency of the remitters and the amount of money sent. 
The data was divided into two categories, those who communicate more frequently, respondents 
who stated that they communicate at least daily or once a week compared to those who speak with 
their family or friends once a month or a few times a year. The result showed that there is a 
significant difference between amounts sent and communication frequency: X2 (1, N= 138) = 
4.046, p < .05. 67.1%. People who communicate less frequently were more likely to send less than 
$500. However, those who more frequently communicate with their family members were more 
likely to send more than $500 (See Figure 5.6 and Appendix 23). This seems to suggest that people 
who communicate more frequently seem to send smaller amounts because they are more in touch 
with the daily needs of the people in Somalia. Additionally, as discussed in the second chapter, 
Somalia has been in conflict since the 1970s and this has resulted in the displacement of many 
people who have kept their connections. For example, many northern Somalis fled but still sent 
money to family members left behind. An illustration of this was Al Barakaat started as a fax-
based system in response to the civil war.   
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Figure 5.6: Classification Tree of Amount sent and Communication frequency 
 
5.5.2 Altruism theory 
Among the reasons why people immigrate include, it is viewed as an opportunity to maximize 
their opportunities. Traditionally some economists viewed immigration to be primarily driven by 
individual choices, except those forced to migrate due to conflict (Cai, 2003). However, the New 
Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) noted that it is primarily driven by the family unit; this 
is partly attributed to their adherence to Neo-Classical economics. Notably, members of NELM 
speculate that the previous literature has often ignored the impact of the migration on the origin 
country (Taylor, 1999).  
Thus, migrants remit mainly because they are expected to support family members that 
supported in their social and economic development. In the study of family members remitting to 
rural areas found lower-income individuals remitted a higher proportion of their incomes (Stark & 
Lucas, 1988). In another study of urban to rural migrants, the amount that has been remitted over 
time can represent 10% to 30% of an individual’s income (Stark & Lucas, 1988).  
Docquier and Rapoport (2005) noted one assumption that people with higher incomes remit 
more. This assumption can be tested against when their incomes of the remitter are counted versus 
the amount they normally send. If the amount their incomes increase and the amount they remit 
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increases, then the assumption would hold about the altruist utility achieved from the remittances. 
Thus the second Proposition is: 
Proposition 2: When levels of income are high then it is likely that GTA Somalis will remit more. 
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between income and 
amounts remitted. There was no significant relationship found between the amount sent and 
income levels, X2 (3, N= 137) = 2.40, p=0.49. When two by two chi-square tests were conducted 
for each of the four income levels, there was no significant relationship between each of the four 
levels of income and the amount remitted (see Appendix 24).  
In employing Altruism theory, results should show that people with higher incomes were 
more likely to remit more. However, this result seems to confirm other components of the theory 
of Altruism and that people have ulterior reasons for sending money. And upon further analysis, 
it was found that for the Somali diaspora factors such as age, gender, or employment status showed 
no significant difference in amounts sent (see Appendix 25).  
Another way the altruism model is tested is how close the sender is to the recipient. The 
‘emotional’ attachment to the receiving people can determine the length the people continue to 
send money. The model degrades over time and space as the connections are loosened. 
Communication with family members ensures that there is a connection to the family still left in 
Somalia. I tested this through the communication frequency and the amount sent.  
Furthermore, according to Stark and Lucas (1988), the longer people remit for altruist 
reasons, then it would be likely that they continue to remit at similar rates. Next, a test to find out 
if there is a difference in amounts sent between frequency in communication and how long they 
have been remitting. Using the same two-by-two categories of communication frequency (less and 
more), years remitting (less and more) and amounts sent (less than 500 and more than 500). Within 
SPSS, I placed the communication frequency variable as ‘layer’ variable, which adds a level for 
each of the variables within a particular variable. 
Proposition 3: When family members communicate less frequently and have been remitting for 
fewer years, then it is likely they will remit less amounts. 
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There was an association observed between remitters who communicate less frequently and that 
have also been remitting for fewer years are likely to remit less amounts: X2 (1, N = 56) = 3.90, p 
< 0.05. Although, interestingly, people sent smaller amounts when they have been in 
communication over a longer time period. This, similarly, supports the idea that as people grow 
older and their communication linkages remain over time they are more inclined to keep 
supporting and providing a social safety net for the recipients. However, when examining those 
who communicate more frequently, there is no difference observed (see Appendix 26). 
Migrant families assist members of their family because they want to help them. However, 
other researchers argue that assisting family members through remittance is part of their sender’s 
self-centred interest. For example, the altruistic motivations why family members can be summed 
up Becker (1991) as an “altruist is made better off by actions that raise his family income and 
worse off by actions that lower it.” (p. 282). Thus, people view their families as part of their own 
self-interest. One form of self-interest includes the idea that family members became important 
agents that can assist in the re-investment of the funds being remitted (Hagen‐Zanker & Siegel, 
2007). It can be hard to differentiate between purely altruism and self-interest.  
Within the literature, a view that family enter a contractual relationship to send the money. 
The contracture thesis argues that remitters send money to pay off loans, insurance and exchange 
of services (Hagen‐Zanker & Siegel, 2007). These types of remittances become self-enforcing 
between the sender and recipients.  For example, Stark and Lucas (1988) posited that families often 
remit as part of a contract to repay for their education or transportation to their new countries. 
Another theory argues that the migrants’ self-centred use of family ensures that their investments 
are protected. As such, the resources and protection offered by in-country family members often 
have a fee associated with it. Yet other researchers, conclude that remittances are seen to be part 
of social security used by family members. One example is a study of Malaysian migrants that sent 
money as a form of social security for elderly parents (Agrawal & Horowitz, 2002; Chami, 
Fullenkamp, & Jahjah, 2005).  
As part of the analysis, I asked respondents to select all the reasons why they send money 
to Somalia. The respondents chose from the 15 reasons along with an ‘other’ option for reasons 
not listed. Once collected, I then placed eight options under “Altruistic” category. Examples of the 
altruistic category include helping with family expenses, education of children and medical 
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treatment. 141 individuals selected 426 altruistic reasons for sending money. On the other hand, 
26 individuals chose 38 reasons that are determined to be self-centred.  
A cross-tabulation of the reasons based on Altruistic reasons with gender shows that 61.0% 
of the respondents to this question were male and 39.0% were female. A chi-square test of the 
difference between the genders and employment status shows that there is no difference when 
employing a multiple response table within SPSS. Other chi-square analysis could not be 
conducted because some variables had less than five making the results invalid.  
The Somali MTOs interviewed stated that the first half of the month is often the busiest 
time for them, with most people sending money the first few days of the beginning of the month. 
One reason is that people are supporting family members with their expenses such rent and school 
fees. Although these are small amounts of money, one agent suggested that remitters often treat 
these as “bill” they must pay each month. They note they usually see more women send the money. 
According to the MTOs, a relatively small percentage, around 10% when asked to estimate, of 
senders are involved in businesses. 
The more money people send, the less they have to pay in remittance fees. For example, 
for anything under $500, senders are charged a 6% fee; for anything above $1000, they are charged 
5% when someone sends more than $3000, then MTOs charge around 3% in fees. When asked 
why they would charge less for sending more money, one reason offered was it is more efficient, 
cost-wise, for the MTO to send larger amounts. Most MTOs do not have many people sending 
money from outside countries to Canada. One agent estimated that it was close to 5% of their total 
business. Within Canada, Somalis use MTOs to send money to children at school or family in an 
emergency situation. 
5.5.3 Mobile Money 
In order to understand the role that technology plays in the remittance system, I test a few 
hypotheses. I wanted to understand how mobile money technology is adapted. Moreover, I wanted 
to know the characteristics of the individual who send money using mobile money. Customer-
facing technologies, such as mobile money have increasingly been adopted by consumers.  
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The Canadian banking access closure to the Money Transfer Organizations (MTOs) has 
also closed access to Mobile Banking innovations that are changing the remittance sector in 
Somalia. One MTO noted they accept online money transfers, for small amounts. They accept 
these payments in their personal banking accounts, its one way they try to assist customers who 
want to send money but cannot physically come into the office with cash. These types of customers 
are repeat customers and have an already established relationship with the MTO. 
An example of mobile money is Zaad, which is one of the most extensive mobile money 
services in Somalia. In order to gain access to it, you need to use TeleSom mobile phone. In order 
to send and receive money, a potential customer needs to go to a Zaad centre with some form of 
ID, and witness. Individuals to have a Zaad are then required to provide their Somali four names, 
often an individual’s first name along with the names of their three fathers. The three names are 
often used to determine an individual’s family lineage in Somalia and as a way to guarantee 
accountability extend to the more than the individual. Moreover, the individual is also required to 
provide the four names of their mother. A photo and figure print of the customer is then and taken 
retained. For an example of the registration form (see Appendix 27). Once the Zaad account, often 
your TeleSom telephone number, you can use it store, send or receive the money. The money in 
the account is held as U.S Dollars. To withdrawal physical cash at a Zaad counter or agents on the 
street. The agents in the street usually have access to Somali currency with official Zaad locations 
providing access to U.S. dollars. 
Hence,  to understand the adoption of mobile money, I employ the Diffusion of Innovation 
(DOI), which was elucidated by Everett M. Rogers (1983). The theory posits how new ideas, 
innovation, “spreads via certain communication channels over time among the members of a social 
system” (Rogers, 1983, p. 5). The theory can be traced to French scholar Gabriel Tarde (1903), 
who tried to understand the ‘S’ curve that emerges when examining innovation, early adaptors and 
opinion leaders (Valente & Rogers, 1995). Others have contributed to the theory; for example, 
Elihu Katz (1957) added to the notion of opinion leaders and followers along with the role of the 
media (Kaminski, 2011).  DOI theory is a part of a change model that tries to place the people who 
serve as the thought leaders that eventually lead to a saturation point for the theory. However, some 
have argued that this theory falls short in several areas. One area is that the theory assumes that 
the diffusion is homogenous, discounts some environmental factors such as economic constraints 
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(Lyytinen & Damsgaard, 2001). Although the DOI theory has some drawbacks, I employed it for 
this study to understand the characteristics of the of how mobile money is being adopted by the 
Somali diaspora. Tan and Teo (2000) operationalized aspects of DOI theory by developing a 
framework that offered insight into internet banking adoption in Singapore. This framework was 
also tested in South Africa by Brown, Cajee, Davies, and Stroebel (2003) with regards to cellphone 
banking adaptions. The resulting framework found three major factors influenced an individual’s 
likelihood of adopting internet banking: attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioral 
control. For this study, the dependent variable was the use of mobile money while the independent 
variable included gender, age, length of remittance and employment status.  The following three 
propositions will explore the adoption of mobile money employing Tan and Teo’s framework. 
 
Attitude is an individual’s view of mobile money contains: Relative Advantage, Compatibility, 
Complexity, Trialability and Risk. 
Proposition 4: When the remitter is employed, then it is more likely that they use mobile money. 
Employment status seems to be related to the usage of mobile money services (p < 0.05). When 
respondents were asked if they had used mobile money, 39.1% of individuals answered in the 
affirmative. Of these, 75.9% were employed and have used mobile money, while those who were 
unemployed who had used mobile money were 24.1%. This might suggest that employment status 
of Somalis makes it easier to use mobile money because they are exposed to similar technology in 
their work.  
 
Subjective norms are the social influences that affect the use of mobile money to remit funds to 
Somalia. 
Proposition 5: When an individual has remitted for a longer period of time they are more likely 
to use mobile or online services to remit. 
A chi-square test was performed, and a relationship was found between individuals who remit 
using mobile or online services more frequently remit and also send more money, X2 (1, N = 138) 
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= 4.02, p < 0.05. The convenience offered by online services might lead the senders to use mobile 
services rather than physically going to the agent’s offices.  
 
Perceived behavioural control is the environmental conditions that allow for internet banking, 
including: Self-efficacy and Facilitating conditions.   
Proposition 6: When mobile money is used then it is likely that people will remit more. 
To test this proposition, a chi-square test was conducted, and I found that there is no difference in 
amounts sent between people who use mobile money and those who do not use it. A reason why 
this might be the case is that members of the diaspora are unsure about using mobile for security 
reasons. Another plausible reason for the lack of difference could be that family members of these 
survey participants do not have access to mobile phones and thus can not use mobile money. They 
are also inclined to support the MTO agents whom they might have had a long-standing 
relationship.  
Proposition 7: When the gender of the remitter is female and they use mobile money then it is 
likely that they will remit more. 
A chi-square test was performed, and a relationship was that there is a difference between the 
genders when using mobile money and the amount remitted. Women who have been remitting 
longer and use mobile money are more likely to send more money, X2 (1, N = 138) = 4.02, p < 
0.05. The convenience and security offered by online services might lead the senders to use rather 
than physically going to the agent’s offices (See Appendix 28). 
5.5.4 Security 
The final section for this study was to under the process utilized by the MTOs and if they adhere 
to national and international requirements to stem money laundering. Governments such as the 
Canada, U.S.A. and Great Britain have perceived their domestic Hawala system is a conduit for 
money to be used for nefarious purposes.  
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The process to start an MTO location or to serve as an agent for one of the MTOs used 
only to require someone being accepted as an agent, as the agent for Bakal recounted, the process 
was very open and easy to access. However, as some of the agents and locations began to fail, they 
started instituting financial commitments in order to secure a franchise. In the case of the Bakal, a 
financial deposit is required, and that deposit serves as the limit to the liabilities one can make. For 
example, if a new agent places a $20,000 deposit, then that will be the limit with which they can 
use to secure any remittances for the month.  
Security issues have taken on significance with the increases usage of ICTs, I asked about 
security policies and procedures that are used by the MTOs. All agents have access to the 
password-protected system, over a secure network computer that they isolate from the other 
internet activities. At the same time, the network and system are monitored at the Dubai 
headquarters of the MTOs, and in the agent locations, they use proprietary information systems. 
According to a Dahabshil agent, they use a token system to prevent system hacks, as well as a 
monitoring centre that tracks their attempts on the system. The system has gone down during busy 
times, but the agents associate with network capacity rather than security flaws in the network. 
Hawala agents in the GTA were interviewed provided insight into the business of running 
Hawala agency in Canada. Hawala agents noted that they comply with the Financial Transactions 
and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) requirements against money laundering. This 
includes requiring a photo ID of any new client along with proof address. When individuals send 
more than $1000, then the agents are required to retain the sender’s identity information. 
FINTRAC’s is mandated through the ‘Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist 
Financing Act’ to scrutinize any agency that handles financial transactions in the country 
(FINTRAC, 2018). The interviewees confirmed that FINTRAC audits each MTO branch regularly 
and if they are found to be out of compliance with any Anti-Money Laundry status they are fined 
and publicly listed as offenders as well being ultimately be closed down.  
The MTOs agents interviewed argued that although they are in full compliance with 
Canadian laws, as evidenced by FINTRAC audits, Canadian Banks have refused to do business 
with then Somali Hawala. An agent for Dahabshil in western Toronto noted they currently do not 
have bank-issued debit machines so clients can not pay using the bank cards. Since 2016, Canadian 
banks have gradually stopped accepting Hawala accounts with the last bank being Royal Bank in 
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May 2018. The Canadian banks stated the reason for refusing to be associated with the risk of the 
Hawala system, and they do not want to retain the money for the agents. Due to the banks' refusal 
to work with the Somali MTOs, individuals sending money can use direct money transfer from 
their bank accounts. Thus, remitters are often required to go directly to an agent with cash. 
The Somali MTOs business has reverted to the earlier system of only using physical cash 
rather than the banking system. However, all agents made clear the Hawala system is still legal 
within Canada. In addition to FINTRAC requirements and audits, Somali MTOs that need to send 
physical currency outside of the country, are first obligated to send the cash to a Canada Border 
Services (CBS) location to report the amount of money being sent out. The CBS counts, seals and 
certifies the amount before the MTO agents can fly the money out, usually to Dubai. Once in the 
UAE, they can deposit the money in the financial system, then wire transfers it to Somalia or 
through physical goods bought in the UAE that are later transported to Somalia. 
The cash dominated remittances have its own drawbacks for the MTOs, an agent for 
Dahabshil estimates that up to 20% of their business has disappeared because they cannot accept 
bank cards, money transfers or mobile banking. In an interview with a Taaj agent, the handling of 
cash requires the money to be physically transported to Dubai. Moreover, the MTO agents, 
including Taaj, note this has placed added cost on their businesses. For example, it was noted that 
they now have to pay for added security to send a courier to Dubai; this includes air and hotel 
costs. Additionally, once the banks severed ties with the Somali MTOs, all agents interviewed 
noted they increased the base fee to send money from five percent to six percent. 
Two of the MTO agents speculated that the main reason why the banks pulled their services 
is partly that the Somali MTOs are a form of competition to them. The Somali MTOs have created 
a network that spans the country as well as around the world. It should be noted that the four agents 
acknowledge that a majority of their clients are Somali.  
For the individual, when sending money virtually all (98.6%) were provided with a receipt 
after sending money. The respondents also noted that they were asked for their full name (83.2%) 
and their telephone number (93.7%). Although, only 28.0% of the respondents were asked for their 
address (See Table 5.10). Interestingly, when a cross-tabulation of those asked for their address 
against the amounts below or above $500 shows that they were equally asked for address (50%) 
each. 
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Table 5.10: Information required and provided by Somali MTO to send money. 
Information Required Frequency Percent 
Photo identification 94 66.2 
Receipt or a record of payment 140 98.6 
Complete family name   119 83.2 
Telephone number   134 937 
Home address   40 28.0 
Other   5 3.5 
 
To collect the money in the receiving country, people were asked to provide a code, 42.0%; the 
sender's full name, 62.9%; an identification card, 59.4%; a witness or trusted individual, 26.6% 
and other information, 1.4%. This points to a system that uses a verification process to distribute 
the money. 
In order to ascertain how MTO confirm the identities of the remitter, I posed the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 8: When more money sent then it more likely that the remitter will be required to 
show identification 
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between the amount of 
money sent and the request to show some form of photo identification. The relation between these 
variables was significant, X2 (1, N= 140) = 6.757, p<.05. 48.3% of individuals sending more than 
$500 were asked to show photo ID. When the amount was less than $500, only 25.5% of people 
were asked to show ID Refer to Figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.7: Classification Tree of Amount sent and Communication frequency 
 
This result confirms other studies (Hamza, 2006; Omer, 2004) that found that the Hawala network 
appears to follow the international anti-money laundering protocols and rules such as knowing the 
users of the remittance system. The international and government laws stipulate that money 
transfer agencies track large amounts being sent. The amount is more than 10,000 per 24-hour 
period. However, Somali agents seem to be more risk-averse and taking information about people 
sending less than that amount. 
5.6. Conclusion 
The aim of the third study was to understand the process behind the remittance system, and the 
role played by the Somali diaspora in the social and economic system of Somalia. The remittance 
sector has served as an important segment of the Somali economy and has assisted in the 
stabilization of a ‘failed state.’ The remittances industry has served as an essential link between 
those in the diaspora and family and friends left in the country. Since the 1990 collapse of the state 
in Somalia, the remittance sector has served as the primary access to finance and financial services. 
In fact, the remittance industry seems to work in spite of a lack of a state-regulated financial 
system. 
Through a review of secondary sources such as Statistics Canada, UN Data, the World 
Bank, along with a review of previous research, I established the Somali-Canadian population and 
the demographic profile of the community. As the number of refugees admitted to Canada 
increased drastically in the 1990s, and a large number chose to reside in the Greater Toronto Area 
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(GTA). Next, I detailed the cost to send money from various countries to Somalia and along with 
the number of locations in the Money Transfer Organizations (MTOs) in the GTA. This type of 
information provides an understanding of the reach and scale of the Hawala network. This allows 
us to move then on to understanding the users and businesses associated with the Somali MTOs. 
In order to understand the role of both the diaspora and the remittance sector, this study 
employed a survey questionnaire of Somalis in the GTA along with interviewing members of 
Somali Money Transfer Organizations. The Somali Hawala system, although not new, has changed 
and adapted a unique approach within the context of Somalia. The Hawala system is fast, cheap 
and reliable. Even though it has faced barriers around the world that have appeared over the years. 
For example, the U.S. has placed restrictions on Somali Money Transfer Organizations, in Canada, 
the Canadian banks have closed down accounts associated with the Somali system. The British 
government and the banking industry have attempted to curtail the Somali industry on several 
occasions. 
The survey participants ranged in age, gender, income and education levels. The qualitative 
approach was utilized because it would allow the researcher to understand the process utilized by 
the Somali diaspora when sending funds to Somalia. This approach also allowed me to understand 
the amounts sent by the diaspora, the methods they use the most and the motivations for sending 
the funds. The study confirmed that most Somalis, across the various demographic, socio-
economic categories participate in the Hawala system. 
Most survey respondents regularly send, with most sending at least once a month. A 
significant amount of the Somalis in the GTA send less than $500, and this confirms other research 
that most people send smaller amounts; however, this small amount makes a tremendous 
difference in the daily lives of people in Somalia. This study also re-iterated the fact that most 
Somalis rely on Somali based MTOs because they are often the only remittance providers to the 
country. The Somali MTOs are perceived as trustworthy by members of the diaspora. Interestingly, 
this study also found that a Somali use the Hawala system to send money within Canada itself. 
The study observed that social ties are a strong motivator as to why individuals in Canada 
send money to people in Somalia. The more frequently people communicate they more likely they 
were to remit more frequently. Another finding was people who remit more frequently tended to 
send more money. Although, the findings indicate that these same people remitted smaller amounts 
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too. Confirming that the connection to people in Somalia, as witnessed by how frequently they 
communicate, is a reliable indicator of the amount remittances sent. Based on social network 
theory, the opposite conditions also seemed to confirm that people who have been sending money 
for a lesser period and were less likely to send less money. This study confirmed some aspects of 
social ties as a strong basis for sending money.  
Another theory that I utilized for this study was Altruism theory. The survey participants 
confirmed that they are primarily driven by altruistic reasons why they send money to Somalia. 
For example, people listed that they sent money for family expenses. Other reasons included 
assisting in buying food and educating children. When it comes to people sending money, the 
theory seemed to show that people send money, but one part of the theory could not be replicated. 
An example of this was the idea that as people’s income levels rose, they would send more money. 
My analysis did not find this to be case when it came to Somali remitters.  
Next, I wanted to find out how technology is used in the remittance sector and how new 
innovations were being adopted. I found that a noticeable number of Somalis sent money using 
online and mobile services. This seems to align with research from the World Bank that shows 
that people within Somalia had adopted mobile phones and banking at high rates. I found that the 
most durable connection to those individuals who used mobile money was more likely to be 
employed. Another finding that I found was that people who had remitted for longer periods of 
time were also more likely to use mobile service. Moreover, if the remitter is female and had been 
remitting for a more extended period, then they were likely to use mobile money. In both instances, 
I believe this could be to save on time that might be related to travelling to the MTO location. 
The Somali individuals and businesses are aware of the security implications that arise from 
remitting money, especially to Somalia. This study confirms that individuals and businesses adhere 
to Canadian rules and regulations when sending money. Somali individuals who remit more are 
often asked to provide identification. On the other hand, interviews with businesses confirmed that 
they ensure they track individuals who send large amounts, anything above $1000. Some view that 
the Hawala business will likely lose business as the Somali governments create a banking system 
that is stable. 
Thus, the aim of this third study will be to examine the role of the diaspora in the remittance 
system. More specially, this study will analyze the crucial role served by ICTs in the delivery of 
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billions of dollars into the country. In the case of Somalia and its diaspora, the Hawala system has 
evolved in spite of these restrictions and the lack of the formal banking system. In-country without 
centralized postal system or personal identification system, the Hawala system has several 
advantages. First, individuals without a fixed address can use the system because all that is required 
is code or phrase from the sender to access the funds. Another advantage is that the Hawala system 
works in places where large money transfer institutions do not serve. For example, there are no 
Western Union desks or internationally recognized MTOs in Somalia. A third advantage is that it 
has a relatively low cost, the commission charged the sender is of around five percent. Thus this 
low commission ensures the cost of transfer itself is reasonable for the senders. A fourth advantage 
is that the large Hawala systems are now web-based to facilitate the quick transfer of money. Once 
the money arrived, the client is called, usually, on a mobile telephone which is widely available. 
If the amount is large, a clan elder is called upon to verify the person’s identity. In order to create 
a fast efficient system, technology has enabled this process to move at the pace of the internet. 
5.6.1 Limitations and contributions 
This study had some limitations. The survey was design needed to ask for exact amounts sent 
rather than ranges; this would allow for a more robust statistical analysis. The interview 
questionnaire also should have included more businesses in the sample to ensure a fuller picture 
emerged. However, the study contributed to our understanding of the remittance sector, and the 
role played by the Somali diaspora plays in the socio-economic context of Somalia. This study 
also contributes to our understanding of the role Information and communication technologies play 
in the Hawala system. This study also contributes our understanding of the institutions that underlie 
the social and economic system that has propped-up a society despite the lack of a centralized state 
structure. 
 Mohamed Elmi   Chapter 6:  161 
Chapter 6:  Conclusion: Theoretical elaboration, theoretical 
contribution, study limitations and areas for future research 
6.1. Introduction 
The following chapter builds upon the three empirical studies of this thesis by providing a 
theoretical elaboration. Additionally, it offers theoretical contributions, limitations that arose as 
part of the studies as well as possible areas for future research. In the concluding chapter, 
contributions to both the Information Systems field and our common understanding of Somalia 
are discussed. Drawing on the evidence from the three studies, this chapter makes four main 
claims. The first claim of this study is that Information Communications Technologies (ICTs) act 
as a steering media of social structures, as posited by social theorist Jurgen Habermas, in Somalia, 
thus demonstrating how Somalia’s social institutions function in the absence of a robust 
administrative state. The second claim argues that the diaspora are important agents in stabilizing 
Somalia’s social and economic institutions by offering financial aid, investments and knowledge 
transfer. The third claim, employing the Theory of Communicative Action (TCA), suggests that 
that negative perceptions of Somalia and its people have been influenced by Western news media. 
Finally, I argue that definitions of a failed state are narrow, Western-centric and do not necessarily 
apply to Somalia. 
Without a doubt, ICTs are changing societies around the world, whether by affecting jobs 
in Western countries or political systems in Asia. Somalia has been mischaracterized as a failed 
state by Western scholars and institutions, making it impossible for the world to see the vibrant 
social systems within the country. Moreover, the Somali diaspora are important stabilizing agents. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the ICT sector is thriving within Somali institutions and social 
structures. Somalis point to a social system based on trust and customary laws that has allowed 
technology companies to develop when traditional systems did not exist. The ICT sector has grown 
immensely in the last decade in Somalia. More than half of the population in the county use mobile 
phones on a daily basis. Mobile money has become the norm, and it is increasingly replacing paper 
money as the main form of currency used in the country. In the absence of a centralized 
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government, the mobile phone network has become entrenched in Somali society. This can be 
linked to Somalia’s customary laws. For example, a banking system or stock market exchange did 
not exist for prospective companies to seek out investment for their business ideas. However, one 
social factor that existed long before the Somali state was a network of family and clan lineage 
that would pool resources, including financial, to support potential businesses. ICTs have acted as 
a medium within this process, interacting between various actors within and outside of Somalia. 
More recently, ICTs have allowed for socialization. State institutions, for example, are 
transitioning online to reach more people by using social media sites to announce changes within 
the government. 
Figure 6.1 provides a summary of the three studies that contribute to this concluding 
chapter. The summary relies on context and evidence that emerged as part of those previous 
studies. The first paper provided an understanding of the perceptions of Somalia. Specifically, the 
first explored the perceptions of nation-state failure with the aim to explain Somalia according to 
Western news media. The list of traits and characteristics of Somalia that emerged could be 
extrapolated to observe what a failed state could look like. The second study presented evidence 
of institutions within Somalia. Various social structures in the country are systematically analyzed 
followed by an explanation on how people in Somalia are responding to a lack of formalized state 
structures. The final study discusses how the Somali diaspora and ICTs are supporting institutions 
within Somalia. 
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Figure 6.1: Overview of research results 
 
 
6.2. Theoretical elaboration 
Explanations of Somalia often lack in-depth analysis of social systems apparent within the country. 
Likewise, the role of Information Communication Technologies in Somali society rarely link ICTs 
as an embedded element of the social systems. This thesis aimed to illustrate how ICTs act as the 
primary steering media that has made it possible for Somalia to function despite conditions of 
failure. Employing social theory, I aimed to show evidence of social systems in the country. 
Additionally, I provide examples of how ICT’s support these social systems. According to Talcott 
T. Parsons (1991), social systems are modes of organizations that are essentially open systems that 
interact with their environment through various subsystems. These systems become structures that 
have distinct boundaries and processes that are maintained over time. Similarly, social theory 
further reveals  relationships the significant units have within social systems. The theory provides 
the linkages between the individual, society and culture (Kroeber & Parsons, 1958; Markus, 2004; 
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T. Parsons, 1991). These three components are integral in understanding why societies are 
generally stable and functional.  
The first of the three systems examined is the personality that controls the behaviour of the 
individual, sometimes referred to as the “Human Condition.” Importantly, all individuals are 
imbued with subjective beliefs and shared meanings (Seidman, 2008). When interacting with other 
individuals, the agent has three associated components: the social act, the status-role and the social 
unit. These social elements are what allow actors to interact with the social system. In other words, 
individuals are free to choose their own actions, but they are constrained by society through 
internal and external factors.  
The second aspect of the subsystems is the social system which is “the patterns of 
interactions…that has achieved sufficient continuity to have evolved social roles, statuses, social 
expectations, and norms” (Seidman, 2008, p. 154). The society regulates interactions between the 
individuals. The social system sets the roles and norms of society; if these are being observed and 
the tasks are carried out, I then label these as institutions (Garner & Hancock, 2000). It should be 
noted that institutions are subsystems within the wider social system. For example, this allows a 
student to address a teacher using a particular language perceived as appropriate for both. Over 
time, social systems strengthen, while their inconsistencies lessen.  However, this does not 
necessarily mean that they will function. If key institutions collapse, then all institutions tend to 
weaken. 
The third component of the social system is the culture, which assists the system’s 
reproduction over time. The society requires individuals to internalize the imperatives of the social 
systems such as knowing how to greet an employer in the morning. Second, the cultural system 
exists through various structures within society, including education or work (Garner & Hancock, 
2000). Thus, society achieves cultural consensus with a series of interconnected processes and 
social coordination that allow for the individuals and institutions to interact. Culture is the 
“transmitted and created content and patterns of values, ideas, and other symbolic-meaningful 
systems as factors in the shaping of human behaviour and the artifacts produced through behavior” 
(Kroeber & Parsons, 1958, p. 583). Accordingly, culture sets out the values of society, which  are 
internalized by individuals.  
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Social theory also expands on the concept of the “Unit Act,” a part of social action, which 
helps define the interaction between people and institutions. The unit act is not necessarily a 
concrete measure that exists, and it only comes to fruition once it starts interacting with other units. 
Parsons posited that combining idealism and behaviourism into the ‘unit act’ allows for a better 
understanding of society. The act itself is embedded within the social system. To offer a richer 
analysis of societies, four units with the unit act need to be analyzed. First, the act must have an 
agent or actor. Second, it must be future-orientated, particularly with an end. Third, the arising 
situation must have the means to allow the actor to partake, including placing conditions against 
the actor. Fourth, the response of the social environment.  
A legacy of social theory has been elucidating persisting components of social systems and 
their functioning in relation to their environment. The framework’s four sub-systems are economy, 
governance, dispute resolution, and social conditioning. Economy refers to the prevailing financial 
system and the securing of material resources in a society. Specifically, the economy sets out some 
of the boundaries within society, such as the resource base, the environment and territory. 
Businesses are an example of an economic firm. Governance is how society chooses to define and 
differentiate a social system’s goals. Specifically, the polity, through political institutions, 
mobilizes social resources to achieve these goals. Government institutions and agencies are 
examples of governance institutions. Dispute resolution is the subsystem responsible for the rules 
and regulations that make social functions possible. The legal system is oriented towards the 
harmonization of social institutions, allowing them to be cohesive. The judiciary and dispute 
resolution mechanisms act as integrative organizations. Social conditioning is how individuals are 
socialized into particular social systems and societies. This is usually achieved through education, 
religion and family, which entrench and renew the values, moral and social skills to negotiate 
within social systems. Illustrations of social conditioning include education systems and cultural 
institution such as universities or museums.  
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6.3. Claim 1: Evidence of social systems and how ICTs stabilize institutions 
within Somalia 
Utilizing a schema derived from social theorists such as Parsons, Giddens and Habermas, I provide 
examples of various social systems that have emerged from empirical studies and how ICTs are 
making them possible despite the lack of a functioning state. Figure 6.2 represents how the 
framework applies to this thesis in the proceeding section.  
Figure 6.2: Influence of ICTs in Somalia’s social systems  
 
6.3.1 Economy 
Trade: The first aspect used in this schema to analyze the Somali economy is trade. Within the 
Somali economy, two examples are provided to illustrate existing social systems. First, Somalia is 
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heavily reliant on international trade (please see chapter 4). The people of Somalia access goods 
through various land crossings in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti as well as seaports across the 
country’s coast. The trade routes connect it to countries around the world, but especially the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), China and India where most of the goods consumed originate. These ports 
also allow for exports to other countries, especially livestock to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United 
Emirates. Somalia’s manufacturing industry is relatively small, according to the World Bank 
(2017c), a factor hindering the expansion of this sector is lack of access to reliable electricity. The 
cost of electricity is high due to its over-reliance on oil and diesel. However, the intermediary role 
played by the state (particularly through governance) in trade has undoubtedly negatively affected 
access to the international trade market. For example, the cost of importing most goods means 
people allocate more resources to obtaining the most manufactured goods. This, itself, further 
perpetuates a dependency on an international, neoliberal system in which few Somalis own the 
means of production. Moreover, the system relies on middle people that extract value at each turn, 
adding to the cost paid by the end-user.  
ICT’s have eased Somalia’s access to international trade, and in many instances, the cost 
to access these goods has been reduced. For example, an increase in the availability and number 
of suppliers globally has provided one avenue to reduce costs. The second study provided 
examples from within Somalia that demonstrate how people could have quick access to goods 
from the UAE or China by simply placing orders with Somali traders on mobile applications such 
as WhatsApp. Depending on the urgency of the goods g ordered, they could arrive in major cities 
in the country within days. ICTs have reduced the time, processes and in some cases, the upfront 
costs needed to receive goods. For example, through informal credit systems, goods are paid for 
upon arrival rather than upon order. ICTs are being incorporated into the economic structures, 
making it possible for Somalis to access global markets. When it comes to the country’s largest 
income generator, agriculture and animal husbandry, Somalis are increasingly relying on mobile 
systems to track cost. Additionally, international NGOs are providing support to farmers, in both 
knowledge and money, through mobile SMS text messages.  
 
Currency: The role of currency in Somalia’s economy is critical to understanding the economy 
subsystem. An important element of any social system is “Steering media,” as referred to by 
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Habermas, which are things such as money and power (Myers & Young, 1997).  Understanding 
who controls steering media is central to locate who has power, resources along with understanding 
what is valued in any social structure, including countries (Broadbent, Laughlin, & Read, 1991). 
Within Somalia, various actors play a role in controlling the currency. Internally, the country has 
created a hybrid system that utilizes both localized and international currencies that allow for daily 
commerce. Somalis use the Shilling for the purchase of day-to-day goods, backed by a value that 
pegged to international currencies, particularly the American dollar. The Somali currency in 
circulation was printed by the different central banks throughout Somalia. The system that is used 
to back the value of the currency has been primarily based on supply and demand factors 
(Mubarak, 1997). It is especially influenced by imports and exports instead of gold, as is the case 
in some countries. While collecting data, it was clear how closely the Somaliland Shilling is tied 
to the country’s exports and how that is used to determine the daily exchange rate. Severe drought 
and a partial closure of the Saudi Arabian livestock market led to a drastic decline in the number 
of the animals exported thereby affecting the currency exchange. One consequence of this was the 
decline in the average price of goats, a staple food in the country, from $65 to $45 USD. What has 
helped the currency endure despite a lack of a centralized monetary system is due to social systems 
that built on trust. The Economist (2012) magazine noted the currency “is underpinned by a strong 
social glue.” Interestingly, the value of the country’s money has remained relatively consistent 
even during the years without a central bank.  
Over the last few years, how money is used in the country has changed significantly 
because of ICTs, particularly with the development of mobile money. The country’s large 
telecommunications industry has incorporated mobile money as part of their core service. The 
simplicity of the innovation has allowed people to interact with money in entirely different ways. 
First, as a technology, it has made buying goods and services easier for a population that does not 
have access to a financial system. Mobile money is easier to access, reliable, fast and efficient; it 
works within seconds. As the second study showed, the economy has come to rely on mobile 
money as a way to pay people, to receive money from members of the diaspora, and to purchase 
goods and services. The mobile money system has become so entrenched in the Somali economy 
that it is now utilized as the primary mechanism to set the value of the currency. Telesom, through 
its Zaad subsidiary, has created a platform in which people can exchange their US dollars directly 
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within the mobile system without the need for the central bank’s approval (Scharwatt, 2018). This 
service, also called the Mobile Money Exchange (M-Exchange), allows the Somali currency to be 
fully embedded into the mobile money system. This is an example of a fundamental system within 
Somali society remade by ICTs. An economy that has not included most of the population is 
becoming more dispersed simply through increased accessibility to money through the mobile 
system.  
6.3.2 Governance 
Governance: When I first went to Somalia, I assumed that the country would have clearly 
established and easy to locate governance structures. This assumption led to an initial attempt to 
explain the Somalia phenomena with systems that do not necessarily fit. During the initial stages 
of the research process, I searched for government institutions that looked like the ones I have 
witnessed in other parts of the world with sprawling bureaucracies and binders of laws to enforce. 
For example, when speaking with the Somaliland Ministry of Trade, they would talk about 
assisting the government in creating rules and laws in the future. However, these types of 
institutions often existed in name only, staffed by a handful of individuals. In general, Somalia’s 
political organizations are dissimilar to ones that I was educated about in Canada. In utilizing social 
theory, a state with established institutions should be able to mobilize people and resources towards 
a common goal. These structures extend political power over to other major social systems, 
especially the economy. During my travels, I sought to find a central bank that would set monetary 
policies and allocate financial resources. However, what I found were shells of what these types 
of institutions were supposed to be according to Western standards. Additionally, what I 
encountered was a society in which structures and organizations were not necessarily visible if 
only examined through Western lenses.  
The Somali people have created a system that appears invisible; however, upon closer 
inspection, political organizations do exist and are operational. A governance system allows 
individuals to participate in deciding the affairs of the society. This includes a form of 
representation around kinship that has an informal Emir (leader) system that used to settle disputes. 
As discussed in the second chapter, the disparate grouping of people who came to occupy a space 
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now called Somalia had mechanisms for political organizations. These include a system of political 
structures and institutions that interacts with the economy, the dispute resolution mechanism and 
through social conditioning. In light of this understanding, the second chapter details how Somalis 
utilize a dual mechanism to govern interpersonal and inter-clan relationships. The clan structure 
is, to a great degree, intertwined with the political system of the Somali people. However, this type 
of governance structure has limitations, and as the economy expands, the social systems implement 
more rules to manage friction between the economy and governance.  
The police in different regions enforce both customary law and secular law. An example 
of how the government cedes power to the tribal leaders by differing funds raised through tolls 
placed on roads within the country to the local clan while the government generally raises funds 
from the major ports of entry. The local clan then organizes itself according to its own structure. 
This system has a Western-style political structure awkwardly added to it. For example, a central 
bank will appear to have limited power but does not have full monetary control in the country. 
Governments do not exercise full authority without the buy-in of the clan leaders. For example, 
the internationally backed Somali federal government governance structure requires that political 
leadership be selected through a process of allocations based on clans.   
The unique system in Somalia is assisted by technology. The Somali system requires both 
the visible (government) and invisible (kinship) structures to function. Technology is used to assist 
both these structures in fundraising. The government utilizes social media to announce government 
laws and appointments. The government has also come to rely on mobile communication to pay 
their staff and to issue new rules. ICTs have made it easier for the government to create a sense of 
national direction. The governments across Somalia are using the online and mobile money 
donation model to raise money for their projects. The best example of this is the creation of a 
Ministry of Diaspora in Somaliland to raise funds for national projects such as the road the building 
of a road from the coast to the Ethiopian border. 
 
Private sector: Although the private sector would typically be relegated to the economic sphere in 
the case of Somalia, the evidence points to a private sector that occupies the governance segment. 
The private sector in Somalia has created its own set of institutions that often rival those of the 
state government. Though the system is not new in the country, when the last government slowly 
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lost its power and control, Hills (2014); Leeson (2007b) argue, informal networks of business 
people came  together to implement rules to reduce tensions among each other. In the news media, 
an example often cited as a system created by business people that rivalled  other social structures 
is the Islamic Courts Union, the predecessor to what is now known as Al-Shabab (Mwangi, 2010).  
Business people founded the ICU to reduce the cost of doing business and ensuring security. 
However, at the height of the American-led war on terror, the Islamist nature of the ICU led to a 
view that it was a sympathizer of Al-Qaida. The Ethiopian government encouraged and supported 
by US government, invaded Somalia to oust the ICU. Subsequently, ICU members went 
underground, turning it into a long-running, violent insurgency calling itself Al-Shabbab. Political 
systems in the country have deferred their power to the private sector resulting in a reduction of 
the government’s role, such as electricity production, road construction or even importation of 
goods. The private sector, as a group of individuals, often required a consensus and resources to 
accomplish tasks. For instance, in the earlier example of the highway built from the Ethiopian 
border to the coast, most of the funds raised were from local businesses in addition to the diaspora. 
As Mubarak (1997), a World Bank economist argues, Somalia in its current form is a free-market 
haven. However, what has happened in Somalia is just an extension of neoliberal policy 
prescriptions all over the world. These include privatization of public goods and active 
encouragement of the informal economy along with certain types of governance models in which 
the role of the state is reduced (See Jarle Hansen (2012); Tosa (2009).  
The private sector has also   come to rely heavily on the ICT sector. The largest companies 
in the country are those that provide telecommunication services, and ICTs are at the heart of the 
rest of the economy. In the second empirical study, while interviewing a manager from the Somali 
power company, I noted that the electricity company only uses electronic systems to track usage. 
Although that might seem an obvious step, other countries in the region still rely on a system that 
requires physical visits from individuals to check usage. The rate at which companies are using 
technology is only made possible with the speed of the technology itself. To illustrate ICTs role as 
a glue of Somali social systems, take the case of the Somali language media. The Somali media is 
mainly based online and rebroadcast over the air. The internet has made it possible for the public 
sphere to proliferate. For example, there are more than 12 channels freely available over the air 
and many more based online. The cost of creating a traditional television station is high; however, 
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the internet and low-cost satellite systems have made the number of Somali channels increase. 
Some are based within Somalia, and a significant number are based around the world, especially 
England. This means media produced for and about the country has made it possible for the local 
population to shape their own perceptions about each other. Still, participation in the public sphere 
is not necessarily equal and powerful individuals within Somali society often try to close down the 
television stations.  
6.3.3 Dispute resolution 
Customary law: As the economy grows, Turner (1972) observes one change that results from the 
transition from traditional forms of governance to a legalistic, administrative state is that legal 
mechanism, institutions and structures expand correspondingly. A legal system becomes essential 
to reducing tensions, especially between the polity and the economy. Thus, the dispute resolution 
mechanism leads to an increasingly larger role within the social system. The Somali people have 
created an evolving legal system influenced by different layers based on precedents and imported 
laws. These laws are a combination of traditional, Islamic, and European rules to achieve a system 
that works partly owing to a weak state. Additionally, in the last decade of President Siad Barre’s 
rule, his government implemented a quasi-Marxist system of governance that increased the state’s 
control of the economy. When this type of political and legal system vanished with the state, 
Somalis reverted to the more familiar traditional system called Xeer and Islamic laws. 
Additionally, in the wake of a weakened government, businesses have utilized three methods to 
enter contracts: first by relying on international agencies; second through clans/local networks and 
third through the simplified transactions that avoid third parties. Within Somalia, individuals and 
private enterprises have come to rely on kinship-based laws to settle disputes. Selected elders from 
the local community oversee the Xeer system, without relying on formalized institutions that use 
precedents and Islamic law to come to their decisions. State institutions such as the courts and 
police can be chosen in the metropolises by a system administered and enforced by the 
government. Nonetheless, these are considered weak and ineffectual. This written and unwritten 
combination of rules is part of the justice system in the country. People in the country can choose 
which system they would like to use to settle disputes, enter into agreements or seek justice. Non-
Somali agencies such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Le Sage, 2005) have termed this 
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to be an ‘informal justice’ because of the multitude of approaches that are not codified. 
Interestingly, this is not very different from British common law (Powell et al., 2008). 
 Somalis have incorporated ICTs into the legal process. Laws and regulations passed by the 
state are often unenforceable or out of date and Somalis have come to rely on the Xeer system to 
settle disputes. An example that illustrates how out of date state laws are is concerning the media. 
The laws on the books deal only with print media and the process of obtaining a license for a 
business. However, there are no such laws for setting up a television, radio or online news source. 
Because of the high cost of setting up a traditional newspaper company, people are creating online 
news sources. If a Somali website is based abroad, the traditional system is used to guard against 
libel. Traditional laws are employed to settle disputes that occur using mobile money. Because 
these systems rely on trust, they have come to rely on traditional systems to ensure that people’s 
money is safe in mobile money accounts. Stremlau and Osman (2015) found that although 
companies have access to individual mobile money accounts, they still rely on a traditional dispute 
resolution mechanism to compel  individuals to have their disputes settled (Stremlau, 2018). They 
do not rely on the state institutions in these cases. 
International laws: Somalis have come to rely on international rules as a necessary part of 
governance subsystem. As participants in a globalized economy, Somalis have had to adjust to a 
system created and enforced by other countries and international agencies. Somalia participates in 
the global economy as both exporters and importers of various goods. Within the international 
framework, Somalia’s place as a state in the international system is preserved with the assumption 
that it will be revived. Interestingly, rules that adhered to because of international requirements 
would not necessarily be applied to local populations. An illustration of this dichotomy is the 
companies that participate in the transfer of money, or telecommunications have to adhere to non-
Somali laws. The money transfer sector has been compelled to adhere to international standards 
as part of its daily business or risk closure. The sector's importance to Somali people is 
unparalleled, and thus large companies have to comply with ‘know your customer’ rules to ensure 
their businesses are not closed down. The consequences of non-adherence can be fatal for 
companies such as Barakat, which was shuttered by the US government. Another example of 
adhering to international systems is the Canadian Hawalas that had to change their business 
practices to ensure compliance with anti-money laundering systems. A second industry that has 
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come to utilize international standards without the mediating role of the government is the 
telecommunication sector. Mobile phones from different service providers are operable within the 
country; however, the subscribers of all service providers are able to call abroad as long as they 
have enough credit. The phone companies also use the international standard system to ensure that 
their equipment work and their networks support phones from around the world. 
 Technology plays a role in ensuring compliance with international accords. ICTs have 
made it easier to track customers of money transfer agencies. As noted earlier, the Hawala network 
is compelled to keep extensive records that are managed only by ICTs. For instance, law 
enforcement agencies abroad require access to the names of people sending money, and their 
information has to be easily retrievable. The second study showed that MTOs in Canada adhere to 
the Canadian anti-money laundering rules, and utilize data storage systems that are electronic and 
easily verifiable. In Somalia, MTO customers are identified through photo, phone number and 
family name, all of which are stored for easy retrieval.  
6.3.4 Social conditioning 
Family: When key state institutions collapsed with the government in the 1990s, the family unit 
rose in prominence as its duties within Somali society increased. People in Somalia had seen state 
institutions breakdown much earlier than the day the president fled the country in 1989. In the 
early 1980s, prior to the intensification of internal conflict, Somalia saw a notable increase in the 
number of people leaving the country to work in the booming Gulf countries. The sheer number 
of people fleeing the country in the 1980s, as the third empirical study of this thesis illustrated, 
foretold the disintegration of the social system. The expansion of the internal conflict, which led 
to the displacement of people, especially in the northern part of the country was one reason for the 
disintegration. Although the Somali state did not collapse overnight, as explored earlier in this 
thesis (please see chapter 2), Somalis had come to rely more on their families than the state to 
deliver social provisions. People in rural areas weathered the government’s collapse better because 
the state had ceased to deliver services to rural areas, especially when compared to people in urban 
areas. Somalis created a system in which families support each other. Those who left the country 
utilized systems to ensure they continued to support their family members who remained in the 
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country. A large segment of the population in Somalia relies heavily on remittances to pay for 
children’s education and social services and to provide investment funds for small businesses. 
Within the family social system, ICTs are central to preserving an institution that has taken 
over the place of state institutions.  Family members in Somalia have grown more connected to 
their family members in and outside the country and the third study demonstrates how increased 
communication frequency between families could lead to more financial support for the family 
members in Somalia. It is through technologies like mobile phones and the internet that 
communication between family members has become much easier than in the past.  Additionally, 
due to the number of people in the country, surpassing the 50% of the population owning a phone, 
the time required for the financial support to arrive is much faster. Access to reliable internet means 
people in the country have access to mobile applications such as WhatsApp and Facebook to keep 
in touch with their family members around the world. Even for people in Canada, mobile phones 
are the primary way they communicate with their family members in Somalia.  
Education: The education system is an integral part of any social system; it is through education 
that individuals are socialized into a particular culture. In Somalia, the education system is largely 
privatized. The education system witnessed a decline in funding before the civil war, and after the 
war, some school facilities were turned into emergency accommodations for internally displaced 
persons. Despite these struggles, the education system has shown signs of resilience, with 
communities taking direct responsibility for educating their children.  Communities came together 
to offer education services to children in their areas who were supported by family members in the 
diaspora. 
One of the main areas of concentration in this study was to find out how Somali society is 
preparing the new generation entering the ICT sector, illustrating the value Somalis are placing in 
the sector. What I found was that ICT education is robust and related programs are the most in-
demand specializations. Because of the hyper-capitalist nature of the education system in the 
country, universities offer courses responding to that demand. A growing part of the economy, the 
ICTs sector has enticed the private tertiary institutions to create programs that respond to both 
student and employer needs. Few programs are geared towards liberal arts. In order to establish 
the legitimacy of the instructors and the institutions, these schools have come to rely on the 
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international credentials of their teachers. These teachers and their external accreditations are 
highly valued. These forms of legitimacy are needed because the system within the country is seen 
as inadequate. This is an example of how people in the country are responding to the non-existence 
of a key institution. Companies in Somalia have also taken on the role of training people directly 
because their systems of innovations are moving faster than the formalized education system can 
respond.  
6.4. Claim 2: The diaspora as stabilizing actors 
A second contribution resulting from this study is the corroboration of the diaspora’s integral role 
in supporting the daily lives of people in Somalia. In the third and fourth chapters of this thesis, 
findings showed that the diaspora is a source of essential financial support, goods and services, 
and knowledge that imported into the country. This was particularly the case in the education 
sector. As the country descended into chaos, the education sector virtually collapsed. However, as 
social theorists have observed, the social systems tried to create a balance out of instability. The 
education system in Somalia is a key institution that was destabilized throughout this period. 
Beyond humanitarian contributions, the Somali diaspora are early investors in the businesses that 
further the economic activities of people left within Somalia. Furthermore, people in the diaspora 
serve as important conduits to access innovations and technologies, thus reinforcing the education 
system.  
Furthermore, the case study of Somalis living in Canada illustrates how they use the 
remittance network to assist their family members. The members of the diaspora based in the 
Greater Toronto Area (GTA) send money to provide access to social supports including providing 
money for children’s school fees and supporting elderly family members in their daily expenses. 
It is through their efforts, especially since the withdrawal of the international community after the 
failed United Nations peacekeeping mission in the 1990s, that the humanitarian disaster was 
lessened. The diaspora has provided much-needed support to the people in the country. As an 
agrarian and rural society, the country’s income is heavily reliant on the climate. Studies (Gundel, 
2002; Lindley, 2010a; Orozco & Yansura, 2013; Oxfam, 2015) have shown that whenever the 
country faces drought conditions, the diaspora increases its financial support to the country. These 
support systems have also been in place when the international community reduced their support 
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for charity programs in the country such as after the 2008 global financial crisis. Most NGOs in 
the country usually send emergency aid rather than long-term development programs, and thus a 
greater burden rests on the diaspora and people within Somalia to invest in development programs.  
The GTA study participants confirmed that they send money to Somalia primarily for 
altruistic reasons. Reasons for sending money include family expenses, assistance with buying 
food and educating children. The primacy of charitable support on the part of GTA participants in 
the study confirms the part of the theory that states that people are driven by altruistic reasons. 
However, another part of the theory, the one discussing people who send more money based on 
their incomes rising could not be replicated and further analysis did not find this to be the case for 
Somali remitters.  
In Canada, people use ICTs to send money, communicate and ensure that money is 
received in the country. Technology is also changing the delivery of news. The second study of 
this thesis found that media companies have proliferated online and have innovated using free 
services such as Facebook to deliver the news. The government has embraced social media to the 
extent that it uses those platforms to deliver news about cabinet changes in the government. The 
web is also used to plan the dangerous journeys to Europe and North America in search of a better 
life.  Misleading information is often propagated by people who think that the journey is easy and 
not fraught with danger. However, people are using technology to provide information about the 
dangers of embarking on such a journey, an example being BBC Media Action that presents stories 
online and through radio to dissuade people from the arduous journey. Technology is changing 
how people access financial services, with people able to conduct mobile banking, something 
previously not accessible. Mobile phones have changed not only how people participate in the 
market place but also how they access goods and information.  
The remittance sector is vital to people in Somalia because it plays an important role in the 
delivery of social provisions. In times of conflict, drought or economic downturns, the amount 
received by those in need increases. Somali specific technology and innovations have improved 
the reliability of the Hawala system over the last three decades. More specifically, this study 
focuses on the communication and social networks utilized by Somalis currently living abroad in 
order to facilitate money transfers and foster social relationships. This study examined the Hawala 
remittance system and its evolution.   
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I also provided evidence of how ICTs are facilitating institutions, supporting social services 
and being used throughout Somali society. It is through technology that the country that has little 
or no manufacturing base can access manufactured goods from around the world. People use ICTs 
to order goods from the Middle East or China using mobile applications, which then arrive in the 
country within a relatively short period. Technologies such as mobile money are the backbone of 
the economy; they have reduced the risk associated with physical currencies. NGOs use mobile 
money to transfer money to aid recipients. Technology is facilitating communication with family 
members located around the world. The networked society has reached some of the most rural 
parts of the country.  
Figure 6.3 is an explanatory model to illustrate the role played by the diaspora in 
establishing a stabilizing influence on institutions within Somalia. It is through the Hawala system 
that the Somali the diaspora have consistently helped people and institutions in Somalia. The 
model highlights the main factors and the role played by the diaspora both inside and outside of 
Somalia. As study three showed, communication and contact is key to understanding how the 
Somali diaspora assists people in Somalia. The study has confirmed that social ties, especially 
through communication, are an important factor in the delivery of Education in Somalia and 
helping people with social services. Additionally, the second study found evidence of social 
structures as elucidated by Anthony Giddens’s Structuration Theory.  
Outside of Somalia, the diaspora faces many factors as they interact with Hawala 
structures. Two dynamic forces affect the Hawala network. International rules delineate how MTO 
companies operate in Somalia. These rules and regulations stipulate how money is sent 
internationally, how customers are tracked and even how records are kept. Some of these rules are 
ostensibly presented as measures to prevent or restrict funding for international terrorism and 
specifically Islamic-inspired terrorism. Another international factor influencing the Hawala 
network’s operation is that Somalia is considered as a “Weak State.” This label has affected how 
international organizations and companies interact with Somalia and how people from other 
countries and institutions deal with people working in Somalia. These Hawala networks interact 
with domestic forces, as shown in the Canadian context, including dealing with banking rules that 
have their own inbuilt biases.  For example, in Canada, the closure of Somali Hawala accounts by 
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Canadian banks  could may have stemmed from negative perceptions of Somalia and Somalis (De 
Koker, Singh, & Capal, 2017).  
The Somali diaspora are affected by domestic forces within Somalia, influencing decisions 
around sending money to people and institutions in Somalia. Reasons include responses to 
emergencies, investments and even as part of a social contract. Evidence from this study pointed 
to social contracts between family members as the primary motivator. For example, social 
contracts help to create support for elderly parents in the absence of widespread, mandated social 
safety net to which everyone contributes. As found, in the third study, people also send money 
because of a social contract to assist their elderly members as form of old age security or pension 
as expected in Somali custom. ICTs are integral to this whole process. ICTs facilitate 
communication and contact between people still in Somalia and those in the diaspora. For example, 
the amount sent tends to increase when emergencies affect the people in Somalia. Another factor 
is those in the diaspora may send money based on investment opportunities of interest. 
Inside Somalia, diaspora support people and institutions. Throughout this process, ICTs 
facilitate Hauula, which supports social and economic institutions in Somalia. The diaspora helps 
with providing funds for food, education, medical needs and daily expenses. For example, 
Somalia’s human development indicators show that poverty afflicts the country, with 61% percent 
of the urban population poor, and 80% of the rural population is living under the poverty line. They 
also assist with economic activity in the country. On the economic side, people send money 
through the MTOs because they want to open their own businesses or invest in other people’s 
businesses. They also enable technology transfer by directly participating in the education system, 
including by serving as educators. The country seems to have found a way to conduct business, 
and the diaspora plays a vital role in this economic activity. They open businesses and maintain 
investment in other economic initiatives throughout the country.  
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Figure 6.3: Explanatory model 
 
 
6.5. Claim 3: The news media frames Somalia negatively  
This thesis has extended our understanding of Somalia by illustrating how public discourse has 
influenced the lives and livelihoods of Somali people. The third chapter presented the dominant 
stereotypes and images made about the country. Through an analysis of the articles that mention 
Somalia and the term “failed state”, numerous examples of negative headlines and articles were 
uncovered. This resulted in a set of undesirable characteristics that seemed applied to the country 
and its people interchangeably. These were corruption, dictatorship, the tribal/clan structure and 
un-governability of the country. Somalia and, by extension its people, are presented as flawed and 
then linked to corruption contributing to its current malaise. The data showed that in media articles, 
corruption co-occurs with terms such as refugees, dictators and local terrorism. Moreover, various 
news sources linked corruption to the “clan” structure in the country. Eventually, an underlying 
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thread that appeared in Western news sources has been that the country and its people are 
ungovernable. Thus, a reason for its failed status is that Somali culture contradicts the norms of 
democracy. Furthermore, news media portray violence, warlords, refugees, piracy and terrorism 
as all characteristics of Somali culture. These negative characteristics define Somalia and, by 
extension, define a failed state.  The idea of what constitutes a modern state has evolved over time, 
and its characteristics further defined. However, the same cannot be said for a failed state. The 
modern state should have three components, a defined territory and its legitimacy should be 
unquestioned by its citizens and it should be recognized by other states. However, this study 
showed that stories about Somalia often repeated previous tropes about Africans in general, 
including ideas that they are tribal or ungovernable. However, these tropes have had real 
consequences for Somalia and its people.  
As demonstrated by the second study, Canadian banks have reduced or shut down their 
direct commerce with Somali-owned Money Transfer Organizations (MTOs) that primarily send 
money to Somalia. Although the Somali-owned MTOs have ensured they comply with Canadian 
and International rules and regulations concerning money transfers. Canadian banks have claimed 
that the Somali MTOs represent an unspecified danger to the Canadian banks’ business. Despite 
these restrictions, Somali MTOs have proven to be adept at ensuring that the essential money 
continues to be sent. 
The Hawala system has come under heavy scrutiny because it is perceived as a source of 
finance for illicit behaviour and terrorism. Western governments have placed heavy restrictions on 
banks that facilitate the Hawala brokers, thus effectively driving them further underground. 
Adapting to new policies, regulations and consumer demands as they have emerged, the Hawala 
has survived. In a country without a centralized postal system, formalized banking system or 
personal identification system, the Hawala system has several advantages that overcome these 
barriers. An advantage of the Hawala system is cost. In the second quarter of 2018, the average 
cost, for both currency and service fees, to send the money to Somalia from all countries tracked 
by the World Bank is 7.81%. Another advantage is convenience. At the time of this study, there 
are 13 MTOs operating within the GTA. The headquarters for these companies are based around 
the world; however, none of the MTOs are headquartered in Canada.  
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Another contribution of this study concludes that within Somalia, institutions and 
structures that allow for stabilization of a “failed” state exist. Consequently, this thesis expands on 
Anthony Giddens’ Structuration Theory. The Somali state has been an outcast from the 
international arena for most of the last three decades in part because of this perceived lack of 
institutions. After the state collapsed, this thesis posits that hidden structures that have always 
existed have re-emerged to take hold in Somalia. In Somalia, people have used customary and 
religious laws that predate the state systems. The trust system used certain norms as enforcement 
mechanisms when needed. Supporting evidence of this argument includes how entrepreneurs seek 
investments. Investors relied heavily on trust networks to buy goods or services on credit. This 
thesis demonstrates how these systems are to settle disputes, to add trust mechanisms for investors 
and allow for money transfer agencies. Moreover, an exploration of institutions and sectors across 
the country from the banking sector to educational institutions, show a system that combines local 
organizations with international structures that result in hybrid institutions tailored for the people 
living in the country. For example, universities in Somaliland partnered with Ethiopian universities 
to ensure that their graduates have a recognized diploma. Additionally, the tertiary education 
system has come to rely on teachers who have received their degrees from other countries offering 
legitimacy to the education system. Social structures have come to rely on the private sector to 
deliver social provisions. Corporate social responsibility is evident in the largest 
telecommunication networks (see chapter 4). 
6.6. Claim 4: The Somali state is a recent phenomenon and Western invention  
This study is inspired by scholars such as Diop (1987b), Fanon (1963, 2008) and Simon-Aaron 
(2008) who challenged researchers to go beyond the Western-centric definitions and tropes about 
Africa and Africans more broadly and to critically examine the coding and implied meanings 
behind the concepts. Politicians, scholars, and hegemonic media paint countries that do not have 
Western-style state institutions as backwards or moving backwards. Scholars such as Hagmann 
and Hoehne (2009) and (Dingli, 2013) have argued that studies of failed states such as Somalia 
and Yemen need to be studied using localized knowledge. The inadequacy of a universal and all-
encompassing definition of ‘state’ seems to be one reason why the term ‘failed state’ has taken off. 
This universalization of the concept of state often discounts countries that do not fit easily  into 
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the broader term. In this study, it is clear that Somalia is a functioning state that does not match 
this definition. Leeson (2007a, 2007b) presents an argument that Somalis are ‘better off stateless’ 
because the Somali state squandered resources by misallocating them from things like health, 
education or other public goods into others like the military. Even this type of argument still 
implies the state as ultimately the best organizational approach for a society discounting other 
countries that do not fit into the category of state.  
Somalia is a hybrid state. It should be noted that a hybrid state is not a new concept but the 
modern, administrative state is relatively new. The institutional logics at play in Somalia are 
completely different from those present in other parts of the world. However, that is not to say 
elements within it are not similar to other parts of the world, particularly the Western world. The 
current international system relies heavily on the notion that the state should be central to the 
distribution of aid and development. The Somali people have come to rely on a variety of other 
factors to assist in the creation of a “fluid” state. The state apparatus has not fully emerged out of 
the collapse of the 1990s; however, visible and invisible social structures have emerged to stabilize 
the country. The characteristics of a failed state have allowed the people to create their own 
mechanisms for organizing their society. The term failed state masks the institutions viewed as 
weak while functioning as intended internally. Increasingly, what I found in Somalia was that 
outside aid organizations are turning to a new model in which they deal directly with the clan 
system and individuals to create shared public services and institutions. All of these are examples 
of existing social institutions that are not conventional by Western standards; nonetheless, they are 
fully functioning.  
Somali social institutions have emerged from a period of instability, especially in the 
immediate aftermath of the Siad Barre regime’s collapse. From the second study, examples 
emerged of institutions dominated by the notion that the private state has replaced the political 
state. This is mainly because the private sector has come to be the driver of the economy and social 
policies. Overall, many people pointed to the education system as improving the economic and 
social standing of the country. In the case of Somaliland, individuals and businesses depended on 
the Xeer system to ensure adherence to contracts. The expectation that people must help each other 
is an example of the delivery of social services (see chapter 5). The role of government is minimal 
when it comes to institutions that enable a ‘friendly’ business climate in the country. From across 
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the various interviews, interviewees noted that the economy was functioning and that people with 
business acumen could succeed in the Somaliland economy.  
However, it is worth noting the issues that have hampered economic and social 
development due to the nature of hybrid structures. Concerning the country’s economy, some have 
pointed to the existence of barriers that have negatively affected the overall health of the economy. 
One barrier is the unwillingness of some multinational companies to send goods directly to 
Somalia or Somaliland, in particular. The country’s population would have suffered immensely if 
international trade were hindered. An example of this is that Somalia receives one of the largest 
transfers of remittances on a per capita basis in the world.  This thesis sought to create an 
understanding of how the country works by collating data from various sources within Somalia. 
By bringing to the fore the institutions and social structure of Somalia currently in place, a better 
understanding of the country and its people can be provided. While the international system relies 
heavily on various states and institutions to collect and disseminate information about specific 
countries, Somalia does not have mechanisms in place to collect and share the data. Through a 
manual process of collecting data from various sources, I have provided a fuller picture of Somalia, 
its economy and its people.  
What we know of the Somali people seems to be limited, partly because of the erasure of 
Somali history. The phenomenon of denying history prior to European colonization is evident in 
the discourse about Somalia. The discourse about failure is in reference to the dominant narrative 
that a particular state needs to be similar in terms of its institutions, organization and functionality 
to Western countries. This distortion has been discussed at length by historian and philosopher 
Cheikh Anta Diop (1987a) who has traced how European colonization has not only erased the 
physical spaces inhabited by thriving civilizations and peoples, but also minimized, criminalized 
and, in some instances, eliminated African social systems. An example provided shows how 
trading routes along east Africa were rerouted from Asia to Europe.  
A turning point in our understanding of the geographic space called Somalia was the 
colonial period. Empirical studies have examined how various European colonial systems 
impacted the lives of people in the Horn of Africa region. The British and the Italians laid claims 
to different parts of the region and over decades, they went about changing how resources and 
power were distributed. The British instituted policies which classified and instituted the clan 
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structure in the territory it controlled such as some Somalis and their clans being labelled as Aryan 
while others were categorized as African. The Italians, on the other hand, turned southern Somalia 
into a settler colony with some of the most arable land seized and transferred to Italian settlers. 
Additionally, in both the British and Italian parts of the country, the colonial system created 
institutionalized structures that paid leaders of clans, granted them political and judicial powers, 
and utilized collective punishment to create a leadership class that served the interests of the 
Europeans. After the Second World War, many colonies around the world insisted on 
independence. However, both Italy and Britain continued to claim that the Somali people were not 
ready for their independence and colonization was in the best interest of all involved. This context 
also revealed how the discourse around the Somali people was negatively framed. 
Somalia has a shared history, religion and culture. However, Diop (1962, 1987a, 1987b) 
illustrated that throughout Africa, European colonization had an undeniable impact on the nation, 
instilling differentiation and division that is still evident today. As a result, the two parts of the 
country are still recovering from the divide and conquer strategy employed by both the British and 
Italians. One need only witnesses the impact of the encounter with colonialism by examining the 
approaches that the British and the Italian used to govern the two parts of the country. The 
problems = faced by the new country could be traced back to the mismanagement of the territory 
by both the British and Italians. For example, the British instituted a system of enclosures of 
animals in order to track and control Somali movements, and the Italians confiscated prime 
agricultural lands resulting in the displacement of many inhabitants from their primary source of 
livelihoods. Additionally, structural changes during the colonial era had the effect of magnifying 
the role of political ‘leaders’ either through official policy in the case of the British or through 
economic structures to reward certain clans in the Italian system. As the second chapter illustrates, 
Somalis fought independence and sought a nation-state of their own; however, they were working 
within the mechanism developed by Western colonizers. This is best summarized by Diop (1962): 
“It is easily seen that it is on contact within the Southern world that the Northerners broadened 
their conception of the state, elevating themselves to the idea of a territorial state and of an empire” 
(p. 195). This led my research to examine the post-independence period and the direct link between 
colonialism and  the collapse of Somalia as an administrative state. 
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6.7. Theoretical contribution 
This research contributes to theory and practice in Information Systems and international 
development. More specifically, my work contributes to extending to social theory by 
particularizing it to Somalia. The framework assisted in explaining how Somalia can function in 
conditions of failure. This study then points to direct illustrations of how Somali social institutions 
are coping and in some cases, thriving with the help of ICTs.  
This study facilitates a deeper understanding of the role played by the diaspora in 
supporting the daily lives of the people in Somalia. One way this is achieved was by uncovering 
the methods used by the diaspora to send money to Somalia and supporting the social systems of 
the country. The reliability and speed of the Hawala system is made possible by an indigenous 
Somali ICT sector.  
I expose discourse regarding Somalia, which does not match the more complex reality 
within the country. Undoubtedly, news media plays a key role in shaping our understanding and 
perceptions of the Somali people. Specifically, Western media sources have created perceptions 
that the country and its people are dangerous or potentially damaging to the international 
community. This distorted manner of public discourse is present in popular entertainment in such 
movies as Black Hawk Down or Captain Phillips.  
Lastly, this study contributes to our knowledge of the characteristics and traits of a failed 
state. By pointing to the evidence from Western news media, I expand the definition of a failed 
state. However, I also aim to show how the failed state concept is contradictory and not necessarily 
applicable to Somalia.  
Another theoretical contribution of my research was to define the characteristics of a failed 
state. Within the literature, an entrenched understanding of Somalia is that of a failed state, without 
the context that encompass such a loaded term. An attempt to codify the term resulted in compiling 
a list of concepts related to the term. First, the traits that often associated with Somalia were 
highlighted. These included ideas such as dictatorship, corruption, tribalism, governability and a 
lack of democracy as the most common traits when news reports highlighted stories about Somalia. 
These traits often seem to extend to Somali identity when referring to Somali people in these news 
sources. These terms were part of the othering of Somalia. Unfortunately, negative attributes and 
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connotations are not a recent phenomenon when it comes to Africans. African countries and 
peoples have been labelled with similar language without an acknowledgement of the destructive 
historical effects of colonialism. Particularly, a subject often left out of the description of the 
country is that modern-day Somalia, in its current geographical borders, is a creation of European 
powers. The country simply did not exist before European colonization. Moreover, the country’s 
borders do not align with the traditional lands used by a nomadic people. The region occupied by 
Somalis did not previously adhere to a conventional definition of statehood although traditional 
forms of government ruled the land effectively. It should be noted that Somalis are nationalistic 
and consider themselves a nation. Although they are quick to express patriotism people who 
participated in this study acknowledged that there was never one leader of all Somali people. An 
example of the limitations in applying the concept of state identity to Somalia is that there is no 
one place that agreed upon as the capital for the Somali people. Mogadishu was just another trading 
centre that became home to the Somali capital after European colonization. 
A practical contribution that resulted from this study was to better define the characteristics 
of a failed state. Defining other countries experiencing war or civil strife conditions by simply 
labelling them as ‘Somalia’ is intellectually indolent. Reviews of characteristics that delineate 
statehood include the following: recognition by other states, a defined territory recognized by both 
its inhabitants and other nations, and an administrative state with rulemaking authority. Somalia 
does not meet this definition. In this study, the concept of a failed state concept is interrogated and 
main aspects based on the example of Somalia are brought forward to bring nuance to the term. 
There have to be aspects of violence, presence of warlords, the involuntary mass movement of 
people, some form of threat to its neighbours and the international community for example, piracy 
or terrorism. In Somalia, the state, viewed as a government, is weak. There are a weak federal 
government and even weaker regional governments. However, people in the Somali regions are 
working together in spite of this. 
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6.8. Limitations of this research 
Throughout the various studies of this dissertation, limitations were naturally encountered in 
understanding the discourse about Somalia. Because of time and scope, the data was limited to 
media that specifically mentioned or referred to Somalia as a failed state. I believe a richer 
understanding would have resulted had I included sources that mention Somalia more broadly. 
The first study of this thesis could have offered a better understanding had it gone beyond the 
Western news articles and included academic research about Somalia. This would have added 
insight into how the media shapes perceptions of non-Somali scholars about the country and its 
people.  
The second study also encountered some limitations; ideally, this research should have 
sampled people from across Somalia because I was physically on the ground. For personal safety 
reasons I chose to stay and focus on the relatively safe Northern part of the country. The Northern 
part of the country is different from other parts, particularly South Central Somalia. The southern 
part of the country, especially the capital region, is experiencing instability. It also has a larger 
population, and the companies in the region tend to be larger. The perspective of companies like 
Hormuud Telecom, the largest mobile company in Somalia, would have contributed more to our 
understanding of the nature of ICTs in the region. Furthermore, another region not included in this 
study was Puntland, where telecom company Golis is based. The different regions all offer a 
unique insight into how Somalia works under the conditions of failure.  
 Furthermore, another limitation of this research was that it did not survey more people in 
the Somali diaspora in the GTA due mainly to time constraints. A larger number of participants 
would have helped the study achieve conclusive statements about some of the results. The small 
number of respondents also resulted in some of the variables being too small to draw any 
conclusions. The study should have also considered changing the variables from ranges so that 
participants could self-declare and add continuous numbers for specific categories, such as with 
income. The results were complicated by the lack of precise numbers. The study would also have 
benefited from concrete data on the numbers of Somali people who live in the GTA; however, 
Statistics Canada’s publically available database was of limited value due to the aggregate nature 
of their data. The study would have also benefitted from interviews with Canadian banks to 
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elucidate why they do not accept the business of Somali MTOs. The Canadian banks contacted for 
this study did not respond to inquiries about why they chose to close Somali MTO bank accounts.  
Ultimately, this research was hampered by a lack of empirical data about the country as a 
whole. The country lacks a centralized agency for data, and because the country has been in 
conflict for over 20 years, data was simply non-existent. Initially, I intended to explore the data to 
find out the role of ICTs in the country. However, this task was almost impossible because even 
basic statistics about the number of mobile phone users were lacking. Each company interviewed 
for this study was secretive regarding the number of subscribers; considering it proprietary 
information that would aid their competitors if made public. Other data estimates from 
international agencies were often anecdotally wrong. An example of this is the estimate that about 
50% of the country has a mobile phone. From observation, that number appears much higher. Data 
collection is improving, with a concerted investment from the World Bank and other United 
Nations agencies prioritizing data collection.   
6.9. Areas of future research 
This work illustrates some areas that could potentially benefit from further research. This study 
did not focus on the growing number of young Somalis that have grown up around the world. As 
these youths, grow-up, will the connections to Somalia endure? The number of Somali youth in 
the diaspora is growing and scattered around the world. The future of the remittance industry, for 
example, is an area of research that is lacking. Additionally, it would be interesting to find out their 
perceptions of their own national origin. Importantly, these young Somalis are forming their own 
hybrid identities in the digital age. As a new generation comes of age, an area that may be impacted 
is the remittance sector. People in Somalia rely heavily on the remittance system and the 
connections offered by the people in the diaspora. This study showed that Somalis who have direct 
communication with relatives in Somalia were more likely to donate more frequently and at higher 
amounts. As the next generation of Somalis loses the strong bonds with family in Somalia, the 
impact on the remittance sector need to be further assessed.  The possibility of the creation of a 
strong online identity as posited by Miriyam Aouragh (2011) when examining the Palestinian 
diaspora would be an important way to understand their role from afar. This could also offer 
possibilities about the future of the remittance system and consequently, the future of Somalia. 
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Moreover, the study examined some of the institutional structures that are present within 
the country; however, due to limitations on scope, the rudimentary governmental structures being 
formed were excluded. Some form of a state is emerging in Somalia with the active support of the 
United Nations and African Union, which is changing perceptions of the concept of “state” within 
the country. The entire horn region has been in some form of conflict over the last few decades 
and as these countries re-align their borders, they will impact Somalia, a phenomenon that deserves 
further examination. The different regions of the country have been isolated in part because other 
countries seemed to view the united country as a competitor. The Ethiopian government has 
supported and intervened to support a federal government in Mogadishu; however, they have also 
provided support to Somaliland’s attempt to break away from the central government. At the same 
time, Eritrea has aided groups that were against Ethiopia. In rapid succession, countries in the horn 
seemed to have ended their conflict and signed peace accords with each other. With all these 
changes taking place in the region, the chances of various groups in Somalia receiving similar 
levels of support might diminish. The Somaliland government is increasingly viewed as 
endangered because its chief allies in the region are now working with the federal government. 
While conducting research in Somaliland, the changes now taking place were hard to fathom, and 
most people assumed their path to independence would continue on the current trajectory. The 
people interviewed were hoping for international recognition of their breakaway state; however, 
that has changed very quickly. It would of interest to future researchers to find out how this would 
impact state formation.  
Finally, another area for further research is the fact that technology itself is creating and 
extending forms of hegemony. An example of this includes how Western forms of capitalism are 
creating a dependence for consumer goods and culture. I believe technology is fostering other 
issues of concern, such as a consumer culture that emphasizes a particular Western-centric lifestyle 
as a standard. Moreover, the online infrastructure utilized in Somalia relies heavily on the free 
services of platforms such as Facebook and Google. Other concerns have arisen, including the rise 
of propaganda and hate-speech propagated online because of the unfettered nature of the internet. 
This can sometimes exacerbate the delicate peace in the country. The internet and ICTs, in general, 
seem to be a space where ideology from across distant places propagates. Such is also true in the 
case of Somalia, with  Al-Shabab linking with groups driven by transnational Islamic ideology 
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leading to more isolation and more U.S. military strikes. The role of the ICTs on youth culture 
merits further exploration. 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis 192 
Appendices 
 Appendix 1: Map of Somalia, Sections, States and Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: United National Development Programme (UNDP), 2014; United Nations Population Fund 
(UNPF), 2014 
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Appendix 2: Somali clans and major sub-clans 
 
Adapted from (Bruton, 2012; Cassanelli, 2010; M. Harper, 2012; H. S. Lewis, 1966; I. M. Lewis, 1957, 
1959, 1962, 1999, 2004) 
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Appendix 3: Sentiment entities analysis - type, relevance, sentiment score and count in news headlines 
Entity Sentiment/ 
type 
Relevance Sentiment sentiment/ 
mixed 
Type Count 
Somalia negative 0.893011 -0.396289 1 Country 227 
Somali government negative 0.445175 -0.169169 1 Organization 15 
Yemen negative 0.395306 -0.505519 1 Country 48 
US negative 0.394605 -0.416282 1 Country 59 
Kenya negative 0.357104 -0.326877 1 Country 36 
United Nations negative 0.348963 -0.48808  Organization 44 
President negative 0.298737 -0.23048 1 JobTitle 18 
Somali Government negative 0.289783 -0.316997  Organization 3 
AU negative 0.286102 -0.403712 1 Organization 14 
Somali Diaspora neutral 0.283922   Organization 3 
Africa negative 0.277755 -0.504127  Continent 15 
South Sudan negative 0.275331 -0.370505  Country 7 
Al-Qaeda negative 0.26837 -0.546986  Organization 13 
Mogadishu negative 0.266615 -0.322286 1 City 13 
Afghanistan negative 0.265778 -0.290839 1 Country 8 
Africa negative 0.265464 -0.480418  Country 7 
Iraq negative 0.262523 -0.401745 1 Country 10 
Somali Coast negative 0.259262 -0.301846  GeographicFeature 3 
Ambassador To 
Somalia 
neutral 0.256758   JobTitle 1 
Somalia London 
Conference 
neutral 0.255948   Organization 1 
Syria negative 0.24425 -0.378465 1 Country 14 
Somalia From 
International 
Community 
neutral 0.239281   Organization 1 
Analyst negative 0.237105 -0.408722  JobTitle 12 
Somaliland negative 0.235942 -0.0194915 1 Organization 9 
Funding Of Somali 
Warlords 
negative 0.232013 -0.362341  Organization 1 
Somali Government 
On Operations 
negative 0.227382 -0.248006  Organization 1 
Somali Food Aid neutral 0.226126   Organization 1 
Somali Islamists negative 0.214193 -0.311365  Organization 1 
Somali presidential 
palace 
negative 0.214043 -0.54144  Facility 1 
Mali positive 0.210944 0.0437313 1 Country 5 
Somali Fighters negative 0.206117 -0.527269  Organization 1 
Somali Group negative 0.204536 -0.473602  Organization 1 
Sudan negative 0.201066 -0.651479  Country 4 
Libya negative 0.198682 -0.346754 1 Country 8 
Zimbabwe negative 0.198375 -0.3111  Country 8 
Writer negative 0.198093 -0.38079 1 JobTitle 26 
president negative 0.196362 -0.277468 1 JobTitle 11 
New Somali negative 0.196323 -0.498693  Organization 1 
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Somali Authority 
Embolden Al-Shabab 
positive 0.196114 0.224171  Organization 1 
Europe negative 0.19437 -0.430442  Continent 4 
Ethiopia negative 0.192477 -0.396991  Country 7 
Darfur negative 0.191749 -0.505378  Country 4 
EU negative 0.190179 -0.323227  Organization 5 
UK negative 0.189832 -0.108969 1 Country 7 
China negative 0.189772 -0.478286  Country 5 
east African negative 0.18793 -0.0846471 1 FieldTerminology 5 
Official negative 0.187583 -0.372687  JobTitle 7 
Somali Pirates negative 0.186697 -0.23954  Organization 1 
Commander negative 0.182539 -0.411011  JobTitle 4 
Britain neutral 0.182002   Country 5 
 
 
Appendix 4: Sentiment keyword analysis - relevance, sentiment type, and score in news headlines 
Keyword Relevance Sentiment type Sentiment 
Score 
Sentiment 
Mixed  
somalia 0.913336 negative -0.0964446 1 
somali government 0.793061 negative -0.101292 1 
somali pirates 0.717518 negative -0.413481  
somalia conference 0.702649 negative -0.202834 1 
Somalia arms embargo 0.695357 negative -0.59009  
Independent Somalia 0.692472 neutral   
Somalia Contact Group 0.690156 neutral   
Somalia talks 0.690019 negative -0.249479  
lawless Somalia 0.689116 negative -0.49644  
Somalia deal 0.689041 neutral   
Somalia drought aid 0.688927 negative -0.374241  
Somalia parliament 0.68883 neutral   
U.S. Patrols Somalia 0.682031 negative -0.523214  
war-ravaged Somalia 0.681948 negative -0.247253  
somali president 0.68193 negative -0.119156 1 
Somalia drought victims 0.681926 negative -0.450452  
Somalia fighting kills 0.679846 negative -0.388933  
southern Somalia 0.678636 negative -0.48006  
Somalia al-Qaida-linked group 0.678074 positive 0.3812  
Somalia Media Guide 0.674223 neutral   
Somalia Islamists 0.674162 negative -0.630374  
Uk Somalia Conference 0.672911 neutral   
Somalia Limited 0.672754 neutral   
Somalia militants 0.67261 negative -0.728668  
New Somalia 0.672362 negative -0.352877  
Somalia London Conference 0.672287 negative -0.446558  
Somalia War 0.671529 neutral   
Somalia claw 0.668709 negative -0.218894  
Somalia presidents 0.668125 negative -0.22053  
Somalia parliamentarians 0.667771 positive 0.368007  
somali capital 0.666977 negative -0.373012  
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Somalia central bank 0.666823 negative -0.356355  
Justice In Somalia 0.665828 neutral   
Somalia Neighbours 0.665691 negative -0.394782  
Situation In Somalia 0.664429 negative -0.30908  
Somalia Cordial Relations 0.663981 neutral   
Post Conflict Somalia 0.663645 negative -0.498948  
Somalia Violation 0.663628 negative -0.663404  
Document Compromises Somalia 0.663527 neutral   
Rivalries Weaken Somalia 0.662785 neutral   
Operation In Somalia 0.662305 negative -0.288644  
Somalia peace 0.660414 negative -0.416266  
RELATIONS SOMALIA 0.660302 negative -0.509031  
Somalia helicopter assault 0.66014 negative -0.46949  
Somalia Plans 0.656631 negative -0.587524  
Somalia rebels 0.652392 negative -0.567013  
Somali peace talks 0.651695 positive 0.165573 1 
new Somali government 0.649121 neutral   
Somali Islamist 0.64692 negative -0.235618  
 
Appendix 5: Targeted keyword analysis – Type, relevance, sentiment type, and score in news headlines 
Text Type Sentiment/Type Sentiment/Score Sentiment/Mixed 
Somalia Entity negative -0.396289 1 
Somali government Entity negative -0.169169 1 
Yemen Entity negative -0.505519 1 
US Entity negative -0.416282 1 
Kenya Entity negative -0.326877 1 
United Nations Entity negative -0.48808  
President Entity negative -0.23048 1 
Somali Government Entity negative -0.316997  
AU Entity negative -0.403712 1 
Somali Diaspora Entity neutral   
Africa Entity negative -0.504127  
South Sudan Entity negative -0.370505  
Al-Qaeda Entity negative -0.546986  
Mogadishu Entity negative -0.322286 1 
Afghanistan Entity negative -0.290839 1 
Africa Entity negative -0.480418  
Iraq Entity negative -0.401745 1 
Somali Coast Entity negative -0.301846  
Ambassador To Somalia Entity neutral   
Somalia London Conference Entity neutral   
Syria Entity negative -0.378465 1 
Somalia From International Community Entity neutral   
Analyst Entity negative -0.408722  
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Somaliland Entity negative -0.0194915 1 
Funding Of Somali Warlords Entity negative -0.362341  
Somali Government On Operations Entity negative -0.248006  
Somali Food Aid Entity neutral   
Somali Islamists Entity negative -0.311365  
Somali presidential palace Entity negative -0.54144  
Mali Entity positive 0.0437313 1 
Somali Fighters Entity negative -0.527269  
Somali Group Entity negative -0.473602  
Sudan Entity negative -0.651479  
Libya Entity negative -0.346754 1 
Zimbabwe Entity negative -0.3111  
Writer Entity negative -0.38079 1 
president Entity negative -0.277468 1 
New Somali Entity negative -0.498693  
Somali Authority Embolden Al-Shabab Entity positive 0.224171  
Europe Entity negative -0.430442  
Ethiopia Entity negative -0.396991  
Darfur Entity negative -0.505378  
EU Entity negative -0.323227  
UK Entity negative -0.108969 1 
China Entity negative -0.478286  
east African Entity negative -0.0846471 1 
Official Entity negative -0.372687  
Somali Pirates Entity negative -0.23954  
Commander Entity negative -0.411011  
Britain Entity neutral   
somalia Keyword negative -0.0964446 1 
somali government Keyword negative -0.101292 1 
somali pirates Keyword negative -0.413481  
somalia conference Keyword negative -0.202834 1 
Somalia arms embargo Keyword negative -0.59009  
Independent Somalia Keyword neutral   
Somalia Contact Group Keyword neutral   
Somalia talks Keyword negative -0.249479  
lawless Somalia Keyword negative -0.49644  
Somalia deal Keyword neutral   
Somalia drought aid Keyword negative -0.374241  
Somalia parliament Keyword neutral   
U.S. Patrols Somalia Keyword negative -0.523214  
war-ravaged Somalia Keyword negative -0.247253  
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somali president Keyword negative -0.119156 1 
Somalia drought victims Keyword negative -0.450452  
Somalia fighting kills Keyword negative -0.388933  
southern Somalia Keyword negative -0.48006  
Somalia al-Qaida-linked group Keyword positive 0.3812  
Somalia Media Guide Keyword neutral   
Somalia Islamists Keyword negative -0.630374  
Uk Somalia Conference Keyword neutral   
Somalia Limited Keyword neutral   
Somalia militants Keyword negative -0.728668  
New Somalia Keyword negative -0.352877  
Somalia London Conference Keyword negative -0.446558  
Somalia War Keyword neutral   
Somalia claw Keyword negative -0.218894  
Somalia presidents Keyword negative -0.22053  
Somalia parliamentarians Keyword positive 0.368007  
somali capital Keyword negative -0.373012  
Somalia central bank Keyword negative -0.356355  
Justice In Somalia Keyword neutral   
Somalia Neighbours Keyword negative -0.394782  
Situation In Somalia Keyword negative -0.30908  
Somalia Cordial Relations Keyword neutral   
Post Conflict Somalia Keyword negative -0.498948  
Somalia Violation Keyword negative -0.663404  
Document Compromises Somalia Keyword neutral   
Rivalries Weaken Somalia Keyword neutral   
Operation In Somalia Keyword negative -0.288644  
Somalia peace Keyword negative -0.416266  
RELATIONS SOMALIA Keyword negative -0.509031  
Somalia helicopter assault Keyword negative -0.46949  
Somalia Plans Keyword negative -0.587524  
Somalia rebels Keyword negative -0.567013  
Somali peace talks Keyword positive 0.165573 1 
new Somali government Keyword neutral   
Somali Islamist Keyword negative -0.235618  
 
Appendix 6: Top five Leximancer themes and their connectivity in percentage across 14 news sources 
Source Theme 1 
(Connectivity) 
Theme 2 
(Connectivity) 
Theme 3 
(Connectivity) 
Theme 4 
(Connectivity) 
Theme 5 
(Connectivity) 
AFP Somalia 
(100%) 
Failed 
(71%) 
Forced 
(57%) 
Somali 
(32%) 
President 
(23%) 
AP Government Somalia Mogadishu Year Pirates 
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(100%) (90%) (52%) (41%) (37%) 
BBC Somalia 
(100%) 
Political 
(47%) 
Somali 
(42%) 
Countries 
(42%) 
Government 
(39%) 
CP Pirates 
(100%) 
Somalia 
(67%) 
Ship 
(39%) 
Group 
(37%) 
Oil 
(23%) 
FT Somalia 
(100%) 
Government 
(65%) 
Country 
(56%) 
War 
(36%) 
Countries 
(25%) 
GM War 
(100% 
Somalia 
(93%) 
World 
(69%) 
International 
(53%) 
Aid 
(39%) 
GUA Somalia 
(100%) 
War 
(91%) 
Failed 
(76%) 
UN 
(75%) 
Foreign 
(52%) 
NPR People 
(100%) 
Somalia 
(80%) 
Country 
(72%) 
Military 
(49%) 
Down 
(35%) 
NYT American 
(100%) 
Somalia 
(81%) 
World 
(74%) 
Country 
(57%) 
International 
(30%) 
REU Government 
(100%) 
Director 
(23%) 
Foreign 
(23%) 
President 
(14%) 
Hold 
(02%) 
TEL Somalia 
(100%) 
Government 
(65%) 
Mogadishu 
(37%) 
Country 
(37%) 
World 
(24%) 
TIM Somalia 
(100%) 
Mogadishu 
(62%) 
Somali 
(40%) 
War 
(38%) 
Security 
(36%) 
WPO Somalia 
(100%) 
Government 
(89%) 
Failed 
(87%) 
Military 
(74%) 
War 
(66%) 
WSJ Somalia 
(100%) 
Military 
(82%) 
American 
(49%) 
Week 
(44%) 
Government 
(39%) 
Combined Somalia 
(100%) 
Foreign 
(93%) 
International 
(86%) 
People 
(84%) 
War 
(59%) 
 
Appendix 7: All Leximancer themes and their connectivity in percentage as well all concepts and number 
of hits across 14 news sources 
Theme  Concept 1  Concept 2 Concept 
3 
Concept 
4 
Concept 
5 
Concept 
6 
Concept 
7 
Concept 
8 
Concept 
9 
Somalia 
(100%) 
Somalia 
(6466) 
Government 
(4993) 
Country 
(3129) 
Failed 
(2805) 
     
Foreign 
(93%) 
Foreign 
(1504) 
Power 
(1365) 
Become 
(1171) 
Former 
(1114) 
Nation 
(970) 
Minister 
(901) 
Crisis 
(923) 
  
International 
(86%) 
International 
(2508) 
Community 
(2134) 
Security 
(2134) 
Political 
(2002) 
Support 
(1148) 
Leaders 
(1240) 
Peace 
(1337) 
National 
(1028) 
 
People (84%) People 
(3385) 
Forces 
(1688) 
Troops 
(1722) 
Group 
(1287) 
Told 
(1359) 
Aid 
(1537) 
Including 
(1030) 
Killed 
(1122) 
Piracy 
(1053) 
War (59%) War (2483) World 
(1993) 
Time 
(1914) 
United 
States 
(1529) 
     
Military 
(54%) 
Military 
(2216) 
Attacks 
(1268) 
Officials 
(1027) 
Down 
(1126) 
Recent 
(891) 
    
Countries 
(49%) 
Countries 
(1891) 
States (1124)        
Somali (46%) Somali 
(2630) 
Mogadishu 
(1785) 
Capital 
(1345) 
Control 
(1149) 
Kenya 
(1320) 
    
Yemen (40%) Yemen 
(2073) 
American 
(1424) 
       
President 
(20%) 
President 
(1313) 
        
Ransoms 
(19%) 
Ransoms 
(2323) 
        
Text (18%) Text (1067)         
Africa (09%) Africa (1250)         
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Director 
(03%) 
Director 
(517) 
        
 
 
Appendix 8: Leximancer name-like concepts, count and their relevancy across all news sources 
Name-Like Count Relevance 
Somalia  6466 100% 
Somali  2630 41% 
Yemen  2073 32% 
Mogadishu  1785 28% 
United States  1529 24% 
American  1424 22% 
Kenya  1320 20% 
Africa  1250 19% 
Iraq  1177 18% 
Afghanistan  1156 18% 
Text  1067 17% 
UN  934 14% 
Al-qaeda  846 13% 
WASHINGTON  807 12% 
Somaliland  618 10% 
British  536 8% 
London  462 7% 
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Appendix 9: Leximancer word-like concepts, count, and relevance across all news sources 
Word-Like Count Relevance Word-
Like 
Count Relevance Word-Like Count Relevance Word-
Like 
Count Relevance 
government  4993 77% told  1359 21% policy  953 15% city  729 11% 
people  3385 52% capital  1345 21% attack  947 15% senior  689 11% 
country  3129 48% peace  1337 21% crisis  923 14% global  670 10% 
failed  2805 43% president  1313 20% money  903 14% days  654 10% 
international  2508 39% group  1287 20% minister  901 14% news  641 10% 
war  2483 38% attacks  1268 20% conflict  899 14% system  630 10% 
ransoms  2323 36% leaders  1240 19% place  895 14% business  587 9% 
military  2216 34% become  1171 18% economic  894 14% men  580 9% 
community  2134 33% control  1149 18% recent  891 14% meeting  568 9% 
security  2134 33% down  1126 17% oil  883 14% head  542 8% 
political  2002 31% states  1124 17% materials  862 13% chief  526 8% 
world  1993 31% killed  1122 17% conference  822 13% director  517 8% 
time  1914 30% former  1114 17% leader  775 12% hold  456 7% 
countries  1891 29% piracy  1053 16% law  773 12% general  445 7% 
troops  1722 27% including  1030 16% use  764 12% member  439 7% 
forces  1688 26% national  1028 16% public  757 12% man  421 7% 
aid  1537 24% officials  1027 16% during  744 12% holds  351 5% 
foreign  1504 23% violence  1003 16% home  744 12% moved  326 5% 
support  1448 22% work  1002 15% website  740 11%    
power  1365 21% nation  970 15% members  730 11%    
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Appendix 10: Atlas/Ti codes grouped by four news code families 
Code *ANP *BNP *OTHER *WIRE TOTALS 
Aid 90 108 138 231 567 
AU 72 134 138 287 631 
Clan 147 175 367 265 954 
Corrupt 68 91 85 108 352 
Democracy 122 71 101 90 384 
Dictator 103 104 146 204 557 
Diplomat 95 125 99 169 488 
Economy 76 79 126 130 411 
Election 126 100 120 289 635 
Expert 104 98 89 177 468 
Export 12 19 13 13 57 
Failed State 828 954 1368 1270 4420 
Famine 123 177 71 98 469 
FDI 1 0 1 5 7 
Hopeless 7 15 4 6 32 
Import 5 7 5 6 23 
Language 0 0 0 12 12 
Law 193 191 318 421 1123 
Lost cause 1 0 0 0 1 
Military 351 289 277 333 1250 
Money Transfer 5 4 6 9 24 
Other-Africa/Haiti 273 606 1044 906 2829 
Other-Asia 409 590 674 858 2531 
Other-Europe 87 167 146 159 559 
Parliament 70 76 131 250 527 
Peacekeeping 102 128 133 202 565 
Piracy 246 651 407 706 2010 
Politician 39 70 51 44 204 
Refugees 71 78 67 55 271 
Somali 331 554 1180 894 2959 
Somali-Institution 15 70 105 59 249 
Somali-NGO 13 10 45 10 78 
Somali-Politician 0 0 0 315 315 
Somalia 1305 2060 3204 2928 9497 
Somaliland 79 68 520 63 730 
Strategic 79 53 95 78 305 
Technology 93 107 117 144 461 
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Terrorism-International 433 445 52 462 1392 
Terrorism-Local 164 368 186 473 1191 
UK 67 580 142 195 984 
UN 247 115 143 463 968 
Ungovernable 1 4 4 2 11 
US 483 133 427 470 1513 
Violence 185 182 183 389 939 
Warlord 159 198 182 324 863 
TOTALS: 7480 10054 12710 14572 44816 
*ANP: North American Newspapers (New York Times, Washington Post, The Globe and Mail, Wall Street Journal) 
*BNP: British Newspapers (The Guardian, The Times of London, The Telegraph, Financial Times) 
*OTHER: Other Sources (The BBC Monitoring Service, National Public Radio) 
*WIRE: Wire Services (The Associated Press, Agence France Press, Reuters, The Canadian Press) 
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Appendix 11: Atlas/Ti coding matrix code co-occurrence and ratio from all news sources 
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: 
Clan                   1028/0.4 
Corrupt 47/0.04                  847/0.46 
Democracy 6/0 28/0.04                 210/0.13 
Dictator 54/0.04 31/0.04 14/0.02                618/0.31 
Failed State 130/0.02 186/0.04 68/0.01 89/0.02               3116/0.43 
Famine 19/0.01 12/0.01 1/0.01 13/0.01 51/0.01              441/0.2 
Hopeless  4/0.01   4/0 1/0             33/0.03 
Military 44/0.02 52/0.03 9/0.01 14/0.01 91/0.02 8/0 2/0            676/0.24 
Peacekeeping 18/0.01 24/0.03 5/0.01 4/0 39/0.01 5/0  69/0.04           423/0.17 
Piracy 30/0.01 32/0.01 3/0.01 14/0.01 188/0.03 22/0.01 1/0 14/0 4/0          1028/0.19 
Refugees 30/0.03 30/0.05 12/0.02 23/0.03 128/0.03 42/0.06 2/0.01 37/0.02 16/0.02 41/0.05         696/0.42 
Somalia 323/0.03 213/0.02 33/0 182/0.02 1499/0.12 198/0.02 13/0 192/0.02 192/0.02 522 181/0.02        5063/0.47 
Somaliland 47/0.03 14/0.01 8/0.01 22/0.02 99/0.02 2/0  7/0 1/0.02 15/0.01 9/0.01 285/0.03       549/0.16 
Terrorism-
International 
29/0.01 48/0.03 2/0 5/0 153/0.03 4/0 1/0 32/0.01 6/0 25/0.01 30/0.02 307/0.03 4/0      808/0.21 
Terrorism-
Local 
73/0.04 53/0.04 2/0 17/0.01 138 22/0.01  36/0.01 15/0 62/0.02 47/0.03 407/0.04 14/0.01 112/0.05     1114/0.35 
Ungovernable  1/0 1/0  4/0 2/0    2/0 1/0 3/0 1/0      15/0.02 
Violence 66/0.04 42/0.03 16/0.01 28/0.02 120/0.02 19/0.01 2/0 36/0.02 12/0.01 20/0.01 42/0.04 198/0.02 14/0.01 25/0.01 42/0.02    834/0.36 
Warlord 112/0.07 30/0.03 2/0 108/0.08 129/0.03 20/0.02 3/0 33/0.02 13/0.01 33/0.01 25/0.02 315/0.03 7/0 25/0.01 74/0.04  152/0.09  1081/0.45 
* Blue highlight: => 0.05 
* Green highlight: = 0.04 
* Yellow highlight: = 0.03 
 * No highlight: =< 0.02 
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Appendix 12: Major regions, populations and GDP within Somalia 
 Population 
(millions) 
% living in 
Urban area 
(2014) 
Land Area 
(sq. km) 
GDP U.S. $ 
(2012) 
South Central 
Somalia 
6,978,642 33.95 238,707 $2.5 billion 
Somaliland 3,508,180 52.88 176,120 $1.6 billion 
Puntland 1,830,073 54.22 212,510 $1.3 billion 
Total 12,316,895 42.35 627,337 5.4 billion 
Source: UNFP 2016, World Bank 2014 
 
Appendix 13: Questionnaire and Narrative Report 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
ICT, THE SOMALI DIASPORA AND THE 
STABILIZATION OF A FAILED STATE 
Participant Demographic Information 
 
i) Name of the participant: _________________________________________________ 
 
ii) Age of the interviewee: __________________________________________________ 
 
iii) Highest level of Education attainment interviewee (circle): 
 
a) Middle school or less 
b) High School 
c) Technical College 
d) Undergraduate university degree 
e) Graduate degree (Post-secondary certificate, Masters, Ph.D. 
 
iv) Education Specialization: ________________________________________________ 
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v) Name of organization: ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
vi) Tenure in organization: __________________________________________________ 
 
vii) Job Title in organization: _________________________________________________ 
 
Open-Ended Interview Questions 
 
i. What institutional and organizational structures have allowed economic and social activity 
possible in Somalia under conditions of failure? 
 
 
ii. What role does information communications technology play in the economic and social system 
of Somalia? 
 
 
iii. What role does the diaspora, through the remittance system, play in the economic and social 
system of Somalia? 
 
 
 
iv. From your perspective, what does the future hold for Somalia, politically? economically? And 
what role will technology play in this future? 
 
 
 
Narrative Report 
Prior to my flight to Hargeisa, I did basic research on the country and the technology sector in more 
generally, but I was not sure what to expect when I landed. On the day I landed, my contact in the country 
had not arrived at the airport, so I decided to get a SIM card while I waited. I also knew that I needed mobile 
communication so I could communicate while in the country. I decided to stop by the kiosk for the SomTel, 
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the desk agent was more enterprising in trying to gain my attention, I asked him how much the plans were 
and he informed me that a one gigabyte data plan would cost $3USD and asked how much data $10 would 
buy and I was told that it would be 4GB. I decided to go with that plan.  
This decision would turn out to cause a few problems almost instantly. Little did I know that I had 
chosen the smaller second carrier, and this meant that I could not call TeleSom and NationLink cellphones 
(or landlines provided by those companies). When I reached my temporary apartment, every phone number 
I dialled, the system would tell me that it was the wrong number. Luckily, I had access to Wi-Fi service in 
the apartment, and I ended up using Google Voice to call local numbers, and that worked for a cost (foreign 
services have better interconnectivity than local carriers). I knew that this would not be a sustainable option. 
That first night in the country, I met my host, and he asked for my phone number and asked which service 
provider I had. I mentioned that I had SomTel and he told me that I should get a TeleSom SIM card instead. 
I then told him about my problem calling numbers, and that is when he told me the reason why I could not 
call anyone was that the phone providers did not communicate with each other. Because a majority of the 
country’s population were already subscribers to TeleSom, the meant that most people could easily 
communicate with each other. I decided to get a TeleSom SIM card. 
Before landing in the country, I was not sure how reliable the internet service would be, I was 
pleasantly surprised to find the country had excellent internet service. They were provided by the two largest 
cellphone providers and the new land-based provider (SomCable). As mentioned earlier, my apartment was 
connected to high-speed Wi-Fi with unlimited downloads. I found that most hotels and cafes provided free 
Wi-Fi throughout the Hargeisa. The first SIM card I had, SomTel, had stable and relative quick internet. 
However, when my TeleSom service was very spotty, and most of the day, my internet did not stay on for 
my more than 30 minutes during the day. I spent a long time with the service department trying to fix the 
internet on my phone but had no luck. The agent informed me that the problem could be associated with 
my Google Nexus 5 phone. This problem left me with a conundrum, stay with TeleSom with its ability to 
call local numbers and send money or go back SomTel with its great internet. I decided to stay with 
TeleSom. 
The company has a virtual monopoly in the country, and this is then re-enforced by its mobile 
money service, ZAAD. ZAAD is fast replacing cash as a payment method within the country. Although the 
TeleSom will not disclose how much money is processed by the system. The service is accepted by virtually 
all merchants, and all registered Telesom customers can send and receive funds electronically. I knew that 
I needed to get myself a registered account because cash was becoming a hassle to deal with. Both 
Somaliland Shillings and US dollars are widely accepted within the country; however, both currencies had 
their own unique problems. Using the Somaliland Shilling meant carrying a large amount of hard currency 
in order for it to be used; the bills started at 500, 1000 and 5000 and one dollar equalled around 8000 
shillings. Meaning that I had to carry more than around 200,000 shillings for the day to ensure I could pay 
for food and transportation. 
On the other hand, the US dollar had its own issues associated with it. Although it is widely 
accepted, most merchants and people have difficulty providing change for $10. I often had to wait for a 
long time as they went looking for a change. However, with mobile money, you could send money without 
having to worry about the problems associated with the hard currency. 
I signed up for the service in my second week in the program. I went to the ZAAD head office in 
Hargeisa, and they asked for a picture ID along with a witness who could vouch for me. I was accompanied 
by a worker of the apartments that I was staying at. The took my picture and asked that I provide my first 
four names (my name, fathers, grandfather, and great grandfather) along with my mother’s names. I only 
had her three names, so the fourth name was placed holder of the Somali word for mother. The process of 
getting my phone registered for the service took about 30 minutes. I then added my first $10 at the cash 
counter. The service only uses US dollars rather than the Somaliland Shilling. 
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Using the ZAAD service was very simple. If you were sending funds to a merchant, #883 code was 
placed in the phone's dialer, the 6-digit merchant ID and the followed by the dollar amount. For example, 
if I want to send $10 to pay for my coffee, I would input #883#123456#10* and then press send. A message 
would pop on my phone screen confirming the name of the merchant’s name as well asking for my password 
to release the funds. Finally, I would tell the merchant that my name and they would get a text with the 
funds and ask for my name to confirm they have received it. The service only accepted whole and half 
dollars; if change needed to be provided, then cash change would be provided. The same process was similar 
to the consumer version of the service; the only difference was the #880 code. 
During my first week of data collection, I had difficulty getting people to talk to me. However, with 
the help of distant family members, I started to reach out to members of big telecoms in the country. Without 
these introductions, I would not have had much success in gaining access to the key informants I was 
seeking. Once I started speaking with the key informants, they started to tell me of other people with whom 
I should speak to. I think this research process provided insight into how Somali society functions; there is 
an emphasis on trust that needs to be earned, especially if you are perceived to be an outsider. That trust 
needs to be extended through family members. 
 
Appendix 14: Interview participant demographics  
Code Age Education+ Specialization Tenure 
(Years) 
Title Type 
D1 42 E Information Technology 7 Dean of ICT Education 
D2 48 E Information Technology 7 President Education 
D3 51 D Journalism and Media 
Management 
10 Deputy Country 
Director 
NGO 
D4 33 E Post-Conflict 1 Emergency Manager NGO 
D5 50 D Management 2 Operations Manager Industry 
D6 29 E Oracle Database 4 Dean of ICT Education 
D7Y 25 D Information 
Communication 
Technology 
2.5 Dean's assistant Education 
D8 47 E Distributed Systems 12 Dean of ICT Education 
D9 30-40 D Information 
Communication 
Technology 
8 Software 
Programmer 
Industry 
D10 45 E Computer Science 6 Chairman Government 
D11 24 D Human Resources 
Management/Technical 
Engineer 
2 months Main Engineer/Head 
of Marketing 
Industry 
D12 31 D Chemical Engineering 5 years (6 
months in this 
role) 
Planning 
Coordinator 
Government 
D13 40 E Business 
Administration/Security 
Studies 
3 (7 with 
government) 
Director of Planning 
and Development 
Government 
D14 28 E Communication 
Engineering 
4 months Transmission Base 
Subsystems station 
Industry 
D15 25 E Development 
Studies/Sociology 
6 Program Specialist NGO 
D16 50+ D Accounting 5 Secretary General NGO 
D17 44 D Biology 2 Head of IT Industry 
D18 48 D Law/Electricity 10 Operations Manager Industry 
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D19 39 D Economics 3 Sales, Distribution, 
& Customer Care 
Manager 
Industry 
D20 30-40 E Business Administration 2 Business Advisor Industry 
D21 40-50 D Telecommunication 8 Business 
development 
Industry 
D22 50-55 E Public 
Health/Development 
Administration 
3 Country Director NGO 
D23 42 E Economics/International 
Relations 
15 Public 
Engagements/CSR 
Director 
Industry 
D24X 31 D Business 6 Regional 
coordinator 
Government 
D25X 30-45 E Accounting 11 Macro-economics 
section 
Government 
D26X 30-35 E Networks (IT) 4 IT Manager Industry 
D27X 38 D Islamic 16 Officer Industry 
D28X 40-50 D Information Technology, 
Engineering 
1 (in 
government 
since 2008) 
Consultant Government 
D29X 35 D Management 6 Teller Industry 
D30X 27 E Economist 2 Operator Industry 
X: Participant asked not to be audio recorded or no transcript available  
Y: Not included in the final analysis. 
+: A: Middle school or less; B: High School; C: Technical College; D: Undergraduate university degree: E: Graduate 
degree (Post-secondary certificate, Masters, Ph.D. 
 
 
Appendix 15: Atlas/Ti codes grouped by nine code families  
Positive (15) Negative (14) ICT (14) Diaspora (5) Economy 
(9) 
Financial 
Sector (6) 
Education/J
ustice (8) 
Social 
Services (4) 
Trust (19) Weak 
government (34) 
ICT for 
development 
(14) 
Diaspora 
(25) 
Private 
sector (19) 
Money 
Transfer 
(27) 
Education 
(61) 
Sustainable 
development 
(7) 
Hope for the 
future (18) 
Cost of ICT 
upgrades (9) 
Connecting all 
Somalis (3) 
Contribution 
to economy 
(10) 
Electricity 
(15) 
Banking 
(12) 
ICT 
Specializatio
n (14) 
Investment in 
People (6) 
Increased ICT 
demand (15) 
MTO Restrictions 
(8) 
Equipment 
(12) 
Not helpful 
(6) 
International 
Trade (13) 
MTO 
Restrictions 
(8) 
Lack of ICT 
Awareness 
(6) 
Investment in 
Healthcare (2) 
Innovative 
Country (13) 
Barriers to 
business (6) 
ICT 
implementatio
n (10) 
Mediators (2) Economy 
(10) 
Financial 
aid 
distribution 
(6) 
Investment 
in education 
(6) 
Other country 
examples (2) 
Connecting all 
Somalis (13) 
Lack of ICT 
awareness (6) 
Cost of ICT 
upgrades (9) 
Contributes 
to illegal 
migration (1) 
Entrepreneu
rial (9) 
Easier 
access (4) 
Justice (6)  
Embrace 
technology (12) 
Lack of 
coordination (6) 
Use of media 
(8) 
 Barriers to 
business (7) 
 Responding 
to ICT Need 
(4) 
 
Increased 
awareness of ICT 
(10) 
International 
Limitation (4) 
Company (5)  Business 
Climate (6) 
 Lack of 
resources (4) 
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Peace and 
Stability (9) 
Lack of resources 
(4) 
Government  
Policy (5) 
 Low taxes 
(2) 
 International 
recognition 
(1) 
 
People 
(8) 
Misuse of ICT (4) Daily use (5)  Multinationa
l Companies 
(2) 
   
Financial aid 
distribution (6) 
Online cost is 
high (4) 
Government is 
connected (4) 
     
Facilitates faster 
remittances (6) 
Lack of 
innovation (3) 
Computer 
programming 
(3) 
     
Investment in 
education (6) 
Lack of 
Investments (3) 
Media (3)      
Political climate 
(5) 
Active Conflict 
(2) 
Gender 
equality (2) 
     
Improvement (5) Contributes to 
Illegal migration 
(1) 
Local Apps 
(2) 
     
Creating a 
government (3) 
       
 
 
Appendix 16: Total Somali refugees around the world since 1987 
 
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2018 
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Appendix 17: Number of Somali migrants by category and applicant type (1980 – 2016) 
Admission category and 
applicant type 
Total - Period 
of immigration 
 1980 
to 
1990 
  1991 
to 
2000 
 2001 
to 
2010 
 2001 
to 
2005 
 2006 
to 
2010 
 2011 
to 
2016 
Economic 
immigrants  
Toronto 
CMA 285 90 150 30 25 - 25 
Canada 745 255 355 95 65 25 40 
Immigrants 
sponsored by family  
Toronto 
CMA 1,905 145 1,205 360 165 190 195 
Canada 4,640 300 2,535 955 385 565 850 
Refugees  
Toronto 
CMA 8,490 1,480 4,425 1,690 865 825 900 
Canada 21,490 3,075 8,405 5,620 2,195 3,420 4,395 
Other immigrants  
Toronto 
CMA 115 - - 80 20 60 35 
Canada 
CMA 225 - - 170 60 110 50 
         
Total - Admission 
category and 
applicant type  
Toronto 
CMA 10,800 1,710 5,780 2,160 1,085 1,075 1,150 
Canada 27,095 3,630 11,295 6,840 2,705 4,130 5,335 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis 212 
Appendix 18: Survey and Questionnaire 
 
GTA Mobile Money Transfer Services Survey 
 
Start of Block: Consent Agreement 
Q1  
CONSENT AGREEMENT  You are being invited to participate 
in a research study. Please read this consent form so that you 
understand what your participation will involve. Before you 
consent to participate, please ask any questions to be sure you 
understand what your participation will involve. 
  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY:  
This research project intends to examine evidence of institutions 
and societal structures in Somalia. By examining, evidence of how 
the institutions such as the monetary system, social services, 
education system and justice are delivered this study will delve 
past superficial perspectives of Somalia. More specifically, this 
study will focus on the communication and social networks that are 
utilized by the Somalis currently living abroad in order to facilitate 
the money transfers and foster social relationships through a 
unique money transfer system. 
  
Participation Criteria:  
You live in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) You use the money 
transfer network You have sent money to Somalia (or Africa) in 
2017. Be over the age of 18 years old. 
Benefits: 
We cannot guarantee any direct benefit to you; however, by 
agreeing to participate in this survey you will: 
• You are contributing your ideas, thoughts and 
experiences to a study that will lead to a better 
understanding the Somali people as well as providing 
insight into the obstacles, challenges and pathways to 
future of the country. 
• Ensure that your voice and opinions are heard and taken 
into serious consideration as we attempt to define, 
explore and examine “Somali” innovation. 
Description: 
The research team is seeking your honest responses to this survey. 
The survey has multiple sections and will take approximately 5 to 
10 minutes to complete. Your responses to this survey will be kept 
confidential. All research is collected and will be reported so that 
no information or comments can be used to identify any person. 
Survey responses will be securely kept for 2 years by the 
researcher to allow for analysis and review; after this time, all data 
will be destroyed. 
  
Please note that the survey was designed to ask many important 
questions; however, some of the questions may not address your 
concerns. We would appreciate if you would answer these 
questions to the best of your ability. 
  
CONFIDENTIALITY: 
The student researcher under the supervisor of the Doctoral Studies 
supervisor will be the only people who have access to the 
information that you provide. All information collected will be 
stored securely in a locked filing cabinet in the doctoral 
supervisor’s office and all information on computers will be 
password protected. Any member hired to transcribe the 
information from audio recordings will make use of codes so as not 
to reveal your identity and will also be asked to sign a separate 
confidentiality agreement stating that they will keep your identity 
confidential. The master list of interview participants will be kept 
separately from the transcriptions so as to ensure that transcripts 
are not linked to interviewees. The student researcher will analyze 
the transcripts will only be provided with transcriptions using 
coded identity markers to further ensure that your identity is not 
revealed during the process. After December 2019 the information 
will be destroyed. A report will be published presenting the overall 
findings of the study. Your name or identifiable information will 
not appear anywhere in any draft or final report.  
  
INCENTIVE TO PARTICIPATE: 
Participants will not be paid to participate in this study. 
  
COSTS AND/OR COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPANTS: 
The costs associated with participating in this study include your 
time and, potentially, a small amount for travel (i.e. public transit, 
parking, etc) to the convenient location you have selected in 
advance. 
   
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF PARTICIPATION:  
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your choice of whether or 
not to participate will not influence your future relations with the 
student researcher. If you decide to participate, you are free to 
withdraw your consent and to stop your participation at any time 
without penalty. 
At any particular point in the study, you may refuse to answer any 
particular question or stop participation altogether.  
  
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY:  
If you have any questions about the research now, please ask.  If 
you have any questions later about the research, you may contact: 
   
               Mohamed Elmi (Student)                               Ojelanki 
Ngwenyama (Supervisor) 
               ELMMOH005@MYUCT.AC.ZA        or        O.NGWEN
YAMA@UCT.AC.ZA 
  
If you have questions regarding your rights as human subject and 
participant in this study, you may contact the University of Cape 
Town Research and Ethics Board for information. The 
Administrator of the ethics committee, Ms. Samantha Alexander, 
can be reached at samantha.alexander@uct.ac.za 
  
Agreement: By clicking on the “I Agree” button below indicates that you 
have read the information in this agreement and that you have had the 
chance to ask questions about the study. Your consent means that you agree 
to participate in the study and have been told that you can change your mind 
and withdraw your consent, by closing your browser, until your survey 
responses are submitted. 
o I Agree  (1)  
o I Disagree  (2)  
 
Skip To: End of Survey If CONSENT AGREEMENT You are being 
invited to participate in a research study. Please read this cons... = 
I Disagree 
 
End of Block: Consent Agreement 
 
Start of Block: Screening Questions 
Q2 Are you Somali? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Skip To: End of Survey If Are you Somali? = No 
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Q3 Are you 18 years or older? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
Skip To: End of Survey If Are you 18 years or older? = No 
 
Q4 Have you sent money to Somalia (or overseas) in 2017? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
Skip To: End of Survey If Have you sent money to Somalia (or 
overseas) in 2017? = No 
End of Block: Screening Questions 
 
Start of Block: Remittance Questions 
Q5  How long have you been sending money overseas? 
o Less than a year  (1)  
o Between 1 and 3 years  (2)  
o Between 3 and 5 years  (3)  
o More than 5 years  (4)  
 
 
Q6 How many times in the past 12 months have you sent money to 
someone who lives or works outside of Canada? Would you say 
about: 
o Almost every week  (1)  
o Two or three times a month  (2)  
o Once a month  (3)  
o Once every two or three months  (4)  
o Once every six months  (5)  
o Two or three times a year  (6)  
o Once in past 12 months  (7)  
 
 
Q7 In the last 12 months, how much money on average do you 
send on a single occasion overseas? 
o 100 or less dollars  (1)  
o 101 - 200 dollars  (2)  
o 201 - 400 dollars  (3)  
o 401 -500 dollars  (4)  
o 501 - 750 dollars  (6)  
o 751 - 1000 dollars  (7)  
o 1001 - 1500 dollars  (8)  
o More than 1501 dollars  (9)  
 
 
 
Q8 How do you normally send the money overseas? 
o By mail/courier  (1)  
o Through family traveling to Somalia  (2)  
o Through Canadian banks (i.e TD Bank, BMO Bank, 
RBC, etc.)  (3)  
o Through money transfer agencies (i.e. Western 
Union/Money Gram) excluding banks  (4)  
o Through Somali money transfer agencies  (5)  
 
Q9 If you did not select "Through Somali money transfer agencies" 
please skip Question 10 and 11 
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Q10 [If through Somali money transfer agencies] Which of the 
following Somali money transfer agencies do you/your family use 
the most? (select one) 
o Amaana Express  (1)  
o Amal Express  (2)  
o Bakal Express  (3)  
o Dahabshiil  (4)  
o Iftin Express  (5)  
o Juba Express  (6)  
o Kaah Express Money Transfer  (7)  
o Salama/Olympic Express  (8)  
o Taaj Express  (9)  
o Tawakal Express  (10)  
o Other (SPECIFY)  (11) 
__________________________________________ 
 
Q11 [If through Somali money transfer agencies]  What other 
Somali money transfer agencies do you/your family use? (Select 
all that apply) 
▢ Amaana Express  (1)  
▢ Amal Express  (2)  
▢ Bakal Express  (3)  
▢ Dahabshiil  (4)  
▢ Iftin Express  (5)  
▢ Juba Express  (6)  
▢ Kaah Express Money Transfer  (7)  
▢ Salama/Olympic Express  (8)  
▢ Taaj Express  (9)  
▢ Tawakal Express  (10)  
▢ Other (SPECIFY)  (11) 
____________________________ 
 
Q12 In Canada, what is the most frequent way you send the 
money? (select one) 
 
o Cash/debit at a money transfer agency office  (1)  
o Through online (computer) transfer  (2)  
o Through mobile (cellphone) money transfer  (3)  
o By mailing a cheque  (4)  
o Other (SPECIFY)  (5) 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q13 Have you/your family ever used online/mobile money 
transfer, when you send money to Somalia? 
o Yes (if "Yes" please answer question 14)  (1)  
o No ( if "No" Skip Question 14)  (2)  
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Q14 [If yes to Question 13] which online/mobile money transfer 
service do you use? 
o EVC Plus  (1)  
o Dahabshiil  (2)  
o Sahal  (3)  
o World Remit  (4)  
o Zaad  (5)  
o Other (SPECIFY)  (6) 
_________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q15 Do you need photo identification (i.e. Driver's License or 
Passport) when sending the money? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
 
Q16 Do you receive a receipt or a record of the money sent? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
 
Q17 What other information is required from you when sending 
the money? (select all that apply) 
▢ Complete family name  (1)  
▢ Telephone number  (2)  
▢ Home address  (3)  
▢ Other  (4) 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q18 What information is required from the people receiving the 
money? (select all that apply) 
▢ A reference code  (1)  
▢ Your full family name  (2)  
▢ An Identification card  (3)  
▢ A witness/trusted individual  (4)  
▢ Other  (5) 
____________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q19 How long does it take for your family/friends to receive the 
money you sent? 
o Less than an hour  (1)  
o 3 – 6 hours  (2)  
o Less than 24 hours  (3)  
o 1 – 2 days  (4)  
o 3 – 6 days  (5)  
o 1 week  (6)  
o 1- 2 weeks  (7)  
o Three weeks or more  (8)  
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Q20   What are the reasons for sending money to your 
family/friends? (choose all that apply) 
o For family expenses  
(1)  
o Purchase of 
land/property  (2)  
o Paying off debts  (3)  
o Savings  (4)  
o Construction/repairing 
of house  (5)  
o Mortgaging of land  (6)  
o Investment/For running 
a business  (7)  
o Sending family 
members abroad  (8)  
o To assist in 
marriage  (9)  
o Education of 
children  (10)  
o To assist in 
buying food  (11)  
o Purchasing of 
cattle/animals  (12)  
o Medical 
treatment  (13)  
o Lending of 
money to family 
member  (14)  
o Celebration 
of Eid  (15)  
o Other 
(SPECIFY)  (16) 
____________ 
 
 
 
Q21 Of those choices, what is the main reason for sending money 
to your family/friends? (Select one) 
 
o For family expenses  
(1)  
o Purchase of 
land/property  (2)  
o Paying off debts  (3)  
o Savings  (4)  
o Construction/repairing 
of house  (5)  
o Mortgaging of land  (6)  
o Investment/For running 
a business  (7)  
o Sending family 
members abroad  (8)  
o To assist in 
marriage  (9)  
o Education of 
children  (10)  
o To assist in 
buying food  (11)  
o Purchasing of 
cattle/animals  (12)  
o Medical 
treatment  (13)  
o Lending of 
money to family 
member  (14)  
o Celebration 
of Eid  (15)  
o Other 
(SPECIFY)  (16) 
____________ 
 
 
 
 
Q22 How do you normally confirm your family/friends have 
received the money? 
o Calling family/friends directly  (1)  
o Text/email messaging family/friends  (2)  
o Confirmation from the money transfer company that 
funds have been withdrawn  (3)  
o Other  (4) ______________________________ 
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Q23 Would you say Somali money transfer agencies are: 
o Very trustworthy  (1)  
o Somewhat trustworthy  (2)  
o Somewhat un-trustworthy  (3)  
o Very Un-trustworthy  (4)  
o Do not know  (5)  
 
End of Block: Remittance Questions 
 
Start of Block: Technology Questions 
 
Q24 How often do you communicate (whether by telephone letter 
or email) with the person, family or relatives you send money?   
o Daily  (1)  
o Once a week  (2)  
o Once a month  (3)  
o A few times a year  (4)  
o Never  (5)  
 
 
 
Q25    Which of the following do you use to communicate with 
family members the most? 
▢ Landline telephone  (1)  
▢ Mobile cellphone  (2)  
▢ Internet (Skype, Google Talk, Email, etc)  (3)  
▢ Mobile applications (Viber, WhatsApp, 
Facebook Messenger)  (4)  
▢ Other (SPECIFY)  (5) 
______________________________ 
 
End of Block: Technology Questions 
 
 
Q26 Where do you currently reside? (Choose one) 
o Toronto  (1)  
o Etobicoke  (2)  
o Scarborough  (3)  
o North York  (4)  
o Brampton  (5)  
o Mississauga  (6)  
o Markham  (7)  
o Vaughan  (8)  
o Richmond Hill  
(9)  
o Oshawa  (10)  
o Other (SPECIFY)  
(11) ______________ 
 
 
Q27 What is your age? 
o 18-24 years old  
(1)  
o 25-34 years old  
(2)  
o 35-44 years old  
(3)  
o 45-54 years old  
(4)  
o 55-64 years old  
(5)  
o 65-74 years old  
(6)  
o 75 years or older  
(7)  
 
 
 
 
 
Q28 What is your gender? 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Other  (3)  
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Q29 Which one of the following best describes your employment 
status? 
 
o Student  (1)  
o Housewife  (2)  
o Unemployed 
professional  (3)  
o Unemployed non-
professional  (4)  
o Employed Senior 
Executive  (5)  
o Employed staff  (6)  
 
o Self-employed 
professional services  
(7)  
o Self employed 
non-retail business 
owner (8)  
o Self-employed 
retail business owner  
(9)  
o Retired 
professional  (10)  
o Retired non-
professional  (11)  
o Other 
(SPECIFY)  (12) 
__________ 
 
 
 
 
Q30 Which of the following is the highest educational qualification 
that you have achieved? 
o Less than high school diploma or its equivalent  (1)  
o High school diploma or a high school equivalency 
certificate  (2)  
o Trade certificate or diploma  (3)  
o College, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or 
diploma (other than trades certificates or diplomas)  (4)  
o University certificate or diploma below the bachelor's 
level  (5)  
o Bachelor's degree (e.g. B.A., B.Sc., LL.B.)  (6)  
o University certificate, diploma, degree above the 
bachelor's level  (7)  
 
 
 
Q31 Can you estimate in which of the following groups your 
personal income falls? Was your total personal income during the 
year ending December 31, 2017... ? 
o Less than $5,000  
(1)  
o $5,000 to less 
than $10,000  (2)  
o $10,000 to less 
than $15,000  (3)  
o $15,000 to less 
than $20,000  (4)  
o $20,000 to less 
than $25,000  (5)  
o $25,000 to less 
than $30,000  (6)  
o $30,000 to less 
than $40,000  (7)  
 
o $40,000 to less 
than $50,000  (8)  
o $50,000 to less 
than $60,000  (9)  
o $60,000 to less 
than $70,000  (10)  
o $70,000 to less 
than $80,000  (11)  
o $80,000 to less 
than $90,000  (12)  
o $90,000 to less 
than $100,000  (13)  
o $100,000 and over  
(14)  
 
 
 
End of Block: Demographic Questions 
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Interview Questionnaire 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
ICT, THE SOMALI DIASPORA AND THE 
STABILIZATION OF A FAILED STATE 
 
 
 
Participant Demographic Information 
 
i) Name of the participant: _________________________________________________ 
 
ii) Name of organization: ___________________________________________________ 
 
iii) Job Title in organization: _________________________________________________ 
 
Open-Ended Interview Questions 
 
i. Can you describe how the Hawala system works? Who is your typical customer? What 
are the main reasons for sending money? 
 
 
 
ii. What are some of the processes that are used by your organization? What are some of the 
requested information from the sender and receiver? How does your organization secure 
customer information and your own networks? 
 
 
 
iii. What role does information communications technology play in the remittance system? 
Do people utilize mobile money/online services? Can you describe how that works? 
 
 
 
iv. From your perspective, what is the future of the Hawala system? Are there any 
innovations being tested now? 
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Appendix 19: Length of time sending money 
Q5_Length_Sending_Money Frequency Percent 
Less than a year 14 9.9 
Between 1 and 3 years 25 17.6 
Between 3 and 5 years 19 13.4 
More than 5 years 84 59.2 
Total 142 100.0 
 
Appendix 20: Length of time sending money by age range 
Q5_Length_Sending_Money 25-34 years old 
35-44 
years old 
45-54 
years old 
55 years 
or older 
Total 
Less than a year 
Frequency 8 3 1 2 14 
Percent 57.1% 21.4% 7.1% 14.3% 100.0% 
Between 1 and 3 years 
Frequency 9 7 5 3 24 
Percent 37.5% 29.2% 20.8% 12.5% 100.0% 
Between 3 and 5 years 
Frequency 5 6 3 5 19 
Percent 26.3% 31.6% 15.8% 26.3% 100.0% 
More than 5 years 
Frequency 11 21 24 24 80 
Percent 13.8% 26.3% 30.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Frequency 33 37 33 34 137 
Percent 24.1% 27.0% 24.1% 24.8% 100.0% 
 
Appendix 21: Reasons for sending money (select all that apply) 
Q20_Reasons_for_sending_money Frequency Percent 
For family expenses 89 62.2 
Purchase of land/property 3 2.1 
Paying off debts 13 9.1 
Savings 3 2.1 
Construction/repairing of house 10 7.0 
Mortgaging of land 2 1.4 
Investment/For running a business 3 2.1 
Sending family members abroad 11 7.7 
To assist in marriage 13 9.1 
Education of children 79 55.2 
To assist in buying food 92 64.3 
Purchasing of cattle/animals 3 2.1 
Medical treatment 79 55.2 
Lending of money to family member 4 2.8 
Celebration of Eid 60 42.0 
Other (SPECIFY) 3 2.1 
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Appendix 22: Somali MTOs used by remitters 
Q11_Somali_Agency Frequency Percent 
Amal Express 17 11.9 
Bakal Express 28 19.6 
Dahabshiil 47 32.9 
Iftin Express 13 9.1 
Juba Express 12 8.4 
Kaah Express Money Transfer 12 8.4 
Salama/Olympic Express 9 6.3 
Taaj Express 42 29.4 
Tawakal Express 18 12.6 
Other (SPECIFY) 3 2.1 
 
Appendix 23: Chi-Square tests for amounts sent and income levels (2X2 Tables) 
Q7b_Amount_Sent Less than $20,000 Others Total 
Less than 500 
Count 19 63 82 
Expected count 16.2 65.8 82.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.2 -1.2  
More than 500 
Count 8 47 55 
Expected count 10.8 44.2 55.0 
Adjusted Residual -1.2 1.2  
Total 
Count 27 110 137 
Expected count 27.0 110.0 137.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.548a 1 0.213   
Continuity Correctionb 1.051 1 0.305   
Likelihood Ratio 1.594 1 0.207   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.275 0.153 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.536 1 0.215   
N of Valid Cases 137     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.84. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Q7b_Amount_Sent $20,000 to less than $30,000 
Others Total 
Less than 500 
Count 19 63 82 
Expected count 19.8 62.2 82.0 
Adjusted Residual -0.3 0.3  
More than 500 
Count 14 41 55 
Expected count 13.2 41.8 55.0 
Adjusted Residual 0.3 -0.3  
Total 
Count 33 104 137 
Expected count 33.0 104.0 137.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .094a 1 0.759   
Continuity Correctionb 0.011 1 0.918   
Likelihood Ratio 0.094 1 0.760   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.839 0.456 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.093 1 0.760   
N of Valid Cases 137     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.25. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Q7b_Amount_Sent $30,000 to less than $50,000 
Others Total 
Less than 500 
Count 37 45 82 
Expected count 37.1 44.9 82.0 
Adjusted Residual 0.0 0.0  
More than 500 
Count 25 30 55 
Expected count 24.9 30.1 55.0 
Adjusted Residual 0.0 0.0  
Total 
Count 62 75 137 
Expected count 62.0 75.0 137.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mohamed Elmi   PhD. Thesis 223 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .001a 1 0.969   
Continuity Correctionb 0.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio 0.001 1 0.969   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 0.554 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.001 1 0.970   
N of Valid Cases 137     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.89. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Q7b_Amount_Sent $50,000 and over Others Total 
Less than 500 
Count 7 75 82 
Expected count 9.0 73.0 82.0 
Adjusted Residual -1.1 1.1  
More than 500 
Count 8 47 55 
Expected count 6.0 49.0 55.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.1 -1.1  
Total 
Count 15 122 137 
Expected count 15.0 122.0 137.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.219a 1 0.270   
Continuity Correctionb 0.681 1 0.409   
Likelihood Ratio 1.194 1 0.274   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.280 0.204 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.210 1 0.271   
N of Valid Cases 137     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.02. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Appendix 24: Communication frequency and amounts sent 
Q7b_Amount_Sent Less Frequently More Frequently Total 
Less than 500 
Count 28 55 83 
Expected count 33.7 49.3 83.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.0 2.0  
More than 500 
Count 28 27 55 
Expected count 22.3 32.7 55.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.0 -2.0  
Total 
Count 56 82 138 
Expected count 56.0 82.0 138.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.046a 1 0.044   
Continuity Correctionb 3.365 1 0.067   
Likelihood Ratio 4.035 1 0.045   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.053 0.033 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.017 1 0.045   
N of Valid Cases 138     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.32. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Appendix 25: Chi-Square tests for amounts sent and age ranges, gender, and employment status 
Q7b_Amount_Sent 
25-34 years 
old 
35-44 years 
old 
45-54 years 
old 
55 
years 
or 
older 
Total 
Less than 
500 
Count 23 18 17 23 81 
Expected count 19.2 21.6 19.8 20.4 81.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.6 -1.4 -1.1 1.1  
More than 
500 
Count 9 18 16 11 54 
Expected count 12.8 14.4 13.2 13.6 54.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.6 1.4 1.1 -1.1  
Total 
Count 32 36 33 34 135 
Expected count 32.0 36.0 33.0 34.0 135.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.199a 3 0.158 
Likelihood Ratio 5.259 3 0.154 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.049 1 0.825 
N of Valid Cases 135   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.80. 
 
When examining differences in age ranges, I created 2X2 tables of the 1 age range versus the other 
age ranges. For example, respondents between age 25 and 34 were 32.0% of the sample. A chi-
square test and found no relationship between the amounts sent and all four age ranges. 
 
Q7b_Amount_Sent Male Female Total 
Less than 500 
Count 50 31 81 
Expected count 49.2 31.8 81.0 
Adjusted Residual 0.3 -0.3  
More than 500 
Count 32 22 54 
Expected count 32.8 21.2 54.0 
Adjusted Residual -0.3 0.3  
Total Count 82 53 135 Expected count 82.0 53.0 135.0 
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Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .083a 1 0.773   
Continuity Correctionb 0.012 1 0.914   
Likelihood Ratio 0.083 1 0.774   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.858 0.456 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.082 1 0.774   
N of Valid Cases 135     
a. cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.20. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Q7b_Amount_Sent Employed Unemployed Total 
Less than 500 
Count 52 30 82 
Expected count 53.9 28.1 82.0 
Adjusted Residual -0.7 0.7  
More than 500 
Count 38 17 55 
Expected count 36.1 18.9 55.0 
Adjusted Residual 0.7 -0.7  
Total Count 90 47 137 Expected count 90.0 47.0 137.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .471a 1 0.493   
Continuity Correctionb 0.252 1 0.615   
Likelihood Ratio 0.474 1 0.491   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.583 0.309 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.467 1 0.494   
N of Valid Cases 137     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.87. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Appendix 26: Chi-Square tests for communication frequency, length and amounts sent 
Q24b_Communication_Frequency 
Less 
than 
500 
More 
than 
500 
Total 
Less Frequently 
Length 
Sending 
Money 
Less Years 
remitting 
Count 13 6 19 
Expected Count 9.5 9.5 19.0 
% 68.4% 31.6% 100.0% 
Adjusted Residual 2.0 -2.0   
More 
Years 
remitting 
Count 15 22 37 
Expected Count 18.5 18.5 37.0 
% 40.5% 59.5% 100.0% 
Adjusted Residual -2.0 2.0   
Total 
Count 28 28 56 
Expected Count 28.0 28.0 56.0 
% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
More Frequently 
Length 
Sending 
Money 
Less Years 
remitting 
Count 24 12 36 
Expected Count 24.1 11.9 36.0 
% 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Adjusted Residual -0.1 0.1   
More 
Years 
remitting 
Count 31 15 46 
Expected Count 30.9 15.1 46.0 
% 67.4% 32.6% 100.0% 
Adjusted Residual 0.1 -0.1   
Total 
Count 55 27 82 
Expected Count 55.0 27.0 82.0 
% 67.1% 32.9% 100.0% 
Total 
Length 
Sending 
Money 
Less Years 
remitting 
Count 37 18 55 
Expected Count 33.1 21.9 55.0 
% 67.3% 32.7% 100.0% 
Adjusted Residual 1.4 -1.4   
More 
Years 
remitting 
Count 46 37 83 
Expected Count 49.9 33.1 83.0 
% 55.4% 44.6% 100.0% 
Adjusted Residual -1.4 1.4   
Total 
Count 83 55 138 
Expected Count 83.0 55.0 138.0 
% 60.1% 39.9% 100.0% 
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 Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (1-
sided) 
Less 
Frequently 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.903c 1 0.048     
Continuity 
Correctionb 
2.868 1 0.090     
Likelihood Ratio 3.973 1 0.046     
Fisher's Exact Test       0.089 0.045 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.834 1 0.050     
N of Valid Cases 56         
More 
Frequently 
Pearson Chi-Square .005d 1 0.945     
Continuity 
Correctionb 
0.000 1 1.000     
Likelihood Ratio 0.005 1 0.945     
Fisher's Exact Test       1.000 0.565 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.005 1 0.945     
N of Valid Cases 82         
Total 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.938a 1 0.164     
Continuity 
Correctionb 
1.475 1 0.225     
Likelihood Ratio 1.958 1 0.162     
Fisher's Exact Test       0.214 0.112 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.924 1 0.165     
N of Valid Cases 138         
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.92. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.50. 
d. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.85. 
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Appendix 27: Zaad Mobile Money Registration form  
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Appendix 28: Chi-Square tests for online/mobile money, amounts sent and length of sending money 
Q13_Online/mobile_Money_Transfer 
Less 
Years 
remitting 
More 
Years 
remitting 
Total 
Yes Q7b_Amount_Sent 
Less than 
500 
Count 16 15 31 
Expected Count 12.5 18.5 31.0 
% 51.6% 48.4% 100.0% 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.0 -2.0  
More 
than 500 
Count 5 16 21 
Expected Count 8.5 12.5 21.0 
% 23.8% 76.2% 100.0% 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.0 2.0  
Total 
Count 21 31 52 
Expected Count 21.0 31.0 52.0 
%    
No Q7b_Amount_Sent 
Less than 
500 
 
Count 20 31 51 
Expected Count 20.2 30.8 51.0 
% 39.2% 60.8% 100.0% 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-0.1 0.1  
More 
than 500 
 
Count 14 21 35 
Expected Count 13.8 21.2 35.0 
% 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
Adjusted 
Residual 
0.1 -0.1  
Total Count 34 52 86 
Expected Count 34.0 52.0 86.0 
% 39.5% 60.5% 100.0% 
Total Q7b_Amount_Sent 
Less than 
500 
 
Count 36 46 82 
Expected Count 32.7 49.3 82.0 
% 43.9% 56.1% 100.0% 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.2 -1.2  
More 
than 500 
 
Count 19 37 56 
Expected Count 22.3 33.7 56.0 
% 33.9% 66.1% 100.0% 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.2 1.2  
Total Count 55 83 138 
Expected Count 55.0 83.0 138.0 
% 39.9% 60.1% 100.0% 
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 Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (1-
sided) 
Yes 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.020c 1 0.045   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
2.948 1 0.086   
Likelihood Ratio 4.157 1 0.041   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.083 0.042 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.942 1 0.047   
N of Valid Cases 52     
No 
Pearson Chi-Square .005d 1 0.942   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
0.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio 0.005 1 0.942   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 0.559 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.005 1 0.942   
N of Valid Cases 86     
Total 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.381a 1 0.240   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
0.996 1 0.318   
Likelihood Ratio 1.391 1 0.238   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.289 0.159 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.371 1 0.242   
N of Valid Cases 138     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.32. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.48. 
d. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.84. 
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